The court clarified that the amendment to Section 148(3) of the Municipal Corporations Act is prospective and does not apply retroactively to existing lease agreements.

JUDGMENT :

Akula Venkata Sesha Sai, J.

1. Since these two writ appeals arise from a common order, this Court deems it appropriate to hear these two appeals together and to dispose of by way of this common judgment.

2. Heard Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, representing the learned counsel for the appellants on record, and Sri K. Madhava Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation, apart from perusing the material available on record.

3. In these two writ appeals, common order, dated 07.03.2023, passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. Nos. 7430 and 13524 of 2022 is under challenge. W.A. No. 510 of 2023 is an appeal filed by the writ petitioner in W.P. No. 13524 of 2022 and W.A. No. 511 of 2023 is an appeal filed by the writ petitioner in W.P. No. 7430 of 2022.

4. On 12.04.1988, a registered Lease Deed was entered into between the appellant-Indian Oil Corporation Limited and the respondent-Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation for a period of 20 years, commencing from 01.04.1986 to 31.03.2006, in respect of the land situated in Sy. No. 298/B of Allipuram of Visakhapatnam, for establishment of a petroleum outlet by the appellant-Corporation. In terms of Clause 4 (iii) of the registered Lease Deed, dated 12.04.1988, the appellant-Corporation addressed a letter to the respondent-Municipal Corporation on 31.12.2005 requesting to extend the lease period for a further period of 20 years. In fact, vide letter, dated 12.02.2013, the respondent-Municipal Corporation informed the appellant-Corporation that the request for extension of the lease period cannot be considered. It is significant to note in this context that the appellant-Corporation made a representation to the State Government on 01.04.2013 with a request to extend the lease period in respect of the subject property for a further period of 20 years or more. Even according to the respondent-Municipal Corporation, the appellant-Corporation continued to be in possession of the subject property till 23.02.2022 i.e., till the date of holding panchnama at the instance of the respondent-Municipal Corporation.

5. Even after 12.02.2013, the respondent-Municipal Corporation vide a number of communications /proceedings extended the lease period from time to time, while informing the appellant-Corporation that the issue as regards the extension of lease period was pending consideration with the State Government. Eventually, pending such consideration, the respondent-Municipal Corporation vide notice, dated ...10.2020, which was sent on 09.08.2021, informed the appellant-Corporation that the difference of the lease amount has to be paid within seven days from the date of receipt of the notice, and in the event of any lapses or delay in payment of the difference of the lease amount, the vacant site should be handed over to the GVMC. Assailing the aforesaid notice, the authorised dealer of the appellant-Corporation, M/s. Prem Agencies, filed W.P. No. 7430 of 2022. According to the respondent-Municipal Corporation, after holding panchnama on 23.02.2022, physical possession of the subject land had already been taken by the respondent-Municipal Corporation. When the respondent-Municipal Corporation issued an auction notice, dated 01.05.2022, in respect of the subject property, the appellant-Corporation filed W.P. No. 13524 of 2022.

6. The learned Single Judge vide the impugned common order dismissed the writ petitions. Hence the present Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

7. It is contended by Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, representing the learned counsel for the appellants on record, that the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge, dismissing the writ petitions, confirming the impugned action of the respondent-Municipal Corporation, is highly erroneous, contrary to law, arbitrary, not in conformity with the settled principles of law, and also contrary to Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the