IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, BENCH AT AURANGABAD
RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.
Popat Sitaram Godge - Petitioner
Versus
The Registrar, Amrutwahini Udyog Sheti Va Shikshan Vikas Sansthan & Anr. - Respondents
Writ Petition No. 3778 of 1998 With Civil Application No. 1492 of 2006
Decided on : 01-10-2015
Delay Condonation - Employment Termination - Indian Limitation Act of 1963, Section 5 - The court discussed the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963, Section 5, and the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v/s Mst.Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 and Esha Bhattacharjee v/s Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649. The court emphasized the need for a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, and the importance of substantial justice over technical considerations. It also highlighted that there should be no presumption of deliberate delay and that lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
Fact of the Case:
The Petitioner filed a petition due to the refusal of the School Tribunal to condone the delay in preferring the appeal before the School Tribunal, following his termination from employment. The Respondent claimed that the Petitioner had abandoned his service, leading to his termination.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the Petitioner did not act intentionally or deliberately, and the delay caused was neither willful nor with oblique motives. It concluded that the impugned order deserved to be set aside to enable the Petitioner to challenge his termination.
Issues: The main issue was the refusal of the School Tribunal to condone the delay in the appeal filing, and the Respondent's claim of the Petitioner's abandonment of service.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the need for a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, and highlighted the importance of substantial justice over technical considerations. It also noted that there should be no presumption of deliberate delay and that lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
Final Decision: The Writ Petition was partly allowed to the extent of quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 04.07.1998. The delay was condoned, and the parties were directed to appear before the School Tribunal for further proceedings.
1. This matter was admitted by order dated 09.09.1999. I have gone through the petition paper book and I have considered the impugned order and the documents which form the part of the compilation.
2. The Petitioner has filed this petition on account of refusal of the School Tribunal in condoning the delay caused in preferring the appeal before the School Tribunal. The Application for condonation of delay Exhibit2 has been rejected by the impugned order dated 04.07.1998.
3. It appears from the record that the Petitioner, who was terminated on 22.05.1994, has filed the appeal on 14.08.1997. On advise, he initially preferred the civil suit before the Civil Court for challenging his termination. Further, on advise, he had filed a complaint before the Industrial Court and subsequently has filed a writ petition before this Court. The School Tribunal has recorded these aspects.
4. It was stated by the Petitioner before the School Tribunal that after he realized that the jurisdiction to deal with his termination dated 22.05.1994 was with the School Tribunal, he has withdrawn the petition and has filed the appeal before the School Tribunal. The School Tribunal has, therefore, recorded that from the date of withdrawal of the petition, six months have lapsed after which the appeal was filed. Hence, the application was rejected.
5. Shri R.N. Dhorde, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Respondents/Educational Institution, has drawn my attention to the affidavit in reply filed by the Respondents/Educational Institution on 27.07.1999. He points out that the Petitioner had remained absent and had abandoned his service. Hence, his service was terminated w.e.f. 27.05.1994.
6. He further points out that the Petitioner filed Regular Civil Suit No.327/1994 for challenging his termination before the Civil Court on 30.07.1994. Realizing that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, he withdrew the said suit on 15.11.1994. He, thereafter, filed Complaint (ULP) No.370/1994 on 24.11.1994 before the Industrial Court at Ahmednagar. The same was also withdrawn after realizing that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction. He then preferred Writ Petition No.334/1995 before this Court which was pending for almost two years. He sought liberty to withdraw the petition on 11.07.1997 so as to prefer an appeal before the School Tribunal.
7. Shri Dhorde, therefore, submits that these are mischievous acts on the part of the Petitioner. It was an attempt to choose a forum. Even after withdrawing the petition from this Court on 11.07.1997, his appeal was preferred after a lapse of six months. No leniency, therefore, deserves to be granted to the Petitioner inasmuch as this Court should not express any sympathy towards the Petitioner. He prays that this petition be dismissed with costs as the impugned order of the School Tribunal, which takes stock of the entire situation, is neither perverse nor erroneous and therefore, calls for no interference.
8. I have considered the submissions of the learned Advocates for the rival sides.
9. The Apex Court, in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v/s Mst.Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353, while dealing with the issue of delay, has observed in paragraph 3 as under:-
“3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the lifepurpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that
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New India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840]
N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [AIR 1998 SC 3222]
State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132]
O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (dead) and others [(1984) 4 SCC 66]
Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575]
Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Nirmala Devi [(1979) 4 SCC 365]
Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770]
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