An order terminating the arbitral proceedings under Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is not equivalent to an arbitral award and cannot be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. The remedy for such an order is only under Section 14(2) of the said Act.

ORDER :

The present appeal raises a question as regards remedy available to the appellant herein, in respect of an order dated 09.01.2014 passed by a sole arbitrator, for the reason that by the impugned judgement and order, the District Court has held that an application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by the appellant was not maintainable. Since the District Court rendered a finding that the application under Section 34 of the said Act itself was not maintainable, there was no discussion on the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the arbitrator.

2. The learned counsel for the parties have made submissions with regard to the scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the said Act, in the backdrop of the aspect of termination of arbitral proceedings under Section 32 thereof, with particular reference to the concept of termination of mandate of the arbitrator touching upon Sections 14 and 15 of the said Act. The learned counsel for the parties have referred to various judgements in the said context pertaining to termination of the mandate of an arbitrator, as opposed to the termination of the arbitral proceedings themselves, which has become a bone of contention between the parties. This Court is called upon to consider the same and a finding on the said aspect would result in the present appeal being either allowed and the matter being remanded to the District Court, or the appellant being advised to resort to appropriate proceedings, particularly under Section 14 of the said Act.

3. A brief reference to facts would be necessary. The appellant, being the original claimant, is the owner of a piece of land at Village Wagholi, District Pune, Maharashtra. Respondent No.1 was a dealer of respondent No.2 - Indian Oil Corporation Limited. Respondent No.2 Corporation had granted the dealership to respondent No.1 for running a petrol pump at Wagholi. In that context, respondent No.1 approached the appellant and a lease deed was executed in favour of respondent No.1 for a period of 30 years, with an option for renewal of 10 years. As per the terms of the lease, respondent No.1 was to execute a sub-lease in favour of respondent No.2. Accordingly, in terms of the registered lease deed dated 29.09.2001, executed in favour of respondent No.1, he executed a registered sub-lease dated 15.03.2002 in favour of respondent No.2.

4. According to the appellant, respondent Nos.1 and 2 were never punctual in payment of rent and they also failed to pay taxes within time to the government, as also the grampanchayat. As a result of the default, the grampanchayat issued a demand notice to the appellant. In this backdrop, the appellant sent a letter to the respondents to remedy their breaches. Despite notice, the respondents failed to comply with the demands made in the said notice and in that light, as disputes had arisen between the parties, the appellant invoked the arbitration clause contained in the lease deed.

5. In the exchange of communications between the parties in that context, the respondent No.1 informed the appellant that respondent No.2 had appointed another person as a dealer of the petrol pump and effectively, respondent No.1 had been evicted from the premises. According to the appellant, this was also a serious breach of the lease deed as well as the sub-lease deed. The arbitrator, being an officer of respondent No.2, took up the proceedings and the appellant filed his claim petition. In the written submissions that were filed before the arbitrator, it came to light that respondent No.2 had withdrawn the letter of intent for dealership issued to respondent No.1 on the basis of a decision of the Committee of Judges appointed by the Supreme Court in its judgement and order dated 12.01.2007. In this backdrop, respondent No.2 filed a case under the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants Act, 1971 before the Estate Officer against respondent No.1 as well as one Tushar Kshirsagar, who was