The court emphasized that remand orders should not be issued lightly and that jurisdictional issues must be decided by the appellate authority when sufficient evidence is available.

JUDGMENT :

M.S. Sonak, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. The learned counsel for the parties agree that both these Petitions can be disposed of by a common order.

3. Accordingly, we issue Rule in both these Petitions. The rule is made returnable immediately at the request of and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties.

4. In Writ Petition No.9344 of 2024, the Petitioner – HDFC Bank Limited (HDFC), vide prayer clause (a) challenges Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal’s common order dated 26 April 2024 disposing of Appeal Nos. 2 of 2018 and 32 of 2018. In alternative to prayer (a), the Petitioner, vide prayer clause (b) seeks a declaration that the amount the Petitioner claims from the Respondents constitutes, a “debt” under Section 2(g) of the Recovery of Debts And Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (‘the said Act’) and for quashing of the common order dated 26 April 2024. Further, in alternative to prayer clauses (a) and (b), the Petitioner, vide prayer clause (c), in addition to quashing the common order dated 26 April 2024, seeks a direction to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal to decide whether the Petitioner’s claim constitutes a debt within meaning of Section 2(g) of the said Act.

5. In Writ Petition No. 12708 of 2024, the Petitioner -Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait, B.S.C. (“BBK”) seeks a modification of the common order dated 26 April 2024 to the extent of directing the HDFC to release the amount of Rs.20,70,44,806.75/- along with accrued interest, lying in the No-Lien account with the HDFC to the BBK.

6. Since both the Petitions concerned with the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal’s (“DRAT”) common order dated 26 April 2024, it is only appropriate that they are disposed of by a common judgment and order.

7. Mr. Virag Tuljapurkar, learned Senior Advocate for the HDFC, submitted that the Respondents’ Appeals against Debts Recovery Tribunal’s (“DRT”) order dated 26 October 2005 (Exhibit K) were withdrawn by the Respondents. Therefore, the finding in DRT’s order dated 26 October 2005 that the HDFC’s claim constituted a “debt” under Section 2(g) of the said Act attained finality. He submitted that event the DRAT directed adjudication of the HDFC’s original application “on merits”, which means whether the debt was indeed payable based on the evidence on record. He submitted that there is no justification for the DRAT not to rule on this specific issue in its common order dated 26 April 2004. He submitted that this was a case of failure to exercise jurisdiction warranting interference with the impugned order.

8. Mr Viraag Tulzapurkar, without prejudice, submitted that this matter did not involve any seriously disputed questions of fact. The entire material was before the DRAT. No case was made out for a remand. The settled principles regarding remand of matters were not followed by the DRAT. Accordingly, the impugned common order dated 26 April 2024 be set aside and the DRAT be directed to decide all the issues in the Appeals instituted by the Respondents against the DRT’s order. Mr Viraag Tulzapurkar relied upon Arvind Kumar Jaiswal (D) THR. LR Vs. Devendra Prasad Jaiswal Varun, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 146, Ashwinkumar K Patel Vs. Upendra J. Patel and others, (1999) 3 SCC 161, Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad Vs. Sunder Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 485 and S. P. Builders & Ors. Vs Chairperson, Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors., 2006 SCC OnLine All 908 in support of his contentions.

9. Dr Birendra Saraf, learned Senior Advocate for BBK, tendered a copy of the purshis in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 89 of 2006 and submitted that leave was sought to withdraw the Appeal with liberty to raise all contentions, including the contention of jurisdiction as to whether the HDFC’s claim constituted a debt before the DRT. He submitted that the DRAT by order dated 11 July 2014 disposing of Respondents’ Appeals allowed the Respondents to withdraw their Appeals by keeping open all contentions, including contentions going to the jurisdiction of the DRT to