PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
LONG NOTE
Surya Kant Pramjeet Singh and R.P. Nagrath, JJ.
M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. —Petitioner
versus
M/s. Atma Tube Products Ltd and Ors. —Respondents
CRM No. 790 MA of 2010 (O&M) with
CR MA No. 547 MA of 2011 (O&M)
Decided on 18.3.2013

IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) Expression “victim” as defined in Section 2(wa) includes all categories of legal heirs for the purpose of engaging an Advocate under Section 24(8) or to prefer an appeal under proviso to Section 372 of the Code.
(2) Legal heirs comprising only wife, husband, parent and child of a deceased victim are entitled to payment of compensation under Section 357(l)(c) of the Code.
(3) Only those dependents of a deceased victim who have suffered loss or injury as a result of crime and require rehabilitation, are eligible to seek compensation as per Scheme formulated under Section 357A of the Code.
(4) ‘Victim’, who is not complainant in a private complaint case, is not entitled to prefer appeal against acquittal under proviso to Section 372 and his right to appeal, continues to be governed by un-amended provisions read with Section 378 (4) of the Code.

Headnote:(i) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 372, Proviso and 378 read with Section 2(wa)—Appeal against acquittal—Whether word “victim” as mentioned in proviso of Section 372 Cr.P.C. include complainant also for the purpose of availing remedy of appeal—A person who has suffered injury is ‘victim’ within meaning of Section 2(wa)—Similarly, if as a result of aggravated form of victimization, such ‘victim’ of first part does not survive, second part of definition of ‘victim’ as defined in Section 2(wa) of Code substitutes first part and becomes operative whereupon guardian or legal heirs of deceased victim step in for the ‘victims’ for varied purposes under the Code.

       Held: It is so acte clear that a person who has suffered an injury in body or mind or reputation or to his/her property or if such person has been caused loss of property, to which he is legally entitled to, unlawfully at the hands of another person who has been charged as an accused, is the ‘victim’ within the meaning of Section 2(wa). Similarly, if as a result of the aggravated form of victimization, such ‘victim’ of first part does not survive, the second part of the definition of ‘victim’ as defined in Section 2(wa) of the Code substitutes the first part and becomes operative whereupon the guardian (if such ‘victim’ was a minor or of unsound mind) or the legal heirs of the deceased victim, as the case may be, step in for the ‘victims’ for the varied purposes under the Code.

       (ii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 372, Proviso and 378 read with Section 2(wa)—Appeal against acquittal—Whether word “victim” as mentioned in proviso of Section 372 Cr.P.C. include complainant also for the purpose of availing remedy of appeal—Every heir who, in law, is entitled to succeed to estate of a deceased ‘victim’ in one or other eventuality, shall fall within ambit of Section 2(wa) of Code, even if estate of such deceased ‘victim’ is to devolve upon legal heirs as per order of preference prescribed under personal law of such ‘victim’—Both expressions “guardian” and “legal heir” are relatable to some other rights given to a ‘victim’ under the Code including one under proviso to Section 24(8) to engage an Advocate’ with permission of Court and other substantive ‘right to appeal’ under proviso to Section 372 of Code.

       Held: Vasant Pratap Pandit & Anr. v. Anant Trimbak Sabnis (Dr.)18, explained that the word “heir” may be construed both in a wider as well as in a narrower sense and therefore, which sense would be applicable to the facts of a particular case would depend upon the intention and scheme of the particular legislation in which the question occurred.

       Since the expression “legal heir” has not been used in Section 2(wa) for the purpose of non-testamentary succession including entitlement to compensation under the Code, it must be safely inferred and construed that both the expressions “guardian” and “legal heir” are relatable to some other rights given to a ‘victim’ under the Code including the one under proviso to Section 24(8) to engage an advocate’ with the permission of the Court and the other substantive ‘right to appeal’ under proviso to Section 372 of the Code.

       (iii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 372, Proviso and 378 read with Section 2(wa)—Appeal against acquittal—Right to ‘engage an advocate’ given to a ‘victim’ draws parity from right to fair trial guaranteed to an accused and is essentially meant to enable Court to have viewpoint of a ‘victim’ who remained discounted for years and to whom Legislature unambiguously intends to provide a presence and appearance before Court—Since very object of this right is to give restricted participation in trial to ‘victim’ and assist Court to arrive at a just conclusion, it is not necessary nor Code perceives so that only that ‘legal heir’ who has preferential entitlement to succeed to property of an intestate, alone shall be competent to engage such Advocate—Meaning of term “victim” or that of his/her “legal heir” deserves to be given widest amplitude to meet with all kinds of peculiar or unforeseen situations.

       Held: The right to ‘engage an advocate’ given to a ‘victim’ draws parity from the right to fair trial guaranteed to an accused and is essentially meant to enable the Court to have the viewpoint of a ‘victim’ who remained discounted for years and to whom the Legislature unambiguously intends to provide a presence and appearance before the Court. Since the very object of this right is to give restricted participation in trial to the ‘victim’ and assist the Court to arrive at a just conclusion, it is not necessary nor the Code perceives so that only that ‘legal heir’ who has preferential entitlement to succeed to the property of an intestate, alone shall be competent to engage such advocate. The ‘right to appeal’ under proviso to Section 372 at the best enables the Appellate Court to call for the records, reappraise the evidence and determine: (i) whether acquittal of the accused is justified? Or (ii) whether the accused has been rightly convicted for a lesser offence? Or (iii) whether the compensation determined under Section 357 is inadequate? Such an exercise, in our humble opinion, can be undertaken by the appellate court on presentation of appeal by any ‘legal heir’ irrespective of his proximity with the deceased under the personal law. Any narrow construction would defeat the very legislative object behind insertion of Section 2(wa) and proviso to Section 372 of the Code and re-introduce the mischief which the Legislature has intended to remove.

       It was contended and rightly so that the meaning of the term “victim” or that of his/her “legal heir” deserves to be given widest amplitude to meet with all kinds of peculiar or unforeseen situations, two of which are illustratively given below»

        (a) where a major, unmarried orphan is murdered and the accused person(s)/undertrial(s) was/were acquitted of the charges and the State does not prefer an appeal against the acquittal.

        (b) where the entire family is murdered and the accused person(s)/under trial was/were acquitted of the charges and the State does not prefer an appeal against the acquittal.

       In both the mis-happenings there may not be any person known as ‘legal heir’ or a ‘guardian’ to file an appeal against unwarranted acquittal and it will be against all canons of justice to say that the appellate Court in such like situations would be helpless and the offenders will go unpunished. Since the Legislature has finally granted the right to appeal to a ‘victim’, it is the duty of the Court to trenchantly affirm such right and provide appropriate remedy.

       (iv) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 357 , 357A , 372, Proviso and 378 read with Section 2(wa)—Appeal against acquittal—Right to ‘engage an advocate’ or to ‘prefer an appeal’ under proviso to Section 372 does not ipso facto entitle appellant to claim compensation as a ‘legal heir’ or next of kin of a deceased ‘victim’—Every class or category of legal heirs of a deceased ‘victim’ can have locus to invoke remedy under proviso to Section 372 of Code, without reading into Section 2( wa) that if Class-I legal heir of a ‘victim’ opts out of filing any appeal, other legal heirs would also suffer from same disability—Legislative intendment can be given its fullest effect by permitting all legal heirs, irrespective of their classification under personal law to prefer appeal under proviso to Section 372—Such a purposive interpretation of expression “legal heir” within meaning of Section 2(wa) does no violence to nor does it conflict with Section 357 or 357A of Code.

       Held: We say so also for the reason that the right to ‘engage an advocate’ or to ‘prefer an appeal’ under proviso to Section 372 does not ipso facto entitle the appellant to claim compensation as a ‘legal heir’ or the next of kin of a deceased ‘victim’. That being so, every class or category of legal heirs of a deceased ‘victim’ can have locus to invoke the remedy under proviso to Section 372 of the Code, without reading into Section 2(wa) that if Class-I legal heir of a ‘victim’ opts out of filing any appeal, the other legal heirs would also suffer from the same disability.

       The legislative intentment can be given its fullest effect by permitting all legal heirs, irrespective of their classification under the personal law to prefer appeal under proviso to Section 372. Such a purposive interpretation of the expression “legal heir” within the meaning of Section 2(wa) does no violence to nor does it conflict with Section 357 or 357A of the Code. Even if a Class-II legal heir prefers an appeal say against inadequate compensation, the appellate court in the event of enhancement of compensation shall be obligated to disburse the enhanced amount to those persons only who are entitled to the same under Sections 357(1)(c) or 357A of the Code, as the case may be. We, therefore, hold that the expression “legal heir” within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the Code does not exclude other than the Class-I legal heirs of a deceased ‘victim’ nor the right to ‘engage an advocate’ or prefer an appeal is restricted to those persons only to whom compensation is payable under Sections 357, 357A of the Code or under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855.

       (v) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 378—Appeal against acquittal—Victim’ in complaint cases cannot have a remedy superior to that of complainant—Complainant’ in a complaint case who is a ‘victim’ also, shall continue to avail remedy of appeal against acquittal under Section 378(4) only except where he succeeds in establishing guilt of accused but is aggrieved at conviction for a lesser offence or imposition of an inadequate compensation, for which he shall be entitled to avail remedy of appeal under proviso to Section 372—Victim’, who is not complainant in a private complaint case, is not entitled to prefer appeal against acquittal under proviso to Section 372 and his right to appeal continues to be governed by unamended provisions read with Section 378 (4) of Code—Legislature has given no separate entity to a ‘victim’ in complaint case filed by a public servant under a special Statute and appeal against acquittal in such a case can also be availed by ‘complainant’ of that case under Section 3 78(4) of Code only.

       Held: The above discussion thus can be summed up to say that:

        (i) the ‘complainant’ in a complaint case who is a ‘victim’ also, shall continue to avail the remedy of appeal against acquittal under Section 378(4) only except where he/she succeeds in establishing the guilt of an accused but is aggrieved at the conviction for a lesser offence or imposition of an inadequate compensation, for which he/she shall be entitled to avail the remedy of appeal under proviso to Section 372;

        (ii) the ‘victim’, who is not the complainant in a private complaint-case, is not entitled to prefer appeal against acquittal under proviso to Section 372 and his/her right to appeal, if any, continues to be governed by the unamended provisions read with Section 378(4) of the Code;

        (iii) the Legislature has given no separate entity to a ‘victim’ in the complaint case filed by a public servant under a special Statute and the appeal against acquittal in such a case can also be availed by the ‘complainant’ of that case under Section 378(4) of the Code only.

        (iv) those ‘victims’ of complaint cases whose right to appeal have been recognized under proviso to Section 372, are not required to seek ‘leave’ or ‘special leave’ to appeal from the High Court in the manner contemplated under Section 378(3) & (4), for the Legislature while enacting proviso to Section 372 has prescribed no such fetter nor has it applied the same language used for appeals against acquittals while enacting sub-section (3) & (4) of Section 378 of the Code.

       (vi) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 378—Appeal against acquittal—Right to challenge conviction or acquittal or any other sentence or order, emanates only from Statute—Scheme of Code after various amendments, confers right of appeal only on four categories of persons; (i) accused; (ii) State; (iii) victim; and (iv) complainant in complaint cases, and none else—A ‘victim’ who happens to be ‘complainant’ in police case, if files appeal against acquittal is not required to take ‘leave’ under Section 378 of Code—Varied rights given to State, victim or a complainant under Chapter XXIX of Code are not inter se dependent and each right operates within its own sphere— Legislative scheme does not permit an inter se comparison of rights or duties granted or assigned to a ‘victim’ or State—Right(s) of a ‘victim’ under amended Code are substantive and not mere brutam fulmen—These are not accessory or auxiliary to those of State and are totally incomparable as both sets of rights or duties operate in different and their respective fields—A ‘victim’ is not obligated to seek ‘leave’ or ‘special leave’ of High Court for presentation of appeal under proviso to Section 372 of Code.

       Held: Right to challenge a conviction or acquittal or any other sentence or order, emanates only from a Statute. The scheme of the Code after various amendments, confers right of appeal only on four categories of persons; (i) accused; (ii) State; (iii) victim; and (iv) complainant in complaint cases, and none else. In tune with what has been discussed above, the correct interpretation, in our opinion, would be that a ‘victim’ who happens to be the ‘complainant’ in the police case, if files appeal against acquittal is not required to take ‘leave’ under Section 378 of the Code. To this extent we are, therefore, unable to agree, with reverence, to the view taken by the Full Bench of Gujarat High Court and hold that the ‘victim’ (including a complainant in a police case) is not required to apply for or obtain any leave under Section 378(4) of the Code nor such a ‘victim’ is required to seek leave in cases where appeal is against inadequacy of compensation and punishment for lesser offence.

        It hardly calls for a debate that the varied rights given to the State, the victim or a complainant under Chapter XXIX of the Code are not inter se dependent and each right operates within its own sphere. For example, the State has got a right to appeal on the ground of inadequacy of sentence [Section 377] but a victim (including complainant who is also a victim in police case) has got no such right though he/she can prefer appeal if the accused is convicted for a lesser offence. State has no right to appeal against conviction of an accused for a lesser offence. The legislative scheme thus does not permit an inter se comparison of the rights or duties granted or assigned to a ‘victim’ or the State under the aforestated Chapter of the Code.

       The cumulative effect of the above discussion is that the right(s) of a ‘victim’ under the amended Code are substantive and not mere brutam fulmen hence these are not accessory or auxiliary to those of the State and are totally incomparable as both the sets of rights or duties operate in different and their respective fields. We thus hold that a ‘victim’ is not obligated to seek ‘leave’ or ‘special leave’ of the High Court for presentation of Appeal under proviso to Section 372 of the Code.

       (vii) Constitution of India—Article 21—Right to live with dignity— Right to live with human dignity without any fear or actual subjection to any kind of unlawful, unsocial and physical or mental abuse and be a member of the self-regulated civic society too is one of most cherished fundamental right bestowed on every person under Article 21 of Constitution—Protection or conferment of certain rights on a victim under the Code cannot be mirrored as a favour shown to him by Legislature—These are only a minuscule part of fundamental rights of vast magnitude guaranteed under Constitution—State as a custodian of power for enforcement of rule of law owes a corresponding duty to protect these Fundamental Rights—Presentation of appeal against an unmerited and reckless acquittal is also an integral duty of a welfare State, who has overall control over law and order and public order of area under its jurisdiction even if such a duty has been assigned by Legislature as a right’ in literal sense.

       Held: Right to live with human dignity without any fear or actual subjection to any kind of unlawful, unsocial and physical or mental abuse and be a member of the self-regulated civic society too is one of the most cherised fundamental right bestowed on every person under Article 21 of the Constitution. The protection or conferment of certain rights on a victim under the Code therefore cannot be mirrored as a favour shown to him/her by the Legislature. These are only a minuscule part of the fundamental rights of vast magnitude guaranteed under the Constitution. The State as a custodian of the power for enforcement of the rule of law owes a corresponding duty to protect these Fundamental Rights. The State also performs the duty of parens patriae besides making an endeavour to fulfill the promises contained in Articles 38 or 39A of the Constitution. The right to prosecute a wrong-doer, to bring his guilt home and to compel such guilty person to undergo the awarded sentence is an essential part of the State’s enormous duties. The presentation of appeal against an unmerited and reckless acquittal is also an integral duty of a welfare State, who “has an overall control over the law and order and public order of the area under its jurisdiction”, even if such a duty has been assigned by the Legislature as a ‘right’ in the literal sense. State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal & Ors.34 lends full support to us in this regard when it holds that “The State does not in pursuing or conducting a criminal case or an appeal, espouse any right of its own but really vindicates the cause of society at large, to prevent recurrence as well as punish offences and offenders respectively, in order to preserve orderliness in society and avert anarchy, by upholding the rule of law”.

       (viii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 372 and 378—Appeal against acquittal—Scheme of Code nowhere discerns that Legislature ever intended to create two parallel streams for adjudication of appeal(s) against same order—Section 372 lays emphasis that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order except as provided for by this Code—Action in respect of a non-cognizable offence can be initiated only by filing a private complaint before Magistrate and against acquittal in such a case appellate recourse lies under Section 378(4) of Code.

       Held: Similarly, the scheme of the Code nowhere discerns that the Legislature ever intended to create two parallel streams for adjudication of appeal(s) against the same order. Contrary to it, Section 3 72 lays emphasis that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order except as provided for by this Code. That apart, the literal interpretation of proviso to Section 372 or Section 378(l)(a) & (b) of the Code leads to a piquant, anomalous and absurd situation of utter confusion where the Court of Session would have no choice but to await the outcome of the appeal preferred by the State before the •High Court and then perform its bounden duty to follow that decision of the superior Court to negate, for all intents and purposes, the right to appeal of a ‘victim’ contrary to the legislative object behind insertion of the proviso to Section 372 of the Code.

       The only effective modicum to meet with the situation as we perceive can be to interpret and construe Section 378(1)(a) in such a manner that the State’s appeal(s) in respect of all the cognizable offences (whether bailable or non-bailable) are presented to the Court of Session, for such a recourse is the least harmful, non-prejudicial and substantively conforms to the legislative vision underlying the amendments carried out in the Code in the years 2005 and 2009. This can be feasible if the word “and” contained in Clause (a) of Section 378(1) of the Code is read as “or” so that the appeal preferred by the State against an order of acquittal passed by the Magistrate in respect of every cognizable offence, whether bailable or not, lies to the Court of Session only. We hasten to add that the action in respect of a non-cognizable offence can be initiated only by filing a private complaint before the Magistrate and against acquittal in such a case the appellate recourse lies under Section 378(4) of the Code.

       (ix) Interpretation of Statute—Purposive construction—In those cases where language used in a Statute is capable of bearing more than one construction, Court in its attempt to find out true meaning shall have due regard to consequences of alternative constructions so as to avoid resultant hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice, absurdity, inconsistency or a ‘straight clash’ between two Sections of same Act—When a choice has to be made out of two given constructions both of which require reading of some additional words, Court will naturally prefer one which is more in consonance with reason or justice—Court would invariably be reluctant to create casus omissus where there is none, nor shall insert a desired provision in an enactment as it will amount to legislating and not construing Statute—However, where a vacuum caused in a Statute due to omission by its draftsman forestalls Court to construe it consistent with its legislative policy, it becomes bounden duty of Court to fill in such gap and secure object of Statute.

       Held: In those cases where the language used in a Statute is capable of bearing more than one construction, the Court in its attempt to find out the true meaning shall have due regard to the consequences of alternative constructions so as to avoid the resultant hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice, absurdity, inconsistency or a ‘straight clash’ between two Sections of the same Act. In Venkataramana Deyaru v. State of Mysore, the Supreme Court held that “the rule of construction is well-settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be re-concealed with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both ...”. Thus, a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a ‘useless’, ‘lumber’ or ‘dead-letter’ is not a harmonious construction as ‘to harmonise is not to destroy’. [Ref. (i) JK Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of UP & Ors.; and (ii) Calcutta Gas Co. (Prop.) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Ors.] An equally acceptable principle and oftenly pressed into aid is that when a choice has to be made out of the two given constructions, both of which require reading of some additional words, the Court will naturally prefer the one which is more in consonance with reason or justice. [Ref. Ramaswamy Nadar v. State of Madras]

       (x) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 372 and 378—Appeal against acquittal—As to fair balance that is needed to be struck between interests of a ‘victim’ and those of State, it appears more appropriate, just, fair and proper not to compel ‘victim’ to go to High Court instead State can be detoured to present its appeal to Sessions Court even against order of acquittal passed by Magistrate in respect of cognizable and bailable offence—Legislative intent ‘underlying Section 378(1)(a) and 2(a) is to provide a distinct forum of appeals against acquittal passed by Magistrate in relation to cognizable offences—Recourse so suggested is most viable substitute which neither jeopardizes rights of parties nor dilutes legislative intention—It also does not traverse through unknown jurisprudential principles as interpretative power of Court to notice omission of a draftsman vis-a-vis Legislature’s intention and to abridge that distance is well recognized—While in view of proviso to Section 372 an appeal preferred by a ‘victim’ against order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable offence whether bailable or non-bailable shall lie to Court of Session, State’s appeal under Section 378(1)(a) of Code against that order shall also be entertained and/or transferred to same Sessions Court.

       Held: As to the fair balance that is needed to be struck between the interests of a ‘victim’ and those of the State, it appears more appropriate, just, fair and proper not to compel the ‘victim’ to go to High Court instead the State can be detoured to present its appeal to the Sessions Court even against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of cognizable and bailable offence. The Legislative intent ‘underlying Section 378(1)(a) and 2(a) is to provide a distinct forum of appeals against acquittal passed by the Magistrate in relation to cognizable offences. The recourse so suggested is the most viable substitute which neither jeopardizes the rights of the parties nor dilutes the legislative intention. It also does not traverse through unknown jurisprudential principles as the interpretative power of the Court to notice the omission of a draftsman vis-a-vis the Legislature’s intention and to abridge that distance is well recognized. There is adequate jurisprudence bearing directly on the issue that may be briefly noticed at this juncture.

       In the light of the above discussion, we hold that while in view of proviso to Section 372 an appeal preferred by a ‘victim’ against the order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable offence whether bailable or non-bailable shall lie to the Court of Session, the State’s appeal under Section 378(1)(a) of the Code against that order shall also be entertained and/or transferred to the same Sessions Court.

       (xi) Interpretation of Statute—Prospective legislation—Every Statute shall be presumed prospective in operation unless Legislature expressly by necessary implication gives retrospective effect to it—These very principles apply in case of an amendment in a Statute—If amendment intends to create a substantive right or if it affects vested right, it shall ordinarily be prospective in nature though an amendment in procedural law like relating to form and limitation can be applied retrospectively.

       Held: It is equally well-established that every Statute shall be presumed prospective in operation unless the Legislature expressly or by necessary implication gives retrospective effect to it. No such inference can possibly be drawn, even remotely, in the instant case. Otherwise also, it is one of the cardinal principles of statutory interpretation that a Statute dealing with substantive rights shall be prospective unless there are words in the Statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights. Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary says that “a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past”. These principles have been laid down and reiterated in a string of decisions including in (i) Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay; (ii) Arjan Singh v. State of Punjab; (iii) Ex. Capt. KC Arora & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.; and (iv) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rameshwar Rathod.

       These very principles apply in the case of an amendment in a Statute. If the amendment intends to create a substantive right or if it affects the vested right, it shall ordinarily be prospective in nature though an amendment in the procedural law like relating to form and limitation can be applied retrospectively. These principles have been extensively discussed and summed up by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent decision in Ramesh Kumar Son; v. State of Madhya Pradesh.

       (xii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 372 and 378—Limitation Act, 1963—Articles 114 and 115—Appeal against acquittal—Limitation—Mere delay in approaching court of law would not by itself afford a ground for dismissing case though it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching final verdict—Aggrieved person is expected to approach appellate court within reasonable period—For appeal against acquittal filed by a ‘victim’ to High Court period of limitation would be 90 days and where such appeal lies to Sessions Court such period shall be 60 days—For appeal against any other order, reasonable period would be 60 days to High Court and 30 days for appeals to Sessions Court from orders passed by Magistrate—Limitation period of ninety, sixty and thirty days, as the case may be, prescribed above maintainability of appeal by a victim, ought to be counted from date such ‘victim’ acquires knowledge of order appealable under proviso to Section 372.

       Held: The Supreme Court in Japani Sahoo v. Chander SHekhar Mohanty observed that mere delay in approaching the court of law would not by itself afford a ground for dismissing the case though it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching the final verdict. There is no gainsaying that where no period of limitation is expressly provided to prefer an appeal, the aggrieved person is expected to approach the appellate court within a reasonable period. The ‘reasonableness’ of the period within which an appeal may be preferred, however, is, purely a question of fact and will have to be determined keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.

       The Legislative intentment behind Articles 114 & 115(b) of the Limitation Act in prescribing the period of limitation for appeals to the High Court or to the Court of Session against different type of orders is the best guiding factor to determine reasonableness of the period of limitation for an appeal preferable at the instance of a ‘victim’ also. It would, therefore, be reasonable to view that for appeal against acquittal filed by a ‘victim’ to the High Court the period of limitation would be 90 days and where such appeal lies to the Sessions Court such period shall be 60 days. For appeal against any other order, the reasonable period would be 60 days to the High Court and 30 days for appeals to the Sessions Court from the orders passed by the Magistrate, as the case may be.

       The limitation period of ninety, sixty and thirty days, as the case may be, prescribed above for the maintainability of an appeal by a victim, in our considered view, ought to be counted from the date such ‘victim’ acquires knowledge of the order appealable under proviso to Section 372. We say so for the reason that in most of the State cases, the ‘victim’ has no participatory role at the trial stage and the possibility of his/her remaining in the dark about the adverse order cannot be lightly brushed aside. The above rule of limitation, therefore, cannot be mechanically enforced even if the victim had no informed knowledge regarding culmination of the trial proceedings as it might cause serious prejudice to his/her rights, close to the extent of snatching away the right to appeal earned by the victims after a long drawn battle.