PATNA HIGH COURT
Dipak Misra, Mihir Kumar Jha and Jyoti Saran JJ.
Jitendra Kumar Verma S/o Sri Ramji Pd.Verma
Versus
State Of Bihar Through The Principal Secretary, Urban Development & Housing Department, Govt.Of Bihar, Patna
Letter Patent Appeal No. 618 of 2010
Decided On : MAY 11, 2010
(Paras 19, 21 and 27)
CWJC No. 1067/10- Set aside.
(2001) 8 SCC 540; AIR 2002 SC 1334; AIR 2005 SC 648; 2731- Relied on.
AIR 2002 SC 834- Referred to.
Interpretation of statute-Court cannot enlarge scope of legislative intent when language of statute is plain and unambi guous-Court has to discover true legislative intendment-Court cannot recast legislation.
(Paras 22 and 27)
Dipak Misra, J.
1. Questioning the defensibility and legal sustainability of the order dated 23.2.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 1067 of 2010, the present intra-Court appeal has been preferred under Clause-X of the Letters Patent. When the matter was listed before the Division Bench on 13.4.2010, the Division Bench, after referring, to Section 27 of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 (for brevity the Act) and taking note of the decision rendered in Jagdish Singh V/s. The State of Bihar & Ors., (CWJC No. 9380 of 2008), decided on 14th November, 2008 and further the reliance placed by Mr. Y.V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the contesting respondent no. 6, on Section 21 of the Act, especially sub-section (3) of Section 21, thought it appropriate that the matter should be heard by a larger Bench as there are certain observations in the decision rendered in Jagdish Singh (supra). On the basis of the aforesaid order, the larger Bench has been constituted and the matter has been placed before us.
2. Bereft of unnecessary details, the facts which are essential for adjudication of this appeal are that the 6th respondent- writ petitioner, challenged the Governments direction contained in Memo No. 6020 dated 18.12.2009 issued by the Department of Urban Development and Housing to the effect that notwithstanding the change of Chief Councillor (Mayor), the Empowered Standing Committee (for short the Committee) of the Municipal Corporation, as nominated earlier, would continue. It is worth noting that the writ petitioner was elected as Mayor-cum-Chief Councillor of Gaya Municipal Corporation after the death of the Chief Councillor on 27.9.2009.
3. It was contended before the learned Single Judge that as a newly elected Chief Councillor, he has the right under Section 21(3) of the Act to nominate the Members of the Committee. The said proponement was combatted by the present appellants who had filed an application for intervention and were heard by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge referred to various provisions of the Act and after scanning the anatomy of Sections 21, 22, 24 & 27 of the Act came to hold that the life of the Committee Members is co-terminous with the life of the Chief Councillor/Mayor who nominated them. The learned Single Judge further opined that the directives issued by the State Government under Annexure-5 to the writ petition was clearly contrary to the statutory provisions and the statutory scheme inasmuch as once a new Mayor has been elected, he has the right to nominate his new team of the Empowered Standing Committee from amongst the Members itself and further that the Chief Councillor and the Members of the Committee are collectively responsible to the Municipal Council and that the words used in Section 21 (3) of the Act which empowers the Chief Councillor to nominate from among the Councillors elected within a period of seven days on his entering office has its own signification and it conveys that he has to work with the Committee as one team.
4. Being of this view, the learned Single Judge lanceted the direction of the State Government pertaining to continuance of the Committee.
5. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, the present appeal has been preferred by the interveners-appellants, the Members of the earlier Empowered Standing Committee, contending, inter alia, that the interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge on Section 21 (3), if read in juxtaposition with Section 27 of the Act, is palpably erroneous inasmuch as the term of the Committee is co-terminous with the term of the Members of the Municipal Council and, therefore, it cannot be construed that it is co-terminous with the tenure of the Chief Councillor who had nominated them. It is urged by Mr. Bhanu Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the appellants, that the order passed by the learned single Judge is vulnerable inasmuch as he has been guided by the concept of democracy and collec
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