IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
I.A. ANSARI, SHIVAJI PANDEY AND SUDHIR SINGH, JJ.
THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA THROUGH THE REGISTRAR GENERAL - PETITIONER
VERSUS
SRI K.K. CHAUBEY & Ors. – Respondents
CR NO.153 OF 2015 IN CWJC NO. 19862 OF 2010 WITH CR NO. 154 OF 2015 IN CWJC NO. 21447 OF 2011 WITH CR NO. 155 OF 2015 IN CWJC NO. 10185 OF 2010 WITH CR NO. 156 OF 2015 IN CWJC NO. 10525 OF 2012 WITH CR NO. 157 OF 2015 IN CWJC NO. 5831 OF 2012
Decided on : 30-09-2015
(A) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Section 114 – Review – Parameters – Review of a judgment and order is permissible where a glaring omission or patent mistake or grave error has crept in because of judicial fallibility – While appellate court is empowered to correct all matters of error committed by subordinate court, review can be allowed on limited grounds – Review cannot be sought for or allowed on ground that decision was erroneous on merits – Such an aspect would be exclusively within province of appellate court – Review of a decree or order is possible if no appeal is provided against such decree or order or where provisions for appeal exist but no appeal has been preferred. (Paras 17, 21 and 22)
(B) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Section 114 – Review – Substantive power of review under Section 114 has not laid down any condition as a condition precedent for exercise of power of review nor has Section 114 imposed any fetters on court's power to review its decision. (Para 22)
(C) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 – Review – Ordinarily, court or Tribunal cannot review its order or decision if statute does not confer such power – Power of review by Civil Court cannot be unguided and uncanalised – Power of review being a creature of statute, cannot be exercised as an inherent power. (Para 32)
Case laws. – AIR 1974 All 133 – Discussed; (1953) 344 US 443; (1975) 1 SCC 674; (1979) 4 SCC 389; AIR 1963 SC 1009; AIR 1980 SC 674; AIR 1971 SC 2162; AIR 1971 SC 107; AIR 2005 SC 592; AIR 1954 SC 526; (2006) 6 SCC 224; (1982) 3 SCC 331; (2003) 7 SCC 219; (2009) 8 SCC 106; (1995) 1 SCC 259; (2003) 2 SCC 45 – Relied.
To err is human. Being human beings, Judges may also commit error. Having recognized this basic human weakness, law provides for review. No wonder, therefore, that Justice Robert Jackson remarked, in Brown v. Allan (1953) 344 US 443 at 540, “We are not final, because we are infallible; we are infallible only because we are final”
.
2. When a relevant statutory provision or a relevant Constitutional provision escapes the attention of a Judge, while deciding an issue or a lis, or when a Judge, while relying on a binding precedent, fails to notice some relevant observations made in the same very judicial precedent, which the Judge is relying upon, or when a Judge, while interfering with a statutory provision, fails to notice some other relevant or inseverable provisions, causing thereby confusion or miscarriage of justice, is a review legally permissible? The present set of review petitions seeks answer to these crucial questions.
3. Consequently, it is not uncommon for a Court to be invited to decide if its order, decision or judgment suffers from any such error, which calls for review of the order, decision or judgment, as the case may be. If, therefore, any review petition is made, the Court shall consider the review petition gracefully and with open mind so that no miscarriage of justice is caused.
4. Appropriate, therefore, it is, in our considered view, that the broad parameters and power of review are clearly spelled out by us before any order on the present set of review petitions is made.
5. How the question of review in the present set of review petitions has come to be raised takes us to the background facts leading to the making of these review petitions. The material facts and various stages, which have led to the present set of review petitions, are, therefore, set out, in brief, as follows:-
6. In exercise of powers conferred on the High Court by Section 34 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (for short, the Act), “Registration of Advocates as Advocates-on-Record of the Patna High Court Rules” were framed under heading “D” of Chapter-XXIV of the Patna High Court Rules, 1916. The Registration of Advocates as Advocates-on-Record of the Patna High Court Rules (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”), came into force with effect from 10.12.2009.
7. Under Rule 3A of the Rules, Advocate-on-Record means those advocates, who intend to act in addition to plead and, by virtue of Rule 5 of the Rules, an advocate has been disentitled to register himself in the register of Advocates-on-Record unless he (i) has an office in the city of Patna, (ii) has a registered clerk working with him exclusively or with other advocates collectively; and (iii) has been recommended, in writing, by, at least, one Senior Advocate. Rule 4 puts an embargo on the right of a litigant to engage an advocate to act in connection with any litigation, whether pending or to be instituted, in the High Court, as his or her Advocate-on-Record, unless the advocate is registered as an Advocate-on-Record (for short, A.O.R.).
8. With the help of writ petitions made, as many as five in number, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Rules were put to challenge by some petitioners, who are registered as advocates by the Bihar State Bar Council, the principal contention of the writ petitioners being that the Rules are in violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, Section 30 of the Act and ultra vires the powers conferred upon the High Court under Section 34 of the Act. These writ petitions gave rise to C.W.J.C. Nos. 5831/2012, 10525/2012, 21447/2011, 10185/2010 and 19862/2010.
9. By a common judgment and order, dated 17.07.2015, the writ petitions have been partly allowed in the following terms:-
“(a) The High Court does have the power to frame Rules under Section 34 of the Act, but in such a manner that the right to practise is not taken away.
(b) The Rules that can be framed under Section 34 of the Act are to be in relation to th
Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aibam Pishak Sharma
Bayer India Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra
Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D. H. Mehta and Another (AIR 1971 SC 2162)
Harish Uppal vs. Union of India and Another
Moran Mar Basselios Cathlicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius (AIR 1954 SC 526)
Municipal Board, Pratabgarh v. Mahendra Singh Chawla
Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (AIR 1980 SC 674)
O.N. Mohindroo v. The District Judge
R. K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court
Rajesh D. Darbar v. Narasingrao Krishnaji Kulkarni
Sow Chandra Kanta v. Sk. Habib
Spencer and Company Limited and Another v. Vishwadarshan Distributor (Private) Limited) and Others
The main legal point established in the judgment is the binding effect of the settlement between the parties, the waiver of the right to seek re-employment by the workmen, and the entitlement of the ....
A lockout is justified if it is declared in response to an illegal strike or a strike that is in breach of a settlement or award.
The combination of eyewitness testimonies, recovery of the weapon used, and forensic examination results can establish guilt in criminal cases, even based on circumstantial evidence.
The conviction of an accused person under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act is not permissible in law if the accused is also charged with committing murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
The court can enhance compensation based on the deceased's income and family dependency, and adjust the multiplier used by the Tribunal if found unjustified.
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.