The NCLT's power to regulate its own procedure is limited by the principles of natural justice, statutory provisions, and regulations framed under such legislations. A delegated or subordinate legislation can only be prospective and not retrospective, unless the rule-making authority has been vested with power under a statute to make rules with retrospective effect.

JUDGMENT

Shekhar B. Saraf, J. - These writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in which a stern challenge has been mounted to an impugned order dated May 12, 2020 issued by the Registrar of the National Company Law Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "NCLT") at its Principal Bench in New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent No. 3"), that prime facie, appears to have been issued with the approval of the Hon''ble Acting President of the NCLT, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent No. 2").

2. It appears that the order dated May 12, 2020 imposes a mandatory prescription on all financial creditors, as defined under the extant provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as "IBC, 2016") to submit certain financial information as a record of default before the Information Utility (hereinafter referred to as, "IU") as a condition precedent for filing any new application under Section 7 of the IBC, 2016. The order further transcends to impose this purported mandatory prescription retrospectively on all those applicants / financial creditors who have pre-existing applications filed under Section 7 of the IBC, 2016 and pending before the various Benches of the NCLT, prior to such final hearing of these applications.

3. It is the grouse of the first writ petitioner that by virtue of being a financial creditor who has such a pre-existing application filed under Section 7 of the IBC, 2016 pending before the NCLT at its Kolkata Bench, the impugned order has the effect of adversely altering their substantive rights as granted to a creditor under the provisions of the IBC, 2016. Not restricting themselves to a singular dimension to such a judicial challenge of such order, the petitioner has also urged that this order has been issued de hors the parent Act that establishes the NCLT, i.e. the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as "CA, 2013"), other relevant provisions of the IBC, 2016 as well as in contravention of prevailing Regulations issued by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (hereinafter referred to as, "IBBI"), the regulatory board established under the IBC, 2016.

4. When this matter was taken up on July 9, 2020, Mrs. Manju Bhuteria, the learned counsel pressed the second writ petition with a sense of extreme urgency while contending that the petitioner, Cygnus Investments and Finance Pvt. Ltd, intended to file a new application under Section 7 of the IBC, 2016 so as to initiate a corporate insolvency resolution process against the targeted corporate debtor, but was precluded from doing so as the impugned order proscribes such a filing in express terms if such an application is not appended with the record of default from an IU.

5. The issuance of this impugned order by the NCLT dated May 12, 2020 thus, has led to the genesis of this lis, and therefore, based on the grounds of challenge to this order that have been levelled by both the writ petitioners, I have heard the two writ petitions conjointly and am passing a common judgement. The petitioners and the respondents have jointly agreed that since the issue relates to a point of law and does not contain any disputed questions of fact, affidavits need not be called for. Based on the arguments advanced by both sides, I am framing the two main issues that need to be dealt with herein:

I. What is the scope of the powers of the NCLT and whether the exercise of the same in the impugned order May 12, 2020 is de hors the IBC, 2016 and the rules and regulations framed thereunder?

II. In the event the answer to the above is in the negative, whether the NCLT could enforce the same retrospectively thereby adversely affecting the rights of the petitioner No. 1 as a financial creditor under the extant provisions of the IBC, 2016?

6. The learned counsel for the first writ petitioners, Ms. Ujjaini Chatterjee, has relied upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court a