The main legal point established in the judgment is the recognition of the public interest and public law element in a development agreement for a mass housing scheme, supporting the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

JUDGMENT :

1. The writ petition was heard only on the point of maintainability. Hence, the merits of the matter are not entered into at this stage and all the findings below are prima facie for the purpose of deciding the question of maintainability.

2. The respondents plead non-maintainability at the outset.

Relief B) of the writ petition, it is contended, concerns a money claim and is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction.

Secondly, the petitioners are not parties to the development agreement on which they heavily rely, hence hit by privity.

The said agreement is not a statutory agreement; hence, no writ lies for its implementation.

Fourthly, all the private respondents are companies having privately elected Boards of Directors, having no connection with the Government of West Bengal.

3. That apart, the petitioners, it is contended, have failed to demonstrate that not handing over their flats within the alleged time given amounts to violation of fundamental rights, namely right to life under Article 21.

4. The respondents cite judgments, which have been discussed later on hereunder, and seek to distinguish the petitioners’ citations.

5. The petitioners, on the other hand, harp on the public law element allegedly involved in the present case to justify the invocation of the writ jurisdiction. It is submitted that mere availability of alternative remedy is not a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

6. The first decision cited by the petitioners is Smt. Vrinda Gujarati & Ors. V. Bareilly Development Authority & Ors., reported at AIR 1997 All 107, in which a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court had interfered in the case of delay occasioned by the authorities in registering applications for allotment of houses. However, there the judicial review had emanated from contracts which originated from statutes and rules. The inaction complained of was that of the Bareilly Development Authority. Although, in the present case, the HIDCO is also involved, the inaction complained of is primarily of the Respondent Nos. 8 and 9 which are not statutory bodies, nor are the agreements statutory contracts. Thus, the said judgment is not applicable in terms.

7. The next cited judgment of the petitioners is LIC of India & Anr. V. Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors., reported at (1995) 5 SCC 482, where the Supreme Court contemplated interference in the writ jurisdiction in state action in the contractual field. Paying capacity for life insurance was broadly included within the right to life and public element was read into it. The said principle, no doubt, holds true for the present case, though analogically.

8. The ratio laid down in W.B. Housing Board & Ors. v. Brijendra Prasad Gupta &Ors., reported at (1997) 6 SCC 207, however, pertains to land acquisition and involves the role of the Housing Board, which is a statutory authority. Hence, the ratio laid down therein is not applicable directly to the present case.

9. The next citation of the petitioners, being Urmila Roy & Ors. v. Bengal Peerless Housing Development Company Limited &Ors. [(2009) 5 SCC 242] relates to the W.B. Housing Board Act, 1972 and is not apt in the facts of the present case, which is not under the said or any similar statute.

10. The ratio laid down in the next judgment, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai &Ors. [(1998) 8 SCC 1] is broadly applicable in the sense that the existence of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar in several circumstances.

11. Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd. V. State of Bihar &Ors., reported at 2021 SCC OnLine 801, encapsulates the principles of law governing interference in the writ jurisdiction. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy have been discussed there and it has also been reiterated that an alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discussions below would go on to clarify that the broad principles laid down