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2023 Supreme(Cal) 818

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.
M/s. Binoy Trading Co. and Another - Appellant
Vs.
Tata Motors Finance Limited - Respondent
AP 289 of 2023 with AP 368 of 2023
Decided On : 07-08-2023

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Mr. Shyamal Chakraborty, Mr. Debajyoti Mondal, Ms. Anjana Das, Adv.
For the Respondent: Mr. Rohit Banerjee, Mr. Saubhik Chowdhury, Ms. Tapasika Bose, Advs.

An application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside an arbitral award must be filed before the Court which has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the application and which has jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings.

Headnote:

ARBITRATION - JURISDICTION - SECTION 34 - COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT - SECTION 42 - ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT - MAINTAINABILITY OF APPLICATION - CITY CIVIL COURT HAVING PECUNIARY JURISDICTION - APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 34 TO BE FILED BEFORE CITY CIVIL COURT.

Fact of the Case:

Petitioner filed applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside of two arbitral awards. Respondent raised a preliminary objection of maintainability, arguing that the applications should be filed before the City Civil Court as the petitioner had already filed a miscellaneous application there.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the City Civil Court had pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act and that Section 42 of the Act mandated that when any application with regard to an arbitration agreement had been made under Part I in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent application arising out of that agreement.

Issues: Whether the applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 were maintainable before the High Court or the City Civil Court.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court relied on Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which provides that when any application with regard to an arbitration agreement has been made under Part I in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent application arising out of that agreement. The Court also considered the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the Notification dated 20th March, 2020, which fixed the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court and the Calcutta High Court.

Final Decision: The Court dismissed the applications as not being maintainable, holding that the City Civil Court was the competent Court to entertain the applications.

JUDGMENT :

Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.

1. The petitioner/award-debtor has filed the present applications under section 34 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside of two awards dated 4.8.2022 and 1.11.2022 passed by the learned sole arbitrator in arbitrations where the petitioner was the respondent. Both the applications involve identical facts. Learned counsel for the respondent in both the applications have argued on the point of maintainability. Hence the applications are being disposed of together.

2. The respondent/award-holder has taken a preliminary point of maintainability of the present applications on sections 2(1)(e) and 42 of the Act of 1996. The respondent says that the present applications should be filed before the Ld. City Civil Court since the petitioner has already filed a miscellaneous application in that Court. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent also takes the point of pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court and the City Civil Court as determined by a Notification dated 20.3.2020 issued by the Judicial Department of the Government of West Bengal.

3. The brief facts of the case is that the petitioner has suffered an award dated 1.11.2022 for a principal sum of Rs. 82,91,536.50/-. The respondent filed a post-award application for interim relief under section 9 of the Act before the Ld. City Civil Court on 29.12.2022. An ad-interim order was passed on the same day inter alia authorising the Receiver to take necessary steps with regard to the petitioner’s vehicle and that the vehicle would remain in the custody of the Receiver. The petitioner filed an application thereafter on 4.4.2023 connected with the Misc. Case (No. 7612 of 2022) of the respondent praying for dismissal of the Misc. Case and for a direction on the Receiver to handover the vehicle to the petitioner. The present applications were filed for setting aside of the award on 28.4.2023.

4. Since the respondent/award-holder has raised an objection with regard to the maintainability of the present applications, that question will be decided first.

5. Section 2(1)(e) of the Act defines “Court” for the purposes of domestic arbitration, as the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes.

6. Section 42 begins with a non-obstante clause and stipulates that any application made in respect to an arbitration agreement under Part-I of the 1996 Act would confer that Court alone with jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.

7. The object of section 42 is to prevent conflict and multiplicity of decisions of different Courts. The section aims to provide uniformity by bringing the parties to the Court where the first application was made under an arbitration agreement and ensuring that all subsequent applications are made only in that Court.

8. The undisputed facts indicate that the petitioner approached the Ld. City Civil Court in the Misc. Case filed by the respondent and prayed for appropriate orders with regard to release of the petitioners’ vehicle. The petitioner has also made specific averments in the application stating that the City Civil Court is empowered to forthwith try and entertain the application and pass necessary orders. The petitioner, at such point of time, did not take any stand of the City Civil Court not being competent or empowered to try and entertain the application.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a Division Bench decision passed in Shri Sushanta Malik vs. Srei Equipment Finance Limited reported in AIR 2015

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