IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Rohit Ranjan Agarwal, J.
Mahendra Singh And Another - Appellant
Vs.
M/s Sriram Transport Finance Co. Ltd. - Opposite Party
Arbitration & Conciliation Application U/S11(4) No. - 104 of 2022
Decided On : 25-07-2022
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 2 (1) (e) (i) and 34 – Arbitral Award – Challenged – Jurisdiction - Maintainability of application under Section 34 of Act, 1996 before this Court against arbitral award passed by the sole Arbitrator - Counsel appearing for the applicants, while addressing on maintainability of application under Section 34 of Act of 1996, submitted that word “Court” used in Section 34 read with Section 2 (1) (e) (i) means Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. According to learned counsel, both Principal Civil Court and High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 34 of Act, 1996 - As Allahabad High Court does not exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction and, thus, would not come within the ambit of Court as provided under Section 34 read with Section 2 (1) (e) (i) of Act of 1996 - Application under Section 34 of Act of 1996 is not maintainable. (Para 16)
Finding of the court: The law in regard to the maintainability of the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 against an arbitral award has already been settled by the various judgments of Apex Court and the matter is no more res integra - As Allahabad High Court does not exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction and, thus, would not come within the ambit of Court as provided under Section 34 read with Section 2 (1) (e) (i) of the Act of 1996 - Application moved by the applicants under Section 34 of Act of 1996 challenging the arbitral award passed by the sole Arbitrator is only maintainable before the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction and not this Court.
Result: Application dismissed.
JUDGMENT :
1. Heard Sri Pradip Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicants.
2. This is an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred as the ‘Act of 1996’) laying challenge to the award dated 26.03.2022 passed by Sri J.P. Narayan, Additional District & Sessions Judge (Rtd.), sole Arbitrator.
3. The Stamp Reporter has made a report that the present application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is not maintainable in view of the order passed in Civil Misc. Arbitration Application No. 01 of 2018.
4. Sri P.K. Srivastva, learned counsel appearing for the applicants, while addressing on the maintainability of the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, submitted that the word “Court” used in Section 34 read with Section 2 (1) (e) (i) means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. According to learned counsel, both the Principal Civil Court and the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.
5. He has placed reliance upon decision of Apex Court rendered in case of Executive Engineer, Road Development Division No. III, Panvel Vs. Atlanta Limited, 2014 AIR (SC) 1093.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the applicants and perused the material on record.
7. The sole question which has to be adjudicated is in regard to maintainability of the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before this Court against the arbitral award passed by the sole Arbitrator.
8. Before adverting to decide the issue in hand a cursory glance of provisions of Section 2 (1) (e) (i) and Section 34 of the Act of 1996 are necessary for better appreciation of the case, thus, both the provisions are extracted here as under;
[(e) “Court” means—
(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;
……….
34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if—
(a) the party making the application 1[establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that]—
(i) a party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration:
Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or
(b) the Court finds that—
(
The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the definition of 'Court' in section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and its application to determine ....
An application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside an arbitral award must be filed before the Court which has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the appl....
The Additional District Judge lacks jurisdiction to entertain applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act if the application was initially filed before the District Judge.
Venue of arbitration does not equate to its jurisdictional seat; petitions under the Arbitration Act must be filed where arbitration took place, as established in prior Supreme Court rulings.
The court affirmed that under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, courts cannot re-evaluate the merits of an arbitral award and must adhere to jurisdictional limits under Section 34.
The court established that challenges to an arbitrator's jurisdiction under Section 16 can only be raised after a final award, not as an interim appeal.
The jurisdiction in arbitration applications is determined by the chosen seat of arbitration, irrespective of prior applications filed in other courts.
The main legal point established in the judgment is the determination of jurisdiction for setting aside an award under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, based on the seat and v....
The court clarified that applications for extending the mandate of an arbitral tribunal under Section 29A must be filed before the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, not the High Court.
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