CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Sen, J., Mitter, J., Khundkar, J.
Shib Nath Banerjee & Ors. - Appellant
Versus
A.E. Porter & Ors. - Respondent
Decided On : 03-06-1943
Ultra Vires - Detention - Defence of India Act, 1939, Sections 2, 2(2)(x), 2(5), 21, Defence of India (Amendment) Ordinance, 1943, Sections 2, 3, Government of India Act, 1935, Sections 49, 52, 59, 72, 92, 95, 96, 102, 108, Schedule 9, General Clauses Act, 1897, Sections 3, 8, 43a, Interpretation Act, 1889, Section 33 - The court held that the Governor-General's Ordinance amending the Defence of India Act was ultra vires as it directly repealed and amended an Act of the Indian Legislature. The court also held that the detention orders were invalid as they were not made in accordance with the provisions of the Defence of India Rules, which required the Governor to be personally satisfied about the necessity of detention. The court relied on the principle that one legislature cannot directly repeal or amend an Act of another legislature unless expressly authorized to do so. The court also emphasized the importance of judicial scrutiny of executive actions, even in times of emergency, to ensure that the liberty of individuals is not infringed.
Fact of the Case:
The case involved nine individuals detained in different jails under Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules. The detentions were made between 1940 and 1943. The Federal Court had declared Rule 26 ultra vires of the Defence of India Act, 1939. The Governor-General subsequently promulgated an Ordinance amending the Act to validate the detentions. The petitioners challenged the validity of the Ordinance and the detention orders.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the Governor-General's Ordinance amending the Defence of India Act was ultra vires as it directly repealed and amended an Act of the Indian Legislature. The court also held that the detention orders were invalid as they were not made in accordance with the provisions of the Defence of India Rules, which required the Governor to be personally satisfied about the necessity of detention. The court found that the Governor had not personally satisfied himself about the necessity of detention in most of the cases, and that the Home Minister had adopted a procedure of automatically passing detention orders before satisfying himself about the necessity of detention.
Issues: The main issues before the court were: (1) Whether the Governor-General's Ordinance amending the Defence of India Act was valid; (2) Whether the detention orders were valid in light of the Federal Court's decision declaring Rule 26 ultra vires; (3) Whether the detention orders were made in accordance with the provisions of the Defence of India Rules.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the following legal principles: (1) One legislature cannot directly repeal or amend an Act of another legislature unless expressly authorized to do so; (2) The Governor, as the head of the Provincial Government, must personally satisfy himself about the necessity of detention under Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules; (3) The Governor cannot delegate this duty of satisfaction to his Ministers or other officers without a specific order under Section 2(5) of the Defence of India Act.
Final Decision: The court held that the detention of all the petitioners was illegal and ordered their immediate release.
JUDGMENT
Mitter, J. - The nine persons on whose behalf applications u/s 491, Criminal P.C. have been made before us by their relations have been detained in different jails in pursuance of orders passed under Rule 26, Defence of India Rules, on diverse dates between 24th October 1940 and 8th March 1943. Those applications were made on 24th April 1943 after the Federal Court had declared the said rule to be ultra vires Section 2, Sub-section (2), Clause (x), Defence of India Act (35 of 1939), in AIR 1943 1 (Federal Court) . On the same date, nine rules were issued on the Crown to shew cause why the said persons should not be released, Those rules came on for hearing/before us on 7th May 1943. At an early stage of the hearing, seven out of the nine detenus applied to us to give them facilities to swear affidavits in jail. We granted their prayer. They swore affidavits and those affidavits have been put on the record with liberty to the Crown to file affidavits in answer. Another affidavit sworn by Dr. Nalinaksha Sannyal, a member of the Bengal Legislative Assembly and a first cousin of Sasanka Sekhar Sannyal, one of the detenus, was put before us. The Crown objected to the reception of that affidavit but we overruled that objection and directed that affidavit to be put on the re9 cord, the Crown being given liberty to file an affidavit in answer. At the time when we admitted Dr. Nalinaksha Sannyal's affidavit we intimated that we would give reasons in our judgment for admitting the said affidavit.
2. At the time when Dr. Nalinaksha's affidavit was put in the advocates for the petitioners stated that as that affidavit embodied only the proceedings in the Legislative Assembly which would be relevant in all the nine cases before us it would be a needless repetition to file affidavits of exactly the same nature in the other eight cases. They ; accordingly prayed verbally that the formality of having eight more affidavits of the same nature, one in each of the other eight cases, may be dispensed with and Dr. Nalinaksha Sannyal's affidavit may be allowed to be used in all the nine cases which we were hearing together. To that course the learned Advocate-General did not object and we allowed the prayer. The Crown has put in an affidavit in answer affirmed by Mr. Porter, who at all material times had been the Additional Secretary in the Home Department of the Government of Bengal, to meet the allegations made in the affidavits of the, seven detenus and those made in the affidavit of Dr. Nalinaksha Sannyal. The orders passed on the nine detinues under Rule 26 have been produced by the Crown for our perusal. True copies of those orders have been put on the record. After the decision of the Federal Court in Keshav Talpade's case,1 the Governor-General has, on 28th April 1943, made and promulgated an Ordinance (Ordinance No. 14 of 1943, hereafter to be called the Ordinance) u/s 72 of Schedule 9, Government of India Act. That Ordinance is as follows:
Whereas an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary further to amend the Defence of India Act, 1939 (35 of 1939) for the. purpose hereinafter appearing;
Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 72, Government of India Act, as set out in Schedule 9, Government of India Act (26 Geo. V, C. 2) the Governor-General is pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance:
1. Short title and Commencement - (1) This Ordinance may be called the Defence of India (Amendment) Ordinance, 1943. (2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Substitution of new clause for Clause (x) of Section 2(2), Act 35 of 1939 - For Clause (x) of Sub-section (2) of Section 2, Defence of India Act, 1939 (35 of 1939), the following clause shall be substituted, and shall be deemed always to have been substituted, namely:
(x) the apprehension and detention in custody of any person whom the authority empowered by the rules to apprehend or detain as the case may be suspects, on grounds, appearing to such authority
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