An appeal cannot be maintained against a discharge of a contempt rule under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, but a Letters Patent Appeal is permissible if the lower court exceeds its jurisdiction, thus affecting rights.

JUDGMENT :

SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J.

1. At the outset, a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeal is taken on behalf of the State-respondents.

2. Learned senior counsel appearing for the State-respondents submits that the appeal is not maintainable, having been preferred against an order whereby a Rule of Contempt was discharged.

3. By placing reliance on the language of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (in short “1971 Act”), learned senior counsel submits that the said provision contemplates an appeal only against any order or decision to punish for contempt. As such, no appeal lies against an order discharging a contempt rule or dismissing a contempt application.

4. In support of such contention, learned senior counsel cites D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, (1988) 3 SCC 26 and State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and another, (1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 411, where D.N. Taneja (supra) was followed.

5. The proposition laid down therein was that Article 215 of the Constitution confers jurisdiction or power on the High Court to punish for contempt. The High Court can exercise its jurisdiction only by punishing for contempt. When the High Court, acquits the contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction for contempt, for such exercise will mean that the High Court should act in a particular manner, that is to say by imposing punishment for contempt.

6. Thus, it was reiterated that when the High Court erroneously acquits the contemnor of criminal contempt, it is not that the petitioner who is interested in maintaining the dignity of the court will be without any remedy but such remedy would lie under Article 136 of the Constitution of India before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

7. While laying down such proposition, the Hon'ble Supreme Court proceeded on the premise that contempt is a proceeding between the contemnor and the court and the right of the petitioner is merely that of a complainant. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered that the same might have been the justification for the Legislature consciously not providing any right of appeal against the acquittal of a person from a charge of contempt.

8. Learned senior counsel thus argues that, in the present case, by the impugned order dated July 26, 2024, the contempt Rule issued against the respondents was discharged. Hence, by applying the proposition laid down in the cited judgments as well as incorporated in Section 19 of the 1971 Act, the present appeal is not maintainable.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant controverts such submissions and draws the attention of the Court to the substantive portions of the impugned order whereby valuable rights of the present appellant have been affected.

10. Upon hearing learned counsel, we start at the genesis of the present appeal.

11. By an order dated March 7, 2024, the learned Single Judge who passed the present impugned order directed that the Directorate of Youth Services, Government of West Bengal, shall engage the writ petitioner (present appellant) at any Block, Municipality or Corporation under the North 24 Parganas on a contractual basis for a period of two years on a monthly honorarium of Rs. 10,000/- within a period of two weeks from that date. The said order was amended on May 3, 2024 at the behest of the writ petitioner/present appellant, thereby incorporating into the original order dated March 7, 2024 a clause to the effect that the honorarium of Rs. 19,000/- is in terms of the Memo dated March 1, 2024 issued by the Additi