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2026 Supreme(Cal) 223
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA BENCH AT PORT BLAIR
SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, SMITA DAS DE, JJ.
The Union Of India And Others - Appellant
Vs.
Andaman Sarvajanik Nirman Vibhag Mazdoor Sangh And Others - Respondent
MAT No. 70 of 2026, IA No.CAN No. 1 of 2026, CAN No. 2 of 2026
Decided On : 28-04-2026
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : Mr. S.D. Sanjay, ASGI Mr. Divyam Aggarwal, Adv. Mr. V.D. Sivabalan, Adv.
For the Respondent: Mr. Gopala Binnu Kumar, Adv. Ms. Vinita Devi, Adv. Mr. K. M. Nataraj, ASGI Ms. Vatsal Joshi, Adv. Ms. Chidranesh Sharma, Adv. Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Adv.
The state cannot use the 'policy decision' shield to evade constitutional obligations of fairness. Long-term, perennial service in essential functions, where appointments are 'irregular' rather than 'illegal', entitles workers to be considered for regularisation, preventing the systemic exploitation of precarious labour.
Headnote:(A) Constitutional Law - Articles 14, 21, 141, 239 and 240 - Labour Law - Regularisation of casual and daily-rated employees - Right to be treated with dignity and fairness - Binding nature of judicial orders on government instrumentalities - Limits of policy-making discretion - Principles of equal pay for equal work and protection against exploitative long-term temporary engagements.
(B) Res Judicata and Estoppel - Parties cannot approbate and reprobate by inviting judicial interventions in earlier litigation and subsequently challenging the jurisdiction of the same court upon unfavourable outcomes - Where an issue has attained finality through non-challenge, it binds both the administration and the relevant governmental authority.
(C) Labour Jurisprudence - Classification of appointments - "Illegal" versus "irregular" engagements - Long-term continuous service performing essential, perennial functions against sanctioned posts or sanctioned functions constitutes "irregular" employment eligible for regularisation - Policy decisions are non-justiciable only unless patently arbitrary or violative of fundamental rights - Judicial mandates for the welfare of labour are not subordinate to policy claims where systemic exploitation is evident. (Paras 47-152)
Facts of the case:
The litigation originated from a claim by a trade union representing daily-rated workers seeking benefits of minimum pay scales. A prior division bench had directed the administration to frame a regularisation scheme for these workers. The administration and the central government contested the current directive to approve the scheme, arguing it was a sovereign policy decision beyond judicial mandate and that the government was not a party to the initial proceedings. The existing regularisation scheme was formulated following government compliance with previous court-ordered financial disbursements.
Findings of Court:
The court ruled that the administration was barred by the principle of res judicata from reopening issues that reached finality in previous rounds of litigation. The central government, having actively facilitated the implementation of previous orders, was estopped from feigning ignorance or non-involvement. The court clarified that the principles of regularisation for irregular employees engaged in perennial functions are based on substantive justice and cannot be circumventing through the label of policy decision.
Issues: Whether previous judicial directions were binding on the governmental authorities despite their claims of non-party status, whether the framing and approval of a regularisation scheme constitute non-justiciable policy decisions, and whether the criteria established by apex judicial precedents are exhaustive.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that long-term, continuous service by daily-rated workers performing essential tasks inherently required by the state, despite an 'irregular' initial engagement, entitles them to be treated at par with regular employees. Courts have a constitutional duty to intervene when policy-making is used as a shield to perpetuate exploitation of labour, and established judicial mandates evolve to address the lived realities of precarious employment.
Result: Appeal disposed of; directions issued for the approval of the regularisation scheme with modifications regarding eligibility criteria.
| Table of Content |
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| 1. litigation history concerning regularization of daily rated workers in andaman and nicobar islands. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21) |
| 2. appellants contend against judicial overreach into policy and lack of binding authority of earlier contempt orders. (Para 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33) |
| 3. administration argues against court interference in central policy and lack of prior authorization. (Para 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40) |
| 4. respondents justify regularization based on government requisition for funds and prior court directions. (Para 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46) |
| 5. prior judicial decisions on regularization are binding via res judicata regardless of original scope. (Para 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 , 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 69 , 70 , 71 , 72 , 73 , 74 , 75) |
| 6. union of india is bound by regularization commitments by acting in concert with the administration. (Para 76 , 77 , 78 , 79 , 80 , 81 , 82 , 83 , 84 , 85 , 86 , 87 , 88 , 89 , 90 , 91 , 92 , 93 , 94 , 95 , 96 , 97 , 98 , 99 , 100 , 101 , 102 , 103 , 104 , 105) |
| 7. umadevi criteria for regularization are not exhaustive and must include sanctioned functions as a valid test. (Para 106 , 107 , 108 , 109 , 110 , 111 , 112 , 113 , 114 , 115 , 116 , 117 , 118 , 119 , 120 , 121 , 122 , 123 , 124 , 125 , 126 , 127 , 128 , 129 , 130 , 131 , 132 , 133) |
| 8. mandamus can issue against non-policy decisions that violate constitutional rights and basic equality. (Para 134 , 135 , 136 , 137 , 138 , 139 , 140 , 141 , 142 , 143 , 144 , 145 , 146 , 147 , 148 , 149) |
| 9. revised eligibility criteria for 2023 scheme approved to include essential and perennial work. (Para 150 , 151 , 152 , 153 , 154 , 155 , 156 , 157 , 158 , 159 , 160) |
Judgment :
SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J.
1. At the outset, we find that CAN/1/2026, for condonation of the delay in preferring the appeal, is still pending. Although no arguments have been advanced on the same by either of the parties, we choose first to decide the same before proceeding with the adjudication of the appeal on merits.
2. There is a conflict as to the limitation period for preferring a Letters Patent appeal in the Calcutta High Court between the Appellate Side Rules framed by the Full Court and the Limitation Act, 1963. Whereas Rule 2 of Chapter VIII of the former provides that every appeal to the High Court under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent from a judgment of a Judge sitting singly, on the Appellate Side of the High Court, shall be presented within 60 days from the date of the judgment appealed from, Article 117 of the Schedule to the latter stipulates 30 days as the limitation period for an appeal from a decree or order of any High Court to the same Court.
3. Going by the Appellate Side Rules, the appeal has been filed within time; however, as per the Limitation Act, there is a delay of 2 days in presenting the memorandum of the appeal.
4. Since there is some doubt as to whether the Rules governing the procedure of this Court can override a statutory bar, we choose to proceed on the premise that there was a delay of 2 days in preferring the appeal.
5. Even if it is so, by an Order dated April 13, 2026, the Court had observed that an arguable case has been raised by the appellant in this appeal and the private respondents offered to prepare informal paper books. Thus, it is deemed that the said order tantamounts to admission of the appeal and, consequently, deemed condonation of the delay in preferring the appeal. Even otherwise, we are satisfied from the pleadings in CAN/1/2026 that sufficient explanation for the miniscule delay of 2 days in preferring the appeal has been furnished. Accordingly, CAN/1/2026 is allowed without costs, thereby condoning the delay, if any, in preferring the appeal.
6. The Court now proceeds to adjudicate the appeal on merits.
7. The writ petitioners/respondent nos. 1 and 2 are respectively
