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1977 Supreme(Del) 158

High Court Of Delhi
INDER SINGH AND SURENDER SINGH - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF DELHI - Respondent
CRIMINAL APPEAL 135 of 1975
Decided On : 12/16/1977

Advocates Appeared:
AMARJIT SINGH, Kamlesh Bansal, O.P.Soni, R.N.Dixit

Headnote:

CRIMINAL - MURDER - EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 - SECTION 157 - FIRST INFORMATION REPORT - SECTION 145 - CONTRADICTING INFORMANT - SECTION 155 - IMPEACHING CREDIT OF INFORMANT - SECTION 8 - CONDUCT OF INFORMANT - SECTION 10 - RES GESTAE - SECTION 154 - DELAY IN LODGING REPORT - SECTION 134 - NUMBER OF WITNESSES - SECTION 133 - CORROBORATION - SECTION 114 ILLUSTRATION (G) - PRESUMPTION AS TO COURSE OF NATURE - SECTION 114 ILLUSTRATION (H) - COURSE OF BUSINESS - SECTION 114 ILLUSTRATION (I) - COMMON COURSE OF HUMAN CONDUCT - SECTION 114 ILLUSTRATION (J) - STATEMENTS OF RELEVANT FACT BY PERSONS WHO CANNOT BE CALLED AS WITNESSES.

Fact of the Case:

The appellants were convicted of murdering Randhir Singh and attempting to murder his brother Ram Kishan. The prosecution's case was that the appellants had a dispute with the deceased over water rights, and that they had attacked the deceased and his brother with spades. The appellants denied the charges, and claimed that they were falsely implicated.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that the testimony of the eyewitnesses, Ram Kishan and Ram Karan, was reliable, and that it was corroborated by the circumstantial evidence. The court also found that the appellants had a motive for the murder, and that they had the opportunity to commit the crime.

Issues: 1. Whether the first information report was admissible in evidence. 2. Whether the testimony of the eyewitnesses was reliable. 3. Whether the circumstantial evidence corroborated the testimony of the eyewitnesses. 4. Whether the appellants had a motive for the murder. 5. Whether the appellants had the opportunity to commit the crime.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The first information report was not admissible in evidence to prove the truth of its contents, but it was admissible to corroborate the testimony of the informant. 2. The testimony of the eyewitnesses was reliable because it was consistent, it was corroborated by the circumstantial evidence, and it was supported by the motive and opportunity evidence. 3. The circumstantial evidence corroborated the testimony of the eyewitnesses because it showed that the appellants had the opportunity to commit the crime, and that they had a motive for doing so. 4. The appellants had a motive for the murder because they had a dispute with the deceased over water rights. 5. The appellants had the opportunity to commit the crime because they were present at the scene of the crime at the time of the murder.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions of the appellants.

T. P. S. CHAWLA, J

( 1 ) BY a judgment dated 19th May 1975, the two appellants Inder Singh and Surender Singh, have been found guilty by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, of murdering Randhir Singh and also attempting to murder his brother Ram Kishan. Both the offences were held to have been committed by the appellants in, furtherance of their common intention. For the offence of murker each of them has been sentenced to imprisonment of life, an,d, for the attempt to murder each has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 4 years, the sentences to run concurrently. After discussing the evidence, the judgment proceeded :

( 2 ) COUNSEL for the appellants maintained that in order to prove that the first information report had been recorded at the time noted, the daily diary and the copy of the first information report sent to the area Magistrate ought to have been produced. We have seen the daily diary, and it clearly mentions that the first information report was recorded at 5 a. m. We also sent for the first information, report from the Magistrate. It bears an endorsement indicating that it was seen by him on 22nd June 1974. We looked at those documents for our own satisfaction. As a matter of law the prosecution were not bound to produce either of those documents of their own accord. Neither of them is substantive evidence in the case. It was recognised in Bhola Nath vs. The State, 1976 Cri. L. J. 1409 (1), that, hitherto, it has not been the practice in this jurisdiction for the prosecution to produce in evidence the copy of the first information report sent to the Magistrate, though a change in the practice was recommended. The present case was tried before that recommendation was made. Without knowing the facts we cannot go into the question why the first information report was seen by the Magistrate on 22n,d June 1974, and not earlier. The point was never probed at the trial,

( 3 ) BEFORE passing on from the first information report, it is worth getting the nature of the submission that was made into proper legal perspective. A first information report can be used in a variety of ways under the Indian Evidence Act 1872. Almost invariably it is tendered in evidence by the prosecution under section 157 to corroborate the informant. It is then available to the defence for contradicting the informant under section 145 or impeaching his credit under section 155. Even in the unlikely event that the prosecution do not tender the first information report, the defence may itself prove it for achieving those very ends : see Azimaddy and others vs. Emperor, AIR 1927 Cal 17 (2 ). Of course, it can only be used for contradicting or impeaching the credit of the informant, and no one else: see Dharma Ram Bhagare vs. State of Maharashtra, A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 476 (3), and Hasib vs. The State of Bihar, A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 283 (4 ).

( 4 ) WHEN used in any of those ways, it is settled law that the first information, report is not substantive evidence : see The State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry and another, AIR 1960 S. C. 391 (5 ). That means, the first information report is not evidence of the matters mentioned therein. The court cannot base its findings on, the contents of the first information report. It can merely be used for testing the credibility of what the informant says in court. The findings of the court must ultimately rest on the evidence given at the trial of the case. For this reason the court cannot reject the prosecution case simply because it does not tally with the version given in the first information report : see Dharma Ram Bhagare vs. State of Maharashtra, A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 476 (3); Mrs. Meera Puri vs. The State of Nagaland, 1971 Cri. L. J. 539 (6); Ra]a and others vs. King Emperor A. I. R. 1924 Lahore 591 (7) and Naurang Singh Deva Singh-vs. The State AIR 1956 Pepsu 50 (8 ).

( 5 ) HOWEVER, the lodging of a first information report is not only the making of a statement but also an act of complain,t. The statement































































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