VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

1. The present Appeal impugns the Order of the learned Single Judge dated 16.12.2005, whereby the application for condonation of delay in filing Objections to the Award was rejected and consequently the latter were not looked into on the

premise that they were barred from consideration due to the laws of prescription.

2. The Appellant, at the very outset, has been confronted with the question of maintainability of the Appeal. Mr. Harish Malhotra, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, contends that the rejection of the application for condonation of delay has the effect of the dismissal of his Objections which, in turn, results in the refusal to set aside the subject Award. In these circumstances, goes the argument, it is contended that such Orders are appealable under Section 39 (1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The learned Senior Counsel also places reliance on the Letters Patent to submit that even in the Delhi High Court any judgment passed by a Single Judge is assailable before a Division Bench if the judgment or order has the effect of finally determining the rights of either of the parties. Mr. V.P. Chaudhary, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent, however, contends that the present Appeal against the impugned Order is not maintainable in light of the law laid down by various Judgments of the Hon?ble Supreme Court and of this Court.

3. We think it apposite to immediately underscore that as postulated in Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 („Act? for short), in the event Objections for setting aside the Award have been refused consideration on the ground of limitation, a judgment must be pronounced according to the Award, and a decree would automatically follow. The statutory mandate is that “no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of or not otherwise in accordance with the award”. It also needs to be emphasized that Section 39 of the Act itself takes pains to particularize that an appeal shall lie from the enumerated orders passed under the Act and from no others. Rejection of an application seeking condonation of delay does not feature in the six eventualities mentioned in the Section. In any event, such an order is not one passed under the Act. The only recourse, it appears, would then lie under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

4. Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti –vs- Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti, AIR 1962 SC 666 as well as Essar Constructions –vs- N.P. Rama Krishna Reddy, (2000) 6 SCC 94 considered the conundrum of whether an Appeal is maintainable under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act, or under any other provision of that enactment against the dismissal of an application seeking condonation of delay in filing Objections to the Award. Essar Constructions is the later case and distinguishes the earlier one in the following manner:-

27. The first decision cited is Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti –vs- Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti, AIR 1962 SC 666. In that case there was no application to set aside the award at all and no question of rejection of such an application arose. After the award was filed, Defendant 1 filed his “say” about the arbitrator?s award. He subsequently withdrew his “say”. Later, a guardian of a party who was a minor, filed a written statement claiming that the award was null and void on the ground that the award was without jurisdiction. This objection was not pressed before the trial court. The trial court, therefore, passed a decree in terms of the award. The appeal to the High Court was dismissed as not maintainable. The further appeal to this Court was dismissed saying:

When no party filed an objection praying for the setting aside of the award, no question of refusing to set it aside can arise and therefore no appeal was maintainable under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act which allows an appeal against an order refusing to set aside the award.

28. The case is not an authority for the propositi