2018 Supreme(Del) 85
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
HSIL Limited - Plaintiff
Versus
Imperial Ceramic & Ors. - Defendants
CS(COMM) 1082 of 2016 & IA Nos. 9787, 14190, 15316, 15317, 15318 of 2016, 917, 13696, 14013 & 14088 of 2017; CS(COMM) 1087 of 2016 & IA Nos. 9818, 15291, 15292 of 2016, 914, 13692, 14014 & 14015 of 2017; CS(COMM) 1088 of 2016 & IA Nos. 9822, 15293, 15294 of 2016, 915, 13694, 14011 & 14018 of 2017
Decided On : 13-02-2018
Advocate Appeared:
For the Plaintiff : Mr. Manav Gupta, Ms. Prabhsahay Kaur, Ms. Esha Dutta, Mr. Sahil Garg
For the Defendants : Ms. Meera Kaura Patel, Ms. Lata Singh
Headnote:
Trade Mark - Jurisdiction - Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 - Summary of Acts and Sections: Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 - The judgment discusses the interpretation and application of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and its relevance to the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The court's decision is influenced by the interpretation of the plaintiff's business location and the requirement of carrying on business for gaining jurisdiction under Section 134.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff filed suits seeking injunctions against the defendants for using a deceptively similar trade mark. The defendants filed applications for return/rejection of the plaint, citing lack of territorial jurisdiction. The plaintiff sought amendment of the plaint to include jurisdictional facts.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the plaint did not disclose territorial jurisdiction and held that it could not entertain the amendment to incorporate jurisdictional facts. The court dismissed the plaintiff's amendment applications and allowed the defendant's applications for return/rejection of the plaint.
Issues: The main issue was whether the court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suits based on the plaintiff's business location and the interpretation of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the plaint did not disclose territorial jurisdiction and could not entertain the amendment to include jurisdictional facts. The court's decision was influenced by the interpretation of the plaintiff's business location and the requirement of carrying on business for gaining jurisdiction under Section 134.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the plaintiff's amendment applications and allowed the defendant's applications for return/rejection of the plaint, thereby returning/rejecting the plaint in all the suits.
1. The plaintiff has instituted all these suits for permanent injunction restraining the defendant/s in each of the suits from using the trade mark ‘HINDUSTAN VITREOUS’ or ‘H VITREOUS’ or any other mark that is deceptively similar to the trade mark of the plaintiff on its products or which infringes the trade mark of the plaintiff and from thereby passing off their goods as that of the plaintiff and for ancillary reliefs of delivery and costs.
2. Each of the suits was entertained and vide ex parte ad interim orders therein the defendant/s in all the three suits were restrained as sought and a commission issued to visit the premises of the defendants and to seize the infringing goods.
3. The counsel for plaintiff on enquiry states that the plaint in all the three suits is identical. This Court, for the purpose of this order, has referred to the plaint and the applications in CS (Comm.) No.1082/2016.
4. It is not in dispute that the defendant/s in each of the suits are situated at Thangadh in Gujarat.
5. It is also not in dispute that the plaintiff, besides these three suits had also instituted CS (Comm.) No.1382/2016 against another set of defendants, also situated at Thangadh in Gujarat and the plaint in CS (Comm.) No.1382/2016 was also identical to the plaint in the present three suits and similar ex parte ad interim orders were issued in CS (Comm.) No.1382/2016 as well.
6. The defendants in CS (Comm.) No.1382/2016 filed application under Order VII Rules 10 & 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for return/rejection of the plaint for the reason of not disclosing this Court to be having territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and which applications came to be adjudicated vide judgment reported as HSIL Limited Vs. Marvel Ceramics 2017 SCC OnLine Del 6783 and the applications were allowed and the plaint ordered to be returned/rejected; rather than stating herein the reasons which prevailed with this Court in Marvel Ceramics supra, it is deemed appropriate to set out hereinbelow the relevant paragraphs of the order dated 30th January, 2017 supra as under:-
“5. Return/rejection of the plaint on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction is sought contending (i) that the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, in para 35 of the plaint has been invoked, referring to Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and not on the basis of any cause of action having accrued within the jurisdiction of the Court; (ii) that the plea of the plaintiff is also of allegedly infringing goods being sold outside Delhi; (iii) the plaintiff has expressly pleaded in para 35 of the plaint that the plaintiff does not have a branch/subordinate office in Gujarat where the defendants are located; (iv) however the plaintiff itself, at page 429 of its documents, in the document titled ‘Corporate Information’ has shown having a ‘Regional Office’ at Ahmedabad; (v) attention is also drawn to page 429 listing EVOK Stores, whereunder also mention is made of Gujarat Zodiac Square, S.G. Highway, Bodakd, Ahmedabad; (vi) the plaintiff has thus, in para 35 of the plaint falsely pleaded not having any branch/subordinate office in Gujarat where the defendants are located; (vii) that even otherwise, the plaintiff admittedly has its registered office at Kolkata; (viii) that the Division Bench of this Court in para 14 of Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey (2016) 227 DLT 320 has held that where the cause of action has accrued neither at the place of principal office nor at the place of subordinate office but at some other place, the plaintiff can be deemed to carry on business at the place of its principal office and not at the place of its subordinate office; and, (ix) thus the plaintiff herein, even if has a subordinate office at Delhi, though the same is also disputed, cannot invoke Section 134 at Delhi and can at best invoke the same at Kolkata.
6. The counsel for the plaintiff has in response contended, (i) that though the p