JUDGMENT

V. Kameswar Rao, J.

I.A. 11689/2022

1. By this order, I shall decide the aforesaid application which has been filed by the petitioner/applicant seeking condonation of delay in filing a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (`Act of 1996' for short) for quashing and setting aside the arbitral award dated February 04, 2022.

2. The Arbitrator had sent a soft copy of the impugned award dated February 04, 2022 to the applicant/petitioner by email and the hard copy thereof on February 14, 2022.

3. According to the applicant, the petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, is within limitation as the Supreme Court in Suo Moto Writ Petition No. 3/2020, directed that the period from March 15, 2020 till February 28, 2022, shall stand excluded for the purpose of limitation in all proceedings and that the period of limitation would start from March 1, 2022.

4. It is the case of the applicant that the statutory period of three months for challenging the impugned award had started from March 1, 2022 and expired on May 31, 2022, and the additional condonable period of 30 days for challenging the impugned award had expired on June 30, 2022.

5. It is also the case of the applicant that it had commenced internal deliberations for challenging the award and initiated the process for filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act, immediately after receiving the impugned award.

6. Mr. Rajiv Nayar, the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, stated that the employees and the legal team in the petitioner/applicant company, who are associated with the arbitration proceeding exited the company and due to this sudden departure of the employees, the process of filing the petition got severely hindered for three weeks, i.e., till end of March, 2022. He also stated that the newly recruited employees and legal team fell ill due to spread of COVID-19 and other infections due to seasonal changes, which caused hindrance in the process of filing, for another four weeks, i.e., till end of April, 2022.

7. He stated that, when the applicant approached its counsel and instructed them to initiate the filing process under Section 34 of the Act, the counsels informed the petitioner/applicant that they were no longer in a position to handle the disputes and declined to file the petition. Therefore, it was extremely difficult for the petitioner/applicant to file Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996 petition before May 31, 2022, the `prescribed period`. Thereafter, the petitioner/applicant after many attempts engaged a new counsel to defend its interest in setting aside the impugned award.

8. He stated that the new counsel could not file the petition as this Court was closed for summer vacations from June 3, 2022 till July 04, 2022, which prevented the petitioner/applicant from filing the petition for no fault of its own. He also stated that the number of days falling under summer vacations should be excluded in computing the extended and condonable period of limitation, and a fresh period of limitation would then commence which would actually expire on July 31, 2022.

9. He stated that the petitioner/applicant filed the petition on the re-opening day after the Court vacation and the applicant was well within the condonable period of thirty days, and it is evident that, there has been a delay of only three days beyond the statutory period, which are bona fide and beyond the control of the petitioner. Therefore, the delay of three days is minor and falls within discretionary condonable power of this Court.

10. Mr. Nayar contended the respondents' contention that Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (`Act of 1963', for short) does not apply to the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act of 1996, is untenable. He also submitted that the judgments relied by the respondent in Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Marketing Limited, (2012) 2 SCC 624, Sagufa Ahmed and Ors. v. Upper Assam Plywood Produ