The court ruled that undue delays and inaction by the petitioner firm precluded relief in a writ petition regarding composition charges, emphasizing the principle of laches in legal proceedings.

JUDGMENT :

1. The petitioner firm is invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950, seeking the issuance of an appropriate writ or direction for quashing of the impugned order dated 07/13.10.2003, passed by the His Excellency Lieutenant Governor/Director (Lands), and further seeking quashing of the demand of the composition fee amounting to Rs. 39,75,657/- in respect of Plot No. B-96/3, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase-1, New Delhi (hereinafter referred as ‘the plot in question’). The petitioner firm also seeks a direction requiring the respondent to refund the amount of Rs. 3,54,302.65/-, which was wrongly charged to the petitioner as an unearned increase.

BRIEF FACTS

2. It is the case of the petitioner firm that it was originally conducting its business at premises located at No. 119, Idgah, Motia Khan, Delhi. However, the said premises was declared non- confirming for industrial use as per MPD-1962 (Master Plan of Delhi, 1962) . In light of this, the DDA (Delhi Development Authority), under the statutory scheme of Large-Scale Acquisition and Disposal, offered the petitioner the plot in question in a confirming area. At the time of the allotment, the petitioner firm was a part of M/s Matchless Appliances (India), a partnership firm comprising of the petitioner firm along with Sh. Harbans Singh, and Sh. Jaswant Rai Saggi.

3. A demand letter dated 30.04.1969 was issued by the DDA, informing the petitioner of the allotment and requiring payment of half of the total premium for the plot in question. However, the allotment was subsequently cancelled by the DDA through a letter dated 29.09.1970, citing the petitioner firm's failure to make the required payment of the premium. The petitioner firm transitioned into a sole proprietorship on 03.03.1971, and the petitioner firm sought substitution of its status as a sole proprietor with the DDA well in advance of taking possession of the plot in question. The petitioner made the payment on 31.03.1971.

4. On 08.09.1971, the DDA informed the petitioner firm that the request to transfer the allotment to M/s. Kalsi Finance Pvt. Ltd. would be granted upon submission of an Indemnity Bond on a Rs. 10/- non-judicial stamp paper. The petitioner firm promptly submitted the bond, but the DDA unjustifiably delayed the transfer without an explanation.

5. The cancellation of the plot remained effective until 1977, as evidenced by the respondent's letters dated 01.10.1976 and 20.12.1976, wherein it was explicitly stated that the allotment had been restored, subject to the payment of the restoration charges amounting to Rs. 600/-. The petitioner firm duly paid the said restoration charges on 28.02.1977 and the cancellation of the plot remained in force until 28.02.1977, when the restoration charges were paid. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner firm became aware of the cancellation for the first time in 1976, despite having consistently pursued the substitution of the allotment in favour of M/s. Kalsi Finance Pvt. Ltd., as per the agreement dated 03.03.1971.

6. Disputes arose between the partners of the firm, which led to the filing of Suit No. 31-A/1968 before this Court, and by order dated 19.10.1979, the disputes were settled, and the agreement dated 03.03.1971 was duly acknowledged.

7. During the allotment of the plot in question, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act (ULCR Act) was in force, requiring the petitioner firm to obtain an NOC (No Objection Certificate) from the competent authority under the ULCR Act, prior to commencing any construction. Following the restoration of the plot in question, the petitioner approached the authorities on 11.08.1980, seeking the necessary exemption under the law to proceed with construction. The Under Secretary (ULCR), Delhi Administration, by letter dated 10.09.1980, directed the petitioner to submit an attested copy of the title document i.e. the lease deed, as the authorities wer