A landlord can bring subsequent events, such as default in rent payment, to the notice of the court by proper application, and if the tenant fails to pay rent during the pendency of the eviction suit, the court can pass an order of ejectment treating the tenant as a defaulter.

H.N. Sarma, J.

1. These two revision petitions have been referred by the learned single Judge to the Division Bench for resolving the conflict that was noticed in the judgment of this Court rendered in Mahadeo Prasad Agarwala and Ors. v. Sohanlal Garodia and anr, reported in 1991 (GHC) 26A(NOC) and in Abdul Matin Choudhury and anr, v. Nityananda Dutta Banik, reported in 1997 (2) GLT 590. The conflict that was noticed by the learned single Judge relates to the requirement to pay the monthly rent by a tenant to the landlord during the pendency of an ejectment suit filed by the landlord against the tenant failure of which the Appellant would entitle eviction, even though the default relates to period after filing of the eviction suit. In case of Abdul Matin Choudhury and Anr. (Supra) it has been held that such a liability to pay the monthly rent to the land lord subsists even the eviction suit is pending and in case of default the land lord may bring the same to the notice of the Court by a prudent manner for getting decree of ejectment against the tenant. In the case of Mahadeo Prasad Agarwala and Ors. (supra) it has been held that in an ejectment suit on the ground of default filed by the land lord, the period of default is specified in the plaint and default for other subsequent period is not entitled to be considered by the Court in session of the eviction proceeding as it gives rise to separate cause of action. C.R.P. No. 34/2000

2. We have heard Mr. S.S. Sharma learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners/Plaintiffs and Mr. B.K. Goswami, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite party/Defendant in C.R.P. No. 34/2000. We have also heard Mr. N. Choudhury learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. B.R. Dey, learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party in C.R.P. No. 295/2002.

3. Instead of confining ourselves only in answering the reference, as agreed to by both the learned Counsel for the parties in C.R.P. No. 34/2000, we propose to dispose of the revision petition also on merit, in view of the undisputed facts.

4. To put in short the relevant facts for disposal of the revision petition inter alia are as follows:

The suit premises described in the schedule of the plaint was rented to the predecessor in interest of the opposite party on monthly rent of Rs. 251/- as per Bengali Calendar Month to be payable within the 1st week of the next months. An agreement was also executed between the parties to that effect and an amount of Rs. 5001/- was paid in advance to the landlord by the tenant to be adjusted at the rate of 100/- P.M. against the monthly rent. The tenant having defaulted to pay the rent from the month of Kartik 31st B.S. and the suit house also being required for bonafide use and occupation of the land lord for carrying on business of his son, and the tenant having refused to vacate the same on demand, the land lord/Petitioner filed Title Suit No. 23/85 in the Court of the learned, Munsiff, Goalpara for ejectment of the tenant. In due course, the said suit was transferred to the Court of the learned Munsiff, Bongaigaon. At the close of the trial the learned trial Court vide judgment and order dated 14.8.89 decreed the suit holding the tenant to be defaulter in payment of rent as well as on the ground of bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the land lord. The said decree was assailed by the Defendant/opposite party in Title Appeal No. 25/93 and the learned District Judge, Bongaigaon vide judgment and order dated 3.10.94 dismissed the appeal inter alia holding that the suit premises are required bonafide by the landlord, however, setting aside the finding of the learned trial Court on defaulter. The said judgment was further assailed by the tenant before the High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 544/94 and vide judgment and order dated 2.9.97 setting aside the appellate judgment, the matter was remanded back by the High Court to the learned appellate Court for reconsideration. After remand