Important Points:
" The Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order XXXIX, C.P.C. There is no such expression in S. 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order XXXIX or by any rules made under the Code.
" The provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. The effect of the expression `if it is so prescribed` is only this that when the rules prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issue, ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary order in the interest of justice, but is merely to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule
" If the provisions of the S. 94 were not there in the Code, the Court could still issue temporary injunctions, but it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. No party has a right to insist on the Court`s exercising that jurisdiction and the Court exercises its inherent jurisdiction only when it considers it absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to do so- It is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of S. 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court to exercise its inherent power.

K. Harilal, J.

1. Has the District Court, while exercising jurisdiction under section 25 of the Travancore Cochin Literary Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as Act 12 of 1955), the power to grant an interim order of injunction? This is the question that has been referred to this Division Bench by the Reference order.

Prelude

2. The aforesaid question of law has been referred to this Division Bench by the single Judge sitting in review of an order passed earlier by a Single Bench of this court, confirming an order of temporary injunction granted by the District Judge, on an application filed under section 25 of Act 12/1955.

3.According to the learned single Judge, the view expressed in Oorazhma Devaswom Board, Vaduthala v. Brahmadhathan Namboodhiri and others 2014 (1) KHC 383 :: 2014 (1) KLJ 486 stands in conflict with the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Nawab Usma Ali Khan v. Sagarmal AIR 1965 SC 1798, Thresia v. Xavier (AIR 977 Kerala 118 (FB),Gandhian Institute of Studies, Varanasi v. 4th Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others (2007 AIHC 103) and Parayakattu Nalukulangara Devaswom v. Padmanabhan Harshas & others 1983 KLT 803 :: 1983 KLJ 232.

The views in conflict

4. In Oorshama Devaswom Board's case (supra) the court held thus:

"An application for interim injunction against the opposite party in such proceedings can be entertained, but, only in exceptional cases, taking note that the proceedings are governed by section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure."

The aforesaid view is in conflict with the decisions referred to below, according to the learned single Judge.

5. In Nawab Usma Ali Khan v. Sagarmal AIR 1965 SC 1798 the Apex Court held thus:

"Section 141 makes applicable to other proceedings only those provisions of the Code which deal with procedure and not those which deal with substantive rights."

6. In Thresia v. Xavier AIR 977 Kerala 118 (FB) it was held thus:

"Provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure contain both substantive and procedural rights and what is made applicable to proceedings other than suits by section 141 of the CPC is only those provisions which deal with matters of procedure and even in respect of those matters only those which could be made applicable. The Full Bench also noticed that a proceeding under Order 33 is a substantive right."

7. The Allahabad High Court in Gandhian Institute of Studies, Varanasi v. 4th Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others 2007 AIHC 103 enumerated the main procedural provisions in the Code thus:

"Only such provisions are applicable which facilitate the court in arriving at rightful conclusions such as filing of written statement; appearance of parties; examination of parties by the court; discovery and inspection; admissions; production of return of documents; settlement of issues and determination of suits on issues of law or on issues agreed upon disposal of proceeding of first hearing; summoning and attendance of witnesses; adjournments; hearing of suit and examination of witnesses; commissions; judgment, costs."

8. In Parayakattu Nalukulangara Devaswom v. Padmanabhan Harshas & others 1983 KLT 803 :: 1983 KLJ 232 a learned single Judge of this Court held thus:

"This is a provision which enables only certain persons to do certain matters for certain limited purposes. There is nothing in the section which either expressly or impliedly shows or indicates that under this section the District Court can interfere with the convening of a general body or conducting of elections or even convening of a Special General Body. There is also nothing in this section which either expressly or impliedly ousts the jurisdiction of a civil court, particularly in matters relating to convening of General Body or conducting of elections. As stated earlier, this section only confines to matters stated therein."

9. In Arjan Singh v. Punit Ahluwalia and others (2008) 8 SCC 348 the Apex Court held as follows:

"To the said effect,