IMPORTANT POINT
Suspension of a conviction under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. is exceptional, requiring demonstration of irreversible consequences, which was not established in this case.

ORDER :

The petitioner herein is the accused in C.C.No.77/2013 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Kollam. He was convicted for offences underSection 498A and 406, read with Section 34 of the Penal Code in the said Calendar Case.

2. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Additional Sessions Court-III, Kollam vide C.R.A No.172/2024. He also preferred Crl.M.P No.1547/2024 seeking suspension of the sentence and also suspension of the order of conviction, rather the judgment of conviction, to be more precise.

3. The reason espoused for seeking suspension of the judgment of conviction is the possibility of initiating disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, a Plus Two teacher in a Government school, which would result in break in his service. By virtue of the impugned Annexure-A2 Order, the learned Sessions Judge allowed Crl.M.P No.1547/2024 in part, suspending the order of sentence, but refusing to do so, insofar as the judgment of conviction is concerned. The learned Sessions Judge placed reliance upon K.C.Sareen v. CBI [ (2001) 6 SCC 584 ] and also Ajithkumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation [ 2019 (1) KHC 149 ] in arriving at the said conclusion.

4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. The defacto complainant was not originally impleaded in this Crl.M.C and pursuant to an impleading petition filed thereafter, she was impleaded as additional 2^nd respondent. Heard the learned counsel for the 2^nd respondent/defacto complainant, who was subsequently impleaded in this Crl.M.C. Also, heard the learned Public Prosecutor on behalf of the 1^st respondent State. Perused the records.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that several proceedings are pending between the petitioner and the 2^nd respondent, who are husband and wife. The instant case alleging offences under Section 498A - later incorporating the offence under Sections 406 and 420 pursuant to further investigation - is the offshoot of such a marital discord between them. According to the learned counsel, a case of this nature, which is essentially private in nature between the petitioner and the 2^nd respondent, emanating from matrimonial disputes, should be considered in a different pedestal, unlike cases which arise from the Prevention of Corruption Act etc. Learned counsel would point out that, if disciplinary action is initiated against the petitioner, it would cause serious and irreparable harm to him, entailing break in service. Learned counsel would detail the various proceedings pending between the petitioner/husband and the 2^nd respondent/wife. O.P.(HMA) No.758/2012 for divorce preferred by the petitioner was allowed. An R.P(FC) No.244/2015 is now pending before this Court at the instance of the 2^nd respondent. M.C.No.144/2013 preferred by the 2^nd respondent seeking maintenance was allowed by the Family Court, Kollam. R.P(FC) No.176/2015 is pending before this Court against that Order, at the instance of the petitioner herein. O.P.No.774/2013 for recovery of gold ornaments preferred by the 2^nd respondent was allowed by the Family Court, Kollam. The said judgment is challenged before this Court, vide Mat.Appeal No.383/2015. Another Original Petition, O.P(Others) No.241/2016, in respect of a residential building of the petitioner, was decreed in favour of the petitioner, which is under challenge in Mat.Appeal No.42/2023 before this Court. The 2^nd respondent is presently residing in that building, whereas the petitioner, in a rented house. One another Original Petition, O.P(Money) No.739/2016 preferred by the defacto complainant was dismissed, which is under challenge before this Court as Mat.Appeal No.215/2023. Apart from the above litigation, the 2^nd respondent filed a Writ Petition before this Court as W.P(C) No.31117/2022 seeking initiation of immediate disciplinary action against the petitioner. Learned counsel would submit that in the wake of the above referred proceedings, the judgment in C.C.No.77/2013 is also liable to be