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2015 Supreme(Raj) 2094

RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT AT JAIPUR BENCH
Veerendr Singh Siradhana, J.
RSRTC, Alwar - Appellant
Versus
Tej Ram & Ors. - Respondent
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3584 of 1998.
Decided On : 16-12-2015

Advocates:
For the Petitioner:Mukesh Kumar Verma, Advocate.
For the Respondent:Mahendra Shah, Advocate.

The Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is limited to determining whether a prima facie case is made out for approval of the penalty imposed by the employer. The Tribunal cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the domestic inquiry officer and cannot interfere with the findings of the domestic inquiry unless they are perverse or arbitrary.

Headnote:

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 - SECTION 33(2)(B) - APPROVAL OF PENALTY - SCOPE OF TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION - DOMESTIC INQUIRY - FAIRNESS AND PROPERNESS - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE - INTERFERENCE BY TRIBUNAL.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, challenged the order of the Industrial Tribunal declining approval of the penalty of removal from service of the respondent-workman, Teja Ram, for misconduct.

Finding of the Court:

The Tribunal found the domestic inquiry fair and proper but declined approval of the penalty on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

Issues: 1. Whether the Tribunal erred in declining approval of the penalty despite finding the domestic inquiry fair and proper. 2. Whether the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by re-examining the evidence and interfering with the findings of the domestic inquiry.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is limited to determining whether a prima facie case is made out for approval of the penalty imposed by the employer. 2. The Tribunal cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the domestic inquiry officer and cannot interfere with the findings of the domestic inquiry unless they are perverse or arbitrary. 3. In the present case, the Tribunal erred in re-examining the evidence and interfering with the findings of the domestic inquiry, which were based on sufficient evidence and were not perverse or arbitrary.

Final Decision: The writ petition was allowed, the impugned order of the Tribunal was quashed and set aside, and the findings of the domestic inquiry were confirmed.

JUDGMENT

1. - Aggrieved of the order dated 15th November, 1997; declining the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'Act of 1947'), the petitioner - Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for short, 'Corporation'), has instituted the instant writ application challenging the legality, validity and correctness of the order.

2. Briefly, the skeletal material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy raised herein are that the respondent-workman Teja Ram (deceased), was proceeded with for a disciplinary action for he misbehaved with the Manager (Traffic), Alwar Depot, of the petitioner Corporation under intoxication on 4th January, 1994. The respondent-workman was placed under suspension on 4th November, 1994, and was served with a charge sheet for acts and omissions as contemplated under Order 34 of the Standing Orders. On conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer returned a finding of guilt against the respondent-workman for having committed nuisance while on duty at the premises of the petitioner Corporation within the ambit of Clause (b) and (h) of the Order 34 of the Standing Orders. The Disciplinary Authority on a consideration of the findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer on the basis of evidence and materials available on record as well as affording an opportunity of personal hearing to the respondent-workman, inflicted a penalty of removal from service of the Corporation vide order dated 22nd November, 1994. Since, a general reference was pending, an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947, was moved before the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur (for short 'the Tribunal'), for approval of the penalty of removal from service of the Corporation vide order dated 22nd September, 1994.

3. The Tribunal on a consideration of the facts and materials available on record, concluded that the domestic inquiry conducted by the Corporation was fair and proper. However, on the issue of sufficiency of evidence justifying the penalty inflicted declined the approval on the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947; of which the petitioner Corporation is aggrieved of.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Corporation, Mr. Mukesh Kumar Verma, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, asserted that the respondent-workman on 4th January, 1994, though was on leave, came to the premises of the Corporation while he was intoxication and entered the office of Shri A.K. Johari, Manager (Traffic), Ajmer Depot, at about 10.00 A.M. and abused him and also made an attempt to assault him, which disturbed the atmosphere and discipline of the workshop. The respondent-workman was placed under suspension vide order dated January, 1994, and was served with a charge sheet for misconduct as contemplated under Clause 34 of the Standing Orders, 1965. Further, the domestic inquiry was held strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed affording ample opportunity of defence to the respondent-workman. The Inquiry Officer on a proper analysis of the evidence and materials available on record during the course of inquiry, returned the finding of guilt.

5. It is further contended that the inquiry was held to be fair and proper by the Tribunal. Having held the inquiry to be fair and proper, the Tribunal, still interfered with the penalty of dismissal from service of the Corporation vide order dated 22nd September, 1994, and therefore, the Tribunal committed a gross error while declining the application of the petitioner Corporation under Section 34(2)(b) of the Act of 1947.

6. It is submitted that a bare glance of the text of Clause 34 of the Standing Orders would reveal that if one commits nuisance while on duty at any place including corporation premises, branch, booking offices or routes and comes on duty in drunken condition or takes liquor or intoxication while on duty or being found in drunken condition during working hours, amounts to a misconduct. T


















































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