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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR
Sudesh Bansal, J.
IFCI Ltd. – Appellant
Versus
M/s Satyatej Mercantile Pvt Ltd. – Respondent
S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 718/2019
Decided On : 04-11-2022
SARFAESI - Delay in Filing First Appeal - Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Improvement Trust, Ludhiana Vs. Ujagar Singh [(2010) 6 SCC 786], Ram Nath Sao Vs. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195], N. Balakrishnan Vs. M Krishnamurhty [(1998) 7 SCC 123], Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation [(2010) 5 SCC 459], Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157]
Fact of the Case:
Appellant-IFCI Limited, a Government of India undertaking and Public Financial Institution, filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the first appeal, assailing the judgment and decree dated 12.02.2019, whereby a suit for payment of rent and warehousing charges was decreed against the appellant. The appellant claimed that the delay in filing the appeal was due to the negligence of its counsel in informing about the judgment and decree.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found that the delay of 57 days in filing the first appeal was not deliberate and did not suffer from mala fides. The Court observed that the appellant, being a public sector institution, had high stakes in the first appeal. The Court also noted that the term 'Sufficient Cause' should be construed liberally and that the delay should be condoned unless there are mala fides attributed to the appellant in causing the delay deliberately and knowingly to achieve some undue advantage.
Issues: The issues involved the condonation of delay in filing the first appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and whether the appellant's explanation for the delay constituted 'Sufficient Cause'.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court applied the principle that the term 'Sufficient Cause' should be construed liberally and that the delay in filing the first appeal should be condoned unless there are mala fides attributed to the appellant in causing the delay deliberately and knowingly to achieve some undue advantage.
Final Decision: The Court allowed the application for condonation of delay and disposed of the related application. The first appeal was listed for admission.
ORDER
1. Appellant-Defendant has moved application (I.A.No.1/2022), stating inter alia that appellant-IFCI Limited is a Government of India undertaking and Public Financial Institution, which has preferred this first appeal, assailing the judgment and decree dated 12.02.2019, whereby and whereunder suit for payment of Rs.18 lakhs and Rs.50,000/- per month continuously, as rent and warehousing charges, has been decreed against the appellant, on account of non-removal of 24 looms from the property of Modern Syntax (India) Limited, which was put in public auction under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002, for which respondent-plaintiff stood highest bidder and therefore, after finalizing his bid, sale deed dated 20.11.2009 has been executed in favour of plaintiff. It has been stated that in execution of the impugned decree, respondent-decree holder has already recovered amount of Rs.68,58,555/- on 20.09.2019 and thereafter, again bank account of appellant has been attached for an amount of Rs.21,24,000/- vide order dated 10.10.2022 in execution proceedings by the Court of Additional District Judge No.1, Alwar, therefore, there is urgency in the matter and it has been prayed that since first appeal is delayed by 57 days, so an application (CMCC 1367/2019) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred as ’the Act of 1963’) has also been filed. Hence in such circumstances matter may be heard earliest.
2. For reasons mentioned in the application, supported with the order-sheet of the Court of Additional District Judge No.1, Alwar, dated 10.10.2022, in respect of attachment of bank account of the appellant, the application for early hearing (I.A.No.1/2022), is allowed.
3. With consent of learned counsel for both parties, heard on the application (CMCC 1367/2019), filed under Section 5 of the Act of 1963, seeking condonation of delay in filing first appeal.
4. In the application, appellant has indicated that there is delay of 64 days in filing first appeal but Registry of High Court has pointed out the delay of only 57 days, therefore, appellant has moved application (I.A.No.1/2020) to correct the period of delay from 64 days to 57 days only.
5. Respondent-plaintiff filed reply on 07.08.2019, to the application of appellant, filed under Section 5 of the Act of 1963, and has seriously opposed the application.
6. This Court, vide Order dated 11.11.2019, directed the counsel for appellant to file additional affidavit in order to explain the delay. In compliance thereof, an additional affidavit of Mr. V. Sreekumaran Nair, General Manager (Law), of appellant has been placed on record on 20.11.2019. Respondent-plaintiff has also filed counter affidavit on 06.12.2019.
7. It has been stated in the application under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 that the impugned judgment and decree dated 12.02.2019 was passed ex parte and appellant came to know about the judgment and decree only on 04.07.2019, thereafter, the first appeal has been filed immediately on 15.07.2019. It has been indicated in the application that the counsel for appellantdefendant had ensured that he will inform and shall call upon the appellant-defendant, as and when its presence shall be necessary, but he did not call upon appellant-defendant at the time when appearance of appellant was necessary. Later on, when appellant-IFCI contacted to its counsel, then he informed that suit has been decreed ex parte vide judgment and decree dated 12.02.2019 and supplied the copy of the judgment. It is stated that though the counsel for appellant had obtained certified copy of the judgment on 20.02.2019, but he never informed the appellant. It has been submitted that on account of negligence on the part of counsel, the party should not be punished and the delay in filing the appeal be condoned. In additional affidavit, it has been stated that since there is no branch/office of appellant-IFCI at Alwar a
The term 'Sufficient Cause' for condonation of delay should be construed liberally, and the delay in filing the first appeal should be condoned unless there are mala fides attributed to the appellant....
Point of Law : Merely because the appellant is Government organization, lenience cannot be shown to condone such a long delay.
The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for a sufficient cause to condone delay in filing appeals, emphasizing the importance of bona fide motive, inaction, and negligence....
The discretion to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be exercised judiciously, ensuring substantial justice while adhering to statutory principles.
The principle that the law of limitation must be strictly adhered to, and that the burden of proving sufficient cause for condonation of delay lies with the appellant, is crucial in ensuring timely j....
A party seeking to condone delay in appeals must demonstrate sufficient cause, which cannot rely on bureaucratic inefficiency or negligence.
The court emphasized that delay in filing appeals must be strictly justified, and lack of bona fides or negligence can prevent condonation of delay.
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