Judicial review of transfer orders is limited; courts may only intervene in cases of mala fides or statutory violations, considering administrative exigencies and employee disabilities.

ORDER :

(Sameer Jain, J.)

The instant petition is listed on specific directions of this Court, as pursuant to the grant of interim protection vide order dated 09.11.2020, the petition has been kept in abeyance for a prolonged period of time.

2. At the outset, it is noted that the Hon'ble Apex Court, through a plethora of judgments, has time and again held that the permissibility and scope of judicial review against transfer orders is minuscule. The rationale exercised to circumscribe the Courts interference with transfer orders whilst exercising writ jurisdiction, primarily pertains to the fact that a bedlam of an aggravated magnitude shall ensue within the workings of the Government, if all employees, posted at a location of their liking, refuse to and/or contest their postings, when issued on account of administrative exigencies. Inevitably, the only scope of interference subsists in an eventuality where the transfer orders are issued on account of certain malafides, at the end of the transferring authority.

3. The consideration regarding which employee should be posted 'where', falls purely within the administrative domain of the appropriate authority/department to decide, in the best interests of the working of the said department, whilst seeking to advance the department's resultant output and service efficiency. Unless the order is vitiated by mala fides or is passed in violation of any applicable statutory provisions, the Courts ought not to extend interference in such orders. By logical deduction, it is made rather obvious that no Government will be able to smoothly function if the Government Servants insist that once appointed or posted in a particular place, they should continue at such place, as long as they desire whilst meeting out their individualistic and familial ease. The fact of the transfer being an indispensable part of an employee's service is of paramount importance, which often loses favourability at the end of the employee, when they become comfortable with the place of their choosing.

4. It is noted that a government employee, posted at a location of their liking, does not have the fundamental protection to continue serving at the said location, especially in light of the fact that the incident of transfer, is a part and parcel of the conditions of service, when employed on a transferable post. It is true that the order of transfer often causes a lot of difficulties and dislocation in the family set up of the concerned employees but on that score alone, the order of transfer cannot be struck down. Administrative exigencies ought to prevail and/or take precedence over the familial and individualistic priorities of the employees posted on transferable jobs. The only eventuality, where the Courts may extend interference in transfer orders, is when the transfer orders violate an applicable statute or are passed on account of certain malice. In support of the aforesaid reliance can be placed upon the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court as enunciated in Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 659, Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka and Ors reported in (1986) 4 SCC 131, Rajendra Roy v. Union of India and Anr. reported in (1993) 1 SCC 148, National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Shri. Bhagwan reported in (2001) 8 SCC 574 and S.K. Nausad Rahaman v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (2022) 12 SCC 1.

5. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is noted that while passing the interim order dated 09.11.2020, this Court duly took note of the fact that the petitioner has a physical disability, on account of which, the petitioner is unable to perform field duties. The said fact qua the physical disability is also exhibited by the report of the Medical Board, which has voiced a disability to the extent of 40%.

6. At this juncture, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that as the interim protection has been operative in favour of the petitioner for a