The court ruled that serious offences under IPC, such as Section 307, cannot be quashed based on compromise, emphasizing the distinction between quashing and compounding offences.

JUDGMENT :

Rakesh Kainthla, J.

The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 88 of 2023, dated 18.09.2023, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341 , 323 , 325 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as IPC) based on the compromise effected between the petitioner (the accused) and respondent No.2 (the victim). (the parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they are arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

2. I have heard Mr. Rajiv Sirkeck, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Niyati Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents/State.

3. Mr. Rajiv Sirkeck, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that there is no bar in quashing the FIR registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC based on the compromise. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H.N. Pandakumar vs. State of Karnataka , 2025 INSC 37 in support of his submission.

4. Ms. Niyati Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State submitted that the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC is grave in nature and affects the society at large, hence the FIR cannot be quashed in the exercise of the inherent power of the Court.

5. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

6. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 : 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 that the power to quash the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. based on the compromise is different from the power of compounding under Section 320 of CrPC. It was observed:

“57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320, and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as, in its opinion, a continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts that have harmful effects on the public and consist of wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of society, and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Preventi