Conviction based solely on examination-in-chief without considering cross-examination violates principles of fairness and transparency in criminal jurisprudence.

ORDER :

IA No.10814 of 2024

This instant interlocutory application has been filed for suspension of sentence against the Judgment of conviction dated 15.03.2024 and order of sentence dated 16.03.2024 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge-I-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa, in connection with Special POCSO Case No. 59 of 2022 arising out of Jhinkpani P.S. Case No. 22 of 2022, whereby and whereunder the appellant has been convicted under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n) of the IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act and sentenced to undergo R.I. for 20 years and also directed to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- and in default of payment of fine, further directed to undergo R.I. for half year under Section 6 of POCSO Act, R.I. for five years with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and on default of payment of fine, S.I. for two months under Section 363 of IPC, R.I. for 8 years with a fine of Rs. 5000/- under Section 366 of IPC and in default of payment of fine, S.I. for two months, no separate sentence under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC. The sentences were directed to run concurrently.

2. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that it is a case where the prosecution has miserably failed in establishing the charge since the victim herself has not supported the prosecution version if her version will be taken into consideration as recorded in the cross- examination. Further, argument has been advanced that the learned trial court has convicted the appellant merely on the basis of the examination-in-chief although the reference of the testimony of the victim as has been recorded in the cross-examination has been taken note in the impugned judgment but there is no consideration otherwise there would not have been any conviction if proper consideration would have been there with respect to the testimony as has been made on behalf of the appellant as recorded in Para Nos. 19, 20 and 21 of the testimony of the victim who has been examined as P.W.-4. Learned counsel for the appellant based upon the aforesaid grounds has submitted that it is therefore a fit case for suspension of sentence.

3. While on the other hand, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State has vehemently opposed the prayer for suspension of sentence, however he is fair enough to admit the fact that the testimony as recorded in the cross-examination has not been considered by the learned trial Court since there is no finding with respect to the same. Such submission has been made by him after going through the impugned judgment particularly the finding part.

4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone across the findings recorded by the learned trial court in the impugned Judgment as also the testimonies of the witnesses available in the LCR and other material exhibits available therein.

5. This Court in order to appreciate the argument advanced on behalf of the parties gone through the testimony of the victim who has been examined as P.W.-4. Although she has supported the prosecution version in her examination-in-chief but in the cross-examination particularly in para nos. 19, 20 and 21 she has totally discarded prosecution version by making deposition that no illegal things have been done by the present appellant.

6. It appears from the Impugned Judgment that although the part of the cross-examination has been taken note by the learned trial Court in the Impugned Judgment but while considering the testimony in entirety the only reliance has been placed upon the testimony as has been made by the victim,P.W.-4 in the examination-in-chief.

7. The criminal jurisprudence is based upon the principle of fairness and transparency and the moment fairness and transparency is there it is incumbent duty of the learned trial Court to consider by weighing the testimony as recorded in the examination-in-chief with the cross-examination.

8. This Court has seen from the impugned judgment that although the reference of the examination-in-chief of the testimon