The prosecution must prove charges beyond reasonable doubt; failure to substantiate one charge affects the credibility of related charges.

ORDER :

I.A. No. 11265 of 2024

The instant interlocutory application has been filed under Section 430(1) of the BNSS, 2023 for suspension of sentence of the appellant in connection with the judgment of conviction dated 12.07.2024 and order of sentence dated 18.07.2024 passed in Sessions Trial No. 79 of 2018 arising out of Littipara P.S. Case No. 40 of 2017 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Pakur whereby and where under, the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 376 r/w 511 and 379 of the IPC and has been sentenced to undergo R.I. for 10 years with a fine of Rs.50,000/- and a default sentence of S.I. for 1 years under Section 376/511 of the IPC and R.I. for 3 years with a fine of Rs.10,000/- and a default sentence of S.I. for 6 months under Section 379 IPC .

2. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that it is a case where none of the ingredients of Sections 376/511 and 379 of the IPC is available but even then the appellant has been convicted under the aforesaid penal offences.

3. It has been contended that there is vital improvement in the prosecution version if the statement of the prosecutrix recorded in the F.I.R is compared with her testimony as P.W.1, which was recorded during course of trial.

4. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant that the P.W.1 has disclosed in the F.I.R that the appellant had fled away due to her resistance when he was trying to snatch her ornaments i.e., nose pin, ear ring, silver chain, silver anklet etc. However, in her testimony recorded during trial, P.W.1 has stated that the appellant fled away after the villagers came.

5. Further, ground has been made that Police on the same date raided the house of the appellant for the purpose of search of the belongings said to be snatched by the appellant, but they were not found in the house of the appellant, and despite the absence of any connecting evidence appellant has been convicted under Section 379 of the IPC.

6. Submission has also been made that if the instant case is based upon two penal offences, first is under Section 376/511 of the IPC and the second is under Section 379 of the IPC in the same transaction and one of the penal offence i.e. Section 379 IPC in the absence of any recovery, if the conviction has been made, then further prosecution version regarding the commission of rape cannot be said to be substantiated.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid grounds has submitted that it is a fit case for suspension of sentence since the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the charge beyond all reasonable doubts.

8. While on the other hand, learned P.P. has vehemently opposed the prayer for bail.

9. It has been contended by the learned P.P. by referring to the testimony of P.W.1 that not only P.W.1 has supported the prosecution version but the other witnesses have also supported the prosecution version.

10. Learned P.P., based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that it is not a fit case for suspension of sentence.

11. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and gone across the findings rendered by the learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment as also testimonies of the witnesses and the exhibits available in the L.C.R.

12. This Court, in order to appreciate the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties has gone through the F.I.R. wherein according to the prosecution version the victim who has been examined as P.W.1 has disclosed that on her resistance the appellant had fled away after snatching her belongings i.e., ornaments of nose and ear made of gold and chain and payal made of silver. She further stated in the F.I.R that after the incident she came to her house and narrated the incident to her mother and brother. But in her examination-in-chief in her testimony during course of trial she has deposed that when she raised alarm the villagers and her family members including her mother came at the place of occurrence and the appellant fle