The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Declaration u/s 3-D(1) must be issued within the prescribed period, and the court's inherent powers under Article 226 of the Constitution allow for the grant of interim relief.

ORDER :

Assailing the notification issued for the acquisition of the lands of the petitioners for the purpose of formation of National Highways – 45 as having lapsed in view of the Declaration having not been issued within the period of one year from the date of notification, the present writ petitions have been filed.

2. It is the case of the petitioners that the notification issued u/s 3-A (1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Act’) dated 12.10.2018, for the acquisition of the lands was challenged, by filing W.P. No.14729/2019, which was published in the Cuddalore Edition of ‘Dina Thanthi’ on 25.10.2018, in which this Court, vide order dated 22.5.2019 in WMP No.14725/2019 granted an order of interim stay of all further proceedings for a period of four weeks. Ultimately, vide order dated 30.7.2019, this Court dismissed the said writ petition.

3. It is the further case of the petitioners that summons dated 27.9.2019 was issued by the 3rd respondent directing the petitioners to appear for enquiry on 9.10.2019, to which a copy of the letter dated 18.9.2019 containing the technical opinion of the National Highways Authority was annexed so as to enable the petitioners to raise objections. It is the further case of the petitioners that they participated in the enquiry and raised their objections for the acquisition of their lands contending that the lands are agricultural lands. However, the 3rd respondent, vide order dated 9.10.2019, disallowed the objections of the petitioners u/s 3-C of the Act.

4. It is the further case of the petitioner that though notification was issued on 12.10.2018, however, only after a period of one year from the date of notification, the Declaration u/s 3-D (1) of the Act was published in the Government Gazette on 11.11.2019. Thereafter, the 3rd respondent called upon the petitioner vide communication dated 16.12.2019 for the enquiry to be conducted u/s 3-G (3) of the Act for the purpose of determination of compensation in which the petitioners participated and reiterated their objections. Since the Declaration was published after the expiry of a period of one year from the date of notification, the same is in violation of Section 3-D (3) of the Act, which would render the acquisition proceedings as lapsed. Therefore, the present writ petitions have been filed to declare the aforesaid acquisition proceedings as having lapsed.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submit that the Declaration u/s 3-D (1) having been issued beyond the period of one year from the date of issuance of Notification u/s 3-A (1), the said notification ceases to have any effect and no acquisition can be made in pursuance of the said notification. It is the submission of the learned counsel that Declaration u/s 3-D (1) ought to have been issued within one year from the date of publication of notification u/s 3-A excluding the period during which stay was in subsistence in the proceedings initiated before this Court. In the proceedings initiated by the writ petitioner in W.P. No.14729/19, this Court, vide its order dated 22.5.2019, had granted an order of stay in WMP No.14725/19 for a period of four weeks, which was never extended. That being the case, excluding the said period, the Declaration u/s 3-D (1) ought to have been issued and published on 03.09.2019, but it has been published only on 11.11.2019, in the Government Gazette, which is beyond the period of one year prescribed under the proviso to Section 3-D of the Act. Therefore, the acquisition proceedings would cease to exist u/s 3-D (3) of the Act and the acquisition proceedings cannot be carried on.

6. It is the further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the stay having been in operation only for a period of four weeks, wherein after, the said stay having not been extended, the stay ceased to exist and, therefore, only the period during which the stay was in operation alone should be excluded for the purpose of computing the l