Acquittal from criminal conviction does not automatically restore employment rights or benefits if statutory disqualification exists due to prior conviction involving moral turpitude.

ORDER :

1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the order dated 03.08.2018 and to direct the third respondent to treat the period of suspension of the petitioner between 25.05.2010 to 29.02.2016 as duty with pay along with the Scale V, VI and VII promotions.

2. Heard Ms. Nandhini H, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. K. Srinivasamurthy, learned counsel for respondents and perused the materials available on record.

3. When the petitioner was working as Chief Manager in the first respondent Bank at the time of his compulsory retirement on 25.05.2010, the punishment of compulsory retirement was imposed at the culmination of disciplinary proceedings initiated against him. In this regard a criminal case has been registered against the petitioner in R.C.No.41(A)/2008 on 05.08.2008 on the file of the CBI under the Prevention of Corruption Act and charge sheet has been filed in C.C.No.4/2008 on the file of II Additional District Judge/Special Judge for CBI cases, Coimbatore. At the conclusion of the trial, the petitioner was found guilty and convicted.

4. Now the petitioner contends that his conviction was set aside in an appeal and hence he should be deemed to have continued in service as though he was neither placed under suspension nor he was not imposed with the punishment of compulsory retirement. The petitioner referred Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. For the sake of clarity, Section 10 of the said Act is as follows:

10. Prohibition of employment of managing agents and restrictions on certain forms of employment:

(1) No banking company-

(a) shall employ or be managed by a managing agent; or

(b) shall employ or continue the employment of any person -

(i) who is, or at any time has been, adjudicated insolvent, or has suspended payment or has compounded with his creditors, or who is, or has been, convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude, or

(ii) whose remuneration or part of whose remuneration takes the form of commission or of a share in the profits of the company."

5. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner did not challenge the punishment of compulsory retirement and he is drawing pension and he has drawn all the terminal benefits, immediately after he was sent on compulsory retirement. The petitioner being a convict has a statutory disqualification to work in a financial institution like banking institution. Further, the employees who have imposed with the punishment of compulsory retirement on or before 30.04.2015 alone are eligible for encashment of privilege leave. Since the petitioner was imposed with compulsory retirement on 25.05.2010, he is not eligible for leave encashment as that of those employees who have been imposed with similar punishment on or before 30.04.2015. Even if the petitioner was not imposed with the punishment of compulsory retirement, he would have attained the age of superannuation during February, 2016 itself. His conviction was set aside on appeal only on 23.10.2017 which is subsequent to his attaining the age of superannuation and hence he is not eligible to get the relief as prayed.

5.1. In support of his above contention, the learned counsel for the respondent relied on the following judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that merely because there has been an acquittal, it does not entitle the petitioner to get the mandatory benefits or other service benefits as claimed:

(i) Union of India and Ors. Vs. Jaipal Singh, (2003) Supp. (5) SCR 115

(ii) State Bank of India and another Vs. Mohammed Abdul Rahim, (2013) 11 Supreme Court Cases 67

6. On perusal of the judgment passed in the criminal appeal filed by the petitioner, it is seen that the conviction of the trial Court was set aside on the finding that the trial Court failed to appreciate the material contradictions in the evidence. It is further observed that there is a probability of animosity between the accused and the defacto complainant which might re