JUDGMENT

Jagmohan Bansal, J. - The petitioners through instant petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., on the basis of compromise, are seeking quashing of FIR No.99, dated 21.09.2021, under Sections 498A and 406 of IPC, registered at Police Station Verowal, District Tarn Taran (Annexure P-1), and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom.

2. In terms of orders of this Court, learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Khadur Sahib has submitted his report. It confirms that all the parties and Investigating Officer appeared before the Court and tendered their statements qua compromise arrived at between the parties. The compromise is voluntary, genuine and without any coercion. No accused is a proclaimed offender. All the accused as well complainant have entered into compromise.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that divorce petition under Section 13B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 stands filed.

4. Learned State counsel on instruction from Investigating Officer and learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that they have no objection if FIR and consequent proceedings in view of compromise are quashed.

5. Relying upon its earlier judgments in 'Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others, (2012) 10 SCC 303' and 'The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others (2019) 5 SCC 688', a two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 'Ramgopal and another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 2021 SCC online SC 834' while dealing with power of High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash non- compoundable offences on the basis of compromise between the disputing parties has held:

'11. True it is that offences which are 'non-compoundable' cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such attempt by the court would amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section 320Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Section 320Cr.P.C., which may justify its wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket of 'compoundable' offences which have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework of Section 320Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Section 482Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for justifiable reasons can press Section 482Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.

12. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non- compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal justice system.

13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where the offences are pre-dominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck post-conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness