JUDGMENT

Ms. Jaishree Thakur, J.

The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing order dated 02.03.2017 (Annexure P-4) whereby two annual increments of the petitioner were stopped without future effect, suspension period was treated as leave of kind due and termination period as extra ordinary leave besides order dated 07.06.2017 (Annexure P-5) whereby claim of the petitioner for back wages and other allowances for the period from 05.08.2001 to 02.03.2015, stood rejected, despite the fact that he has been acquitted of the charges levelled against him.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner joined the respondent-department i.e. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, as a daily wager, in the year 1980. Thereafter, in 1985, he was regularized on the post of Store Mate, and in the year 1998, he was given promotion as a Driver. However, an FIR No.214, under Sections 392 , 397, 120-B of IPC and Section 25 of the ARMS ACT , 1959, was registered against him at Police Station City Kaithal, on 15.05.2000 with the allegation that he, while working as Driver of the vehicle which was going to the Bank for remittance, looted an amount of Rs.3.27 lacs at gun point in connivance with private persons. He was served with a charge sheet dated 24.01.2001 and an Inquiry Officer was appointed, who, vide his report dated 11.02.2003, found the petitioner actively involved in the looting of cash. The trial Court as well held him guilty and convicted him under Section 411 IPC vide judgment dated 08.04.2003 and vide order dated 10.04.2003, sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years. On conviction, the respondent department terminated the petitioner on 08.08.2003 from the date of conviction. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached this Court by way of filing appeal i.e. CRA-S-798-SB-2003, which was allowed vide judgment dated 14.05.2014 by giving him benefit of doubt and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court was set aside. Accordingly, the competent authority i.e. respondent No.3 reinstated the petitioner in service on 03.03.2015, pending charge-sheet. The competent authority, vide order dated 02.03.2017 (Annexure P-4), after considering the reply submitted by the petitioner as well as other relevant facts, awarded punishment of stoppage of two annual increments without future effect; his suspension order was treated as leave of kind due and termination period was treated as extra ordinary leave. Vide order dated 07.06.2017 (Annexure P-5), his claim for back wages and other allowances for the period from 05.08.2001 to 02.03.2015, was rejected.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would argue that once the petitioner has been acquitted, he cannot be deprived from the benefits of back wages. The principle of 'no work, no pay' will not apply to the case of the petitioner as he was always ready and willing to perform his duties, but was stopped by the respondents. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and others v. Nathu Ram , 2010(1) SCC 428 ; Ram Anjore v. Uttari Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam and others, 2016(2) S.C.T., 716; Prabhu Dayal Madan v. State of Haryana and another, 2015(1) PLR 86.

4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents argued that merely because the petitioner was acquitted would not automatically entitle the petitioner to get salary for the period during which he remained out of service.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties