JUDGMENT : 

NEERJA K. KALSON, J.

1. This criminal revision petition arises out of a deeply unfortunate incident wherein a young married woman and her infant child, stated to be about 8-10 days old, lost their lives. The case culminated in a judgment dated 20.07.2005 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhiwani whereby the accused were acquitted of the charges framed under Sections 304-B, 498-A, 302, 201 read with Section 34 IPC. The acquittal, as noticed from the impugned judgment, was inter alia premised on aspects such as delay in lodging of the FIR, absence of post-mortem evidence regarding the cause of death, inconsistencies in witness statements vis-à-vis their versions recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., and non-establishment of the essential ingredients of the offence alleged. However, this Court makes it clear at the outset that it does not propose to re- appreciate the evidence or examine the correctness of such findings on merits, the present adjudication being confined strictly to the parameters governing revisional jurisdiction.

2. The prosecution was set into motion on the basis of FIR No. 75 dated 05.05.2002. Upon completion of investigation, the matter was committed to the Court of Sessions and tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who, after a full-fledged trial, recorded a finding of acquittal vide judgment dated 20.07.2005. Aggrieved thereby, the present revision petition has been filed.

3. Learned counsel for the revisionist has assailed the impugned judgment on the ground that the findings recorded by the trial Court are unsustainable and is based on conjectures and surmises. He submits that the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in its true perspective. The eye witness to the incident has specifically stated that both the deceased were killed by the accused persons in relation to demand of dowry.It is further contended that the petitioner along with his uncle Sumer Singh had found the neck of deceased to be of bluish colour, tongue protruding out and she was also having burn injuries over her body. He contends that the deceased Saroj and her infant daughter was hurriedly cremated by the respondents.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, has submitted that the scope of interference in revision is extremely limited and that even if some irregularity is assumed, this Court cannot convert an acquittal into conviction. It is fairly not disputed that the legal position in this regard stands settled.

5. The scope of revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. is narrow and circumscribed. The revisional Court does not act as an appellate forum and is not required to reappreciate evidence merely because another view is possible. The jurisdiction is supervisory, intended to correct patent illegality, jurisdictional error, or perversity resulting in miscarriage of justice. The embargo contained in Section 401(3) Cr.P.C. clearly bars conversion of an acquittal into conviction. It has been reiterated in a catena of judgments that such powers are to be exercised sparingly and with great caution.

6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) & Anr. reported in (2002) 6 SCC 650, has held that interference in revision against acquittal is permissible only in exceptional cases where there is manifest illegality or gross miscarriage of justice. It has been categorically observed that the High Court cannot reappreciate evidence and arrive at a different conclusion in a revision petition filed by a private party, in view of the express bar contained in Section 401(3) Cr.P.C., which prohibits conversion of an acquittal into conviction. The said limitation is indicative of the nature and extent of revisional power itself. Para 12 of the said judgment reads thus: -

“12. We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in reappreciating the evidenc