The discretion to entertain a writ petition should be based on the facts and circumstances of each case, and the alternative remedy is not an absolute bar, especially in cases of fundamental rights violation, jurisdictional issues, or violation of natural justice.

PRADEEP KANT, J.

( 1 ) THE petitioner being aggrieved by an order of removal from service dated August 1, 1997, has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petition was filed on october 13. 1997, on which date the High Court passed an order giving time to the learned standing counsel for seeking instructions on the question of competence of the authority who has passed the order of removal from service.

( 2 ) THE matter was listed for several times and on April 17, 1999, the Court again taking into consideration that since no counter-affidavit has been filed, passed an order that the contention of the petitioner is that he has been removed from service without following the principle of natural justice as the Enquiry Officer although has relied upon the preliminary enquiry report but neither the copy of the report of the preliminary enquiry was furnished to him nor he was allowed to cross-examine the witnesses and that the order of removal was passed not by the competent authority, allowed two weeks time and no more to the State to file counter-affidavit and directed for production of the record also. The order further directed that both the parties to come prepared for final disposal of the writ petition.

( 3 ) LATER on counter-affidavit has been filed by the State to which rejoinder-affidavit has been filed by the petitioner.

( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner reiterated the plea that the order of removal from service has been passed in violation of the principle of natural Justice and that the Director was not the authority competent to pass the impugned order, the submission in nut-shell, thus, was that the order has been passed by an authority who was having no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order and that the same suffers from vice of violation of principles of natural justice also.

( 5 ) A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the State that the petitioner has an alternative remedy under the provisions of the U. P. Public Services Tribunal Act and, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable.

( 6 ) IN response to the aforesaid preliminary objection, the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri ritu Raj Awasthi and Sri Amit Bose who volunteered himself to argue the question, submitted that once the petition has been entertained, the petitioner cannot be relegated to the remedy of the Tribunal after a lapse of three years. It was further submitted that since the order impugned has been challenged on the ground of the competence of the authority who passed the order and also for violation of principles of natural Justice in holding the disciplinary proceedings, the high Court has full jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and alternate remedy would not be a bar.

( 7 ) IN the instant case. It cannot be disputed that at the time of filing of the writ petition this Court did not deem it proper to relegate the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy before the tribunal and that is why time was granted to the learned standing counsel to obtain instructions with respect to the competence of the authority to pass the impugned order. Not only this on april 17, 1999, the Court again took into consideration the pleas raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and after being satisfied that a counter-affidavit would be necessary for adjudicating such pleas granted further time to State counsel to file counter-affidavit.

( 8 ) THE Court also felt satisfied that after filing of the counter-affidavit, the matter may be decided finally and, therefore, gave a direction that both the parties were required to come prepared with the case for final disposal of the writ petition. Thus, it cannot be said that the petition was not entertained by the Court.

( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the State asserted that unless an order of admission has been passed, it cannot be said that the petition has been entertained. The purpose of passing an order of admission which o