Honble Amitava Lala, J.—This case is made out basically for conversion of leasehold ‘Nazul’ land to freehold land along with various other reliefs. Therefore, let us first of all know that is ‘Nazul’? ‘Nazul’ means any land or building which, being the property of Government is not administered as a State property under the control of the Land Reforms Commissioner, or the forest, or the Irrigation Department, or is not under the control of the Military, Postal, Telegraph, Railway or other purely Central Government Department. It means properties i.e. land or buildings in or near towns or villages which have escheated or lapsed to the Government. In further, in absence of appropriate heir, the appropriate State or the Government of India, in an appropriate case became the owner of the land. Article 296 of the Constitution of India speaks about the property accruing by escheat or lapse or as an bona vacantia for want of a rightful owner.

2. Originally the writ petition was filed by the petitioner on 27th January, 1999 prying inter alia for quashing the Government Order dated 1st December, 1998, suitable order for conversion of land after disposal of S.L.P. No. 1157-59 of 1998 filed by the State before the Supreme Court, and orders as regards valuation, stamp duty, etc. The Special Leave Petition arose out of a judgment and order dated 15th October, 1997 passed by the High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32605 of 1991 (Satya Narain Kapoor v. State of U.P. and others). The High Court held therein, apart from other points, ‘Nazul’ land can not be converted to freehold land. Ultimately the Supreme Court set aside the judgment and order of the High Court by its judgment and order dated 26th October, 2004 and remanded the matter to the High Court for consideration afresh. The Supreme Court held that the scope of the writ petition was restricted only in respect of 2 shops not for the entire ‘Nazul’ estate. In case the scope which was wanted to be extended, State should have been put to notice or given adequate opportunity. Some interested parties wanted to get one Government Order dated 1st December, 1998 quashed in the application/s under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court felt that since the order of remand is made, such petition/s be treated to be disposed of without any adjudication on merits. The writ petitioner is at liberty to pursue such other remedy as may be open and available to him and as advised. [See the ratio of 2005 (1) ARC 167, State of U.P. and another v. Satya Narayan Kapoor (Dead) by Lrs. and others].

3. After the disposal of the matter in the Supreme Court, on 25th July, 2005 the petitioner made an amendment application making various prayers about conversion of land, fixation of price, reduction of area and condition of sale, etc. alongwith some earlier prayers, like quashing of the aforesaid Government order dated 1st December, 1998 etc.

4. According to us, the prayers, which are made in the writ petition, are not alien to the writ petition originally filed. It is to be remembered that in disposing writ petitions we normally apply principles of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such Code says that amendment of pleadings can be made at any stage of the proceedings, provided amendment is necessary for the purpose of determining the real question of controversy between the parties. A further proviso is added in the recent amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure that amendment should not be allowed after trial commenced unless compelled. This is not the situation here. Therefore, when we find the amendment, which was sought for, is within the four corners of writ, we do not find any reason to dismiss the same. Principally, law is very liberal on this point. It can not be denied on hypertechnical grounds. It would be generally allowed unless it causes prejudice which cannot be compensated or the opposite party accrued any right by the lapse of time. [See JT 2001 (7) SC 112, Dondapati Na