Hon’ble C.K. Prasad, C.J.—As identical question of law is involved in all these appeals, they have been heard together and are being disposed off by this common judgment.

2. All these appeals have been preferred under Section 260-A (2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act 1961) by the Revenue as well as by the Assessee. It provides for filing of an appeal in the form of a memorandum of appeal within 120 days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the Assessee or the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner. It is an admitted position that all these appeals have been preferred beyond the period of limitation as provided under the aforesaid Section and the appellants have filed applications for extension of prescribed period of limitation and for admission of appeals after condoning the delay. When said applications for condonation of delay were placed for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court, the Division Bench by order dated 20.8.2007 referred the following question for determination by a larger Bench :

“As to whether the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal under Section 260-A (2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as provided under Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963?”

3. Hon’ble the Chief Justice on reference so made, directed the matter to be heard by three Judges’ Bench and that is how, these appeals have come up before us for determination of the aforesaid question.

4. The question so formulated necessitates examination of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act 1963) as also the Act 1961. Section 29 of the Act 1963, which is relevant for the purpose, reads as follows :

“29. Savings.—(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.

(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of “easement” in Section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend.”

5. From a plain reading of Section 29 (2) of the Act 1963, it is evident that where in any special or local law, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by its Schedule is provided, the provisions of Section 3 of the Act 1963 shall apply as if such period was the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Act 1963. It also provides that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Act 1963 shall apply only insofar as and to the extent they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

6. In view of aforesaid, the question which, at the first instance, falls for consideration is as to whether an appeal preferred under Section 260-A (2) of the Act 1961 comes within the ambit of Section 29 (2) of the Act 1963 so as to include the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Act 1963. To come within the ambit of Section 29 (2) of the Act 1963, three main ingredients are required to be satisfied, namely :

(1) The special or local law must provide for a period of limitation for any suit or app