DESAI, C.J. : I agree with my brother S.K. Verma that the first question should be answered in the negative and the second, in the affirmative. I regret that I cannot agree with my learned brother Dwivedi.

2. The U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, No. 3 of 1947 has been enacted "to provide for the continuance during a limited period, of powers" to control the letting and the rent of residential and non-residential accommodation and to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom." The letting is controlled through the provisions contained in Ss. 7, 7-A, 7-D and 7-E, the rent is controlled through the provisions in Ss. 4, 5 and 6 and eviction of tenants is prevented through the provisions in Ss. 3, 7-C, 14 and 15. The preamble only explains why these provisions and other provisions have been enacted; it itself is not an enactment and is not required to be enforced by courts. What is to be enforced by the courts is the provisions contained in the Act and they may resort to the preamble only to remove ambiguities or doubts existing in the provisions. If a provision is clear the preamble becomes irrelevant.

3. In these petitions we are concerned with the provisions relating to the control of letting and the most important provision dealing with this matter is S. 7. Sub-Section (1) of it simply requires notice about an accommodation becoming vacant to be given to the District Magistrate and does not by itself impose any control on letting. A notice is to be given to the District Magistrate so that he may pass an order to control the letting of the accommodation in exercise of the power conferred by Sub-Section (2). The power conferred by Sub-Section (2) is to require by a general or special order, a landlord to let or not to let to any person any accommodation which is vacant, or has fallen, or is about to fall, vacant. The Sub-Section is unhappily worded. There are two orders that a District Magistrate is empowered to pass, (1) an order requiring a landlord to let an accommodation and (2) an order requiring a landlord not to let an accommodation. An order requiring the letting must in its very nature be an order requiring the letting to a particular person. An order prohibiting the letting would ordinarily be an order prohibiting the letting to any person; there would hardly be any occasion for a District Magistrate's prohibiting the letting to a particular person. A general order is an order addressed to all landlords or to a landlord in respect of all accommodations owned by him. A special order is an order to a particular landlord in respect of a particular accommodation that has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant. A special order can require the landlord to let the accommodation to a particular person or prohibit him from letting it to "any person".

There cannot be a general order requiring a landlord to let the accommodation; if nobody wants it, it is not possible for the landlord to let it out. "To let" means to enter into a relationship of landlord and tenant through a contract and, as every contract requires the consent of the parties, there cannot be a letting by a landlord unless there is a person willing to be a tenant. Consequently a landlord cannot be ordered just to let his accommodation; if a person wants to take it on lease the landlord may be ordered to let it to him, but a general order "let it to any person" cannot always be complied with by the landlord and could not, therefore, he within the contemplation of the legislature. The words "to any person" cannot always go with the words "to let" and also with the words 'not to let'. An order "Let to any person" does not, as explained above, make much sense and does not appear to have been within the contemplation of the legislature. As far as prohibition is concerned, the legislature seems to have contemplated the order "Do not let to any person without my permission" rather than an order "Do not let to a particular person without my permis