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2012 Supreme(All) 2980
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Sudhir Agarwal, J.
Satendra Pal Singh -Appellant
Versus
Dwarika Das and Others -Respondent
C.M.W.P. Nos. 58850, 58851 and 58852 of 2012
Decided On : 08-11-2012
Counsel for the Petitioner: Rishi Chaddha.
Counsel for the Respondents: None.
Headnote:
Rent Note - Registration of Lease - Indian Stamp Act, 1899 - Summary of Acts and Sections: Section 2(16) of Indian Stamp Act, 1899; Section 2(14) of Indian Stamp Act, 1899; Section 35 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899; Section 17(1) and Section 49 of Indian Registration Act, 1908 - The court discussed the definition of 'lease' under Section 2(16) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the requirement of registration under the Indian Registration Act, 1908. It emphasized the distinction between the implications of the two acts and the specific provisions applicable in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The court also referred to various judgments and their applicability to the present case, ultimately concluding that the rent note in question was not compulsorily registrable and could not be excluded from evidence.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner challenged the eviction decree based on default in rent payment, arguing that the unregistered rent note could not be relied upon for any purposes, including collateral purposes. The court analyzed the definition of 'lease' under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the requirement of registration under the Indian Registration Act, 1908. It also considered the sufficiency of stamp duty on the rent note and the specific provisions applicable in the state of Uttar Pradesh.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the rent note in question was not compulsorily registrable and could not be excluded from evidence. It also noted that the judgments of the lower courts contained concurrent findings of facts demonstrating default in payment of rent by the petitioner, leading to the liability to vacate the accommodation.
Issues: The issues revolved around the admissibility of the unregistered rent note as evidence, the requirement of registration under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, and the sufficiency of stamp duty on the rent note. The court also addressed the findings of the lower courts and the scope of judicial review in such matters.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the analysis of the specific provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the Indian Registration Act, 1908, as applicable in the state of Uttar Pradesh. It emphasized the limited scope of judicial review and the principles governing the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the writ petitions, finding no justification warranting interference with the orders/judgments impugned in the case.
1. Heard Sri Rishi Chadha, learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.
2. In all these three writ petitions the issues of facts and law are common and, therefore, Sri Rishi Chadha, learned counsel for the petitioner, has addressed this Court by treating Writ Petition No. 58850 of 2012 as the leading case but covering all the three cases and the same are being decided by this common judgment.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner assailing the impugned judgments dated 11.11.2003 and 28.07.2012 whereby both the courts below have passed decree for eviction of petitioner-tenant from the shop(s) in dispute on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent, contended that the courts below have relied on an unregistered rent note for collateral purposes, i.e., for determining the rate of rent payable by petitioner though it being an unregistered document, could not have been relied on for any purposes including collateral purposes. He referred to the definition of "lease" in Section 2(16) of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1899") and contended that even a unilateral document, namely, "Kubuliat" is included therein. The mere fact that the rent note was a unilaterally executed document, would make no difference in order to bring it within the ambit of definition of "lease" and, therefore, as required under Section 35 of Act, 1899 unless the document is duly stamped, it would not be taken into consideration for any purposes whatsoever. Reliance is placed on the Apex Court's decisions in Mohan Lal Vs. Anandibai and others, AIR 1971 SC 2177; M/s Bajaj Auto Limited Vs. Behari Lal Kohli, AIR 1989 SC 1806; Avinash Kumar Chauhan Vs. Vijay Krishna Mishra, AIR 2009 SC 1489 and decisions of other High Courts in Ganpat Mal Dhariwal Vs. Sukhraj, AIR 2001 Raj. 372; Smt. Bidya Devi Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Allahabad and others, AIR 2004 Cal. 63; Ram Abatar Mahato Vs. Sm. Shanta Bala Dasi, AIR 1954 Cal. 207. He also attempted to distinguish decision of this Court in Nawal Kishore Varshney Vs. Xth Additional District Judge, 2012 ADJ(6) 645 relied by courts below and contended that therein the Hon'ble Court has simply observed that the document is unilaterally signed, would not qualify to be a "lease" though this finding and inference is in the teeth of Section 2(16) of Act, 1899 which defines "lease".
4. Having gone through the record and after giving my anxious thoughts to the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, I find myself unable to accept the same.
5. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that a document, even if executed unilaterally, would qualify the definition of "lease" and unless registered it cannot be looked into at all. The definition of "lease" contained in Section 2(16) of Act, 1899, reads as under:
"2(16) "Lease" means a lease of immovable property, and includes also--
(a) a patta;
(b) a Kabuliyat or other undertaking in writing, not being a counterpart of a lease, to cultivate, occupy, or pay or deliver rent for, immovable property;
(c) any instrument by which tolls of any description are let;
(d) any writing on an application for a lease intended to signify that the application is granted;"
(emphasis added)
6. It cannot be doubted that definition of "lease" under Act, 1899 is for the purpose of attracting provisions of chargeability of duty on an "instrument" under the said Act. The term "instrument" is also defined in Section 2(14), which reads as under:
"2(14). "Instrument" includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or record;" (emphasis added)
7. Item 35 Schedule 1 of Act, 1899 provides the determination of duty on an "instrument", namely, "lease". For the moment I need not to doubt whether the "rent note" in dispute in the present case, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-8 to the writ petition No. 58850 of 2012, may quality the definition of
