JUDGMENT :

1. Heard Mr. Pritish Kumar, Mr. Amal Rastogi and Mr. Prashasht Puri, learned counsels for applicant(s) and Mr. Sandeep Dixit, Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Radhika Verma, Mr. Samir Om, Mr. Bhanu Bajpai as well as Mr. Mukund Tewari, learned counsel for opposite parties.

2. Issue under consideration is with regard to extension of time under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1996) with the question involved being :-

Whether the concept of 'Court' as envisaged under Section 29A read with Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1996 would include a High Court not having original civil jurisdiction as in the case of Allahabad High Court?

3. A preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of this Application for extension of mandate under Section 29A of the Act of 1996 has been taken by opposite parties to the effect that such an application would be maintainable only before the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district or to a High Court which exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration as if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit but since the Allahabad High Court does not exercise such original civil jurisdiction, the application would be cognizable only before commercial court and not the Allahabad High Court.

4. Mr. Sandeep Dixit, Senior Advocate expounding the aforesaid proposition has raised the following arguments:-

(i) Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1996 clearly indicates the definition of 'Court' to be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and would include the High Court only in case such a High Court is exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction also having jurisdiction to decide questions forming subject-matter of arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit. It is submitted that as such in view of clear definition of the term 'Court', the said term indicated in Section 29A of the Act of 1996 would be referable to such a definition whereby an application preferred under Section 29A of the Act in the State of U.P. would be maintainable only before principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, which in this case would be the commercial court and not the High Court.

(ii) There being no ambiguity in the definition of term 'Court' as indicated in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1996, no original jurisdiction can be ascribed to Allahabad High Court and as such it is only the principal Civil Court where such an application would be maintainable.

(iii) That definition of 'Court' as per Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1996 has to be maintained with regard to provisions of the Act of 1996 and cannot keep changing with each Section.

(iv) Once an appointment of Arbitrator has been made under Section 11(6) of the Act, High Court would become functus officio whereby the proceedings would come to an end and cannot be carried further to include extension of mandate under Section 29A of the Act.

(v) That there is no provision for bifurcation under Section 29A of the Act with regard to arbitrators being appointed mutually or by intervention of Court under Section 11(6) of the Act of 1996.

(vi) Analogy has been drawn where arbitrator is appointed under Section 11(6) of the Act of 1996 and an award is passed, the same is challengeable only before the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act and for such purpose, the High Court cannot be considered to be 'Court' having original jurisdiction.

(vii) That even in case of termination of mandate where an application is required to be filed under Section 14 of the Act, the same is also maintainable only with the commercial court and not the High Court and same analogy would be applicable in case of extension of mandate under Section 29A of the Act.

(viii) Distinction under Section 10(2) and Section 10(3) of the Commercial Courts Act, 201