IMPORTANT POINT
The court emphasized that interim mandatory injunctions should not create a new state of affairs that did not exist at the time of the suit, and the plaintiff's actions constituted a serious abuse of the court's process.

JUDGMENT :

J.J. Munir, J.

1. This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of an appellate decree passed in proceedings under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short, 'the Code').

2. The plaintiff, Abdul Shakoor, instituted Original Suit No.275 of 1988 before the Court of Munsif, Sambhal (now Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Sambhal), praying that a permanent injunction be granted against the defendant, Khursheed Khan, restraining him from interfering with the plaintiff raising construction over the suit property, himself taking possession of it or raising construction thereon or interfering in any manner with the plaintiff's possession therein.

3. It is pleaded by the plaintiff-appellant (for short, 'the plaintiff') that he is the owner in possession of a plot of land, bearing Khasra No.109/3, admeasuring 14 decimal, situate in Village Jalal Khan, acquiring his title through a sale deed dated 29.05.1985 executed by its former owner, Gayasuddin in the plaintiff's favour. The plaintiff's further case is that some 200 eucalyptus trees are standing on the suit property. The plaintiff sought permission of the Municipal Board, Sambhal to raise constructions on the said property, submitting a plan for the purpose. The plan submitted was objected to by the defendant, urging a case that the defendant is the owner of Khasra Nos.109/1 and 109/2, admeasuring 32 decimal. The plaintiff's case pleaded in the plaint is that the defendant is owner in possession of Khasra Nos.109/1 and 109/2. Khasra No.109/3 is adjacent to the road and the said fact had allured the defendant into harassing the plaintiff. The defendant filed a suit for injunction, bearing O.S. No.86 of 1987, Khursheed Khan vs. Abdul Shakoor, before the Court of Munsif, Sambhal, which is pending. The said suit was instituted with a case that the suit property is part of Khasra No.109, seeking a relief that the plaintiff may not take possession of a specific portion of Khasra No.109 or raise constructions over any specific part thereof. The plaintiff's further case is that before the plaintiff purchased the suit property, Khasra No.109 had been divided and separately entered in the revenue papers in order to obviate any dispute between the purchasers of its different parts. The plaintiff had purchased the suit property for a sum of Rs.20,000/- admeasuring 14 decimals whereas the defendant purchased 32 decimals for a sum of Rs.10,000/-. The defendant on 26.10.1988 brought forth some masons and labourers, who attempted to lay a foundation for construction in the suit property without authority. It is the plaintiff's case that on the other hand the defendant resists the plaintiff raising constructions in the suit property, preventing him from doing so over his own land. It is on the basis of aforesaid case pleaded that the permanent injunction, above detailed, was sought by the plaintiff.

4. The defendant put in a written statement, pleading a case that the sale deed in the plaintiff's favour is void and not binding upon him. Khasra No.109 was never partitioned by any Court of competent jurisdiction. The said khasra has been wrongly divided against the survey rules. The defendant was delivered possession of the land adjacent to the road by his vendor and since the time of purchase, he is in possession of the said part of the khasra. The eucalyptus trees, standing on the suit property, were planted by the defendant. The plaintiff has caused a loss of Rs.25,000/- to the defendant by destroying the potato crop and water restraint. The further plea raised is that the suit deserves to be stayed under Section 10 of the Code on account of pendency of the earlier suit brought by the defendant, bearing No.86 of 1987 between the same parties, relating to the same property. It is also the defendant's case that the suit is barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and liable to be dismissed.

5. The suit did not run its full course, as would presently be seen. The plaintiff move