Cruelty in matrimonial law encompasses both physical and mental aspects, with the impact on the aggrieved spouse being crucial for determining divorce.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard Shri Deepak Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri Manish Tandon, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. Present appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, arising from the judgement and order dated 22.02.2013 passed by learned Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Kanpur Nagar, in Original Suit No. 175 of 2006 (Ajat Shatru v. Smt. Tripti Singh), whereby the learned trial court has dissolved the marriage between the parties without making any provision for permanent alimony etc.

3. The marriage between the parties was solemnised on 17.04.2002. A son is born to the parties. He has attained the age of majority. According to the respondent, the appellant deserted his company on 12.02.2006. In any case the parties have not revived the relationship since then. The divorce suit was instituted by the appellant in the year 2006. The plaint was amended vide order dated 02.07.2011. By means of the amendment made, the respondent alleged cruelty arising from false criminal case lodged by the appellant against the respondent and his family members being Case Crime No. 60 of 2008 at P.S. Mahila Thana, District Kanpur Nagar, under Sections 498A, 323, 504 and 506 I.P.C. read with Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act making allegation of demand of dowry against the respondent and his parents. It is a fact that the appellant's parents were arrested and later on enlarged on bail arising from that criminal prosecution lodged by the appellant. Here it may also be noted, the appellant has done her Doctorate of Philosophy (Ph.D.) and was earning Rs. 10,000/- per month by giving tuition classes while the respondent has completed his Master of Business Administration (MBA) as also certificate in Microsoft Certified Solutions Developer (MCSD) and was working in Delhi as Senior Manager.

4. In the first place, F.I.R. was lodged six years after the marriage and second it was lodged almost two months after the divorce suit had been instituted by the appellant. Critically, it is an admitted fact that the respondent and his parents have been acquitted in the criminal case. At the stage of evidence, the appellant could not support the F.I.R. allegations and she turned hostile. Seen in that light, a specific pleading of cruelty did exist. The act of cruelty of causing arrest of the parents of the respondent on false allegation of criminal offence, was proven.

5. By way of justification, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant was forced to lodged the criminal case arising from cruelty and indifferent/rude behaviour faced by her in her matrimonial life. At the same time, it could not be disputed by him that allegations levelled in the F.I.R. were never proven. Rather, on the own testimony of the appellant not supporting the F.I.R. allegations and for reason of her turning hostile at the criminal trial, the respondent and his parents came to be acquitted by the learned trial court, but not before suffering arrest at the stage of investigation arising from (false) accusations made in the F.I.R. as may have been supported through oral statements made during investigation. That judgement dated 26.11.2013 in Case No. 322 of 2012, has attained finality.

6. At the same time, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant had turned hostile only to allow for a chance of her marriage to survive. In that, he would submit that a compromise has been entered between the parties whereunder the respondent agreed to revive the marriage between the parties subject to the appellant withdrawing from the criminal case and also withdrawing from proceeding instituted by her seeking maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. However, the respondent developed dishonest intent and did not revive the matrimonial relationship between the parties after the criminal prosecution had been dropped.

7. On repeated queries, learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any pleading o