Cruelty in matrimonial law is assessed based on its impact on the aggrieved spouse, requiring a subjective evaluation of circumstances rather than a mere objective standard.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard Sri Rakesh Pande, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Vishakha Pande, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Ramesh Singh Kushwaha, holding brief of Sri Ashish Kumar Nagvanshi, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. Present appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the Family Court Act arising from judgment and order dated 14.05.2013 passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Varanasi in Matrimonial Case No. 147 of 2002 (Brahma Dayal Singh Vs. Smt. Meena Singh). By that order, the learned Court below has dismissed the divorce case instituted by the present appellant.

3. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the respondent and also perusal of record, we find no good ground to offer any interference in the present proceeding. Divorce had been sought on ground of cruelty. As the basis of that allegation, it was disclosed to the learned Court below that the parties were married on 13.05.1987. A daughter was born to them on 5.12.1994. The parties continued to cohabit intermittently upto 8.5.2001, when the respondent is described to have left for her parental home, never to return. As to the reasons for intermittent cohabitation and parting of ways, it was asserted that the permanent address of the appellant is in the State of Bihar. At the time of their marriage, the appellant was a student. He was studying at Allahabad. Thereafter, he secured appointment with the Indian Army as a Translator, in 1993. Since then, he remained posted at Kanpur. It was the appellant’s case that his sister was married and his parents were ageing. In those circumstances, the appellant had expected that his wife i.e. the respondent, may continue to reside with the appellant’s parents at their parental home in Bihar, so that due care may be taken of the ageing parents of the appellant. It is in that context that the parties appeared to have cohabited intermittently till 2001. At the same time, it was not the appellant’s case that the parties ever cohabited at Kanpur, where the appellant remained posted since 1993. Merely because the respondent may have refused to continue to live at the parental home of the appellant in the State of Bihar, away from the appellant, who was living in Kanpur in connection with his work, may never amount to cruelty of the kind and degree as may enable the appellant to seek dissolution of his Hindu marriage.

4. It was not the case of the appellant that he ever stayed with the respondent at Bihar to take care of his parents. What exact arrangement may be desired by individual members of the society in relation to their matrimonial relationship, may not be prescribed or governed or dictated by Courts. At the same time, while the appellant may have felt morally obligated to take care of his ageing parents and may have found himself incapable of discharging that moral obligation for reason of his work at Kanpur. Merely because the respondent may have found it difficult to continue in that status i.e. live at Bihar hundreds of kilometers away from the respondent to take care of her ageing in-laws, may not be construed at cruelty.

5. In N.G. Dastane (DR) Vs. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326, the Supreme Court observed:

“31.............

The inquiry therefore has to be whether the conduct charged as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. It is not necessary, as under the English law. that the cruelty must be of such a character as to cause “danger” to life, limb or health or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. Clearly, danger to life, limb or health or a reasonable apprehension of it is a higher requirement than a reasonable apprehension that it is harmful or injurious for one spouse to live with the other.

32. One other matter which needs to be clarified is that though under Section 10 (1) (b), the apprehension of the petitioner that