Cruelty in matrimonial law is subjective and must be assessed based on its impact on the aggrieved spouse, rather than rigid standards or expectations.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard Sri Deep Chandra Joshi, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri D.K. Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. Present appeal has been filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act arising from judgment and order dated 25.9.2008 passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Moradabad, whereby the learned Court below has dismissed Matrimonial Case No. 449 of 2007 (Jyotish Chandra Thapliyal Vs. Smt. Deveshwari Thapliyal).

3. Perusal of the record reveals that the divorce was sought on the ground of cruelty, set up by the appellant. According to the appellant, the respondent practised cruelty in having refused to discharge her moral duty to take care of the aged parents of the appellant. In that regard, it is the admitted case of the appellant (as recorded by the learned Court below in the impugned order) that the appellant used to live away from the respondent while serving as a police official in the State Police. Thus, the appellant nowhere stated that his aged/retired parents were living with the respondent and in that the respondent refused to take care of her in-laws. On the contrary, the appellant himself set up a case that he used to live separately from the respondent while he expected his wife to stay with her in-laws, all throughout so that the appellant's parents may be well taken care of.

4. In the first place, allegation of the daughter-in-law having failed to take all care of her in-laws is a subjective fact. What level of care was necessary or required or desirable, was never established by the appellant. In any case, no inhuman or cruel behaviour was ever pleaded by the appellant as may have established the allegation of cruelty necessary to be proved for dissolution of marriage. Mere failure to take care of aged parents of a spouse that too when the spouse had chosen to live away from his matrimonial home, may never amount to cruelty. What exact situation may prevail in each household is not for the Court to examine in detail or to lay down any law or principle in that regard.

5. Suffice to note that cruelty though available as a ground for dissolution of marriage, there is no straight jacket formula to establish the same.

6. In N.G. Dastane (DR) Vs. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326, the Supreme Court observed:

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The inquiry therefore has to be whether the conduct charged as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. It is not necessary, as under the English law. that the cruelty must be of such a character as to cause “danger” to life, limb or health or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. Clearly, danger to life, limb or health or a reasonable apprehension of it is a higher requirement than a reasonable apprehension that it is harmful or injurious for one spouse to live with the other.

32. One other matter which needs to be clarified is that though under Section 10 (1) (b), the apprehension of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the other party has to be reasonable, it is wrong, except in the context of such apprehension, to import the concept of a reasonable man as known to the law of negligence for judging of matrimonial relations. Spouses are undoubtedly supposed and expected to conduct their joint venture as best as they might but it is no function of a court inquiring into a charge of cruelty to philosophies on the modalities of married life. Some one may want to keep late hours to finish the day's work and some one may want to get up early for a morning round of golf. The court cannot apply to the habits or hobbies of these the test whether a reasonable man situated similarly will behave in a similar fashion.

“The question whether the misconduct complained of constitutes cruelty and the like for divorce purposes is determined primarily by its effect upon the particular person complaining of t