High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
S. C. PANDEY
RAM SHIROMANI MISHRA - Appellant
Versus
SHIV MOHAN SINGH - Respondents
C. R. 1847 Of 1995
Decided On : 10/03/1996
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - APPLICATION OF LIMITATION ACT - APPLICABILITY OF ORDER 43 OF C. P. C. - APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 123 OF LIMITATION ACT - APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 12 AND SECTION 5 OF LIMITATION ACT - SETTING ASIDE OF EX PARTE AWARD - PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED.
Fact of the Case:
The applicant filed three applications supported by affidavits for setting aside three ex parte awards dated 4-7-1984, passed against him in favour of the non-applicants in Claims Tribunal Cases No. 126/89, 131/89 and 127/89 respectively. The applicant claimed that he was not served with the summons in above three cases and, therefore, he was unaware about pendency of any claim against him. He received notices for appearance before the Tribunal in respect of the ex parte awards which were sought to be executed by the claimants on 8-2-1995. The Claims Tribunal dismissed the three applications for setting aside the three ex parte awards without recording any evidence or making enquiry in each case as to whether the summons was served upon the applicant.
Finding of the Court:
1. The revision is maintainable as Order 43 of C. P. C. is not applicable to proceedings before Motor Vehicles Claims Tribunal. Rule 240 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 expressly states that unless otherwise provided in the Act or in those Rules, no orders of the First Schedule of C. P. C. shall be applicable other than those mentioned in the list. The intention of the Rule Making Authority is explicit. It did not want to burden the procedure of Claims Tribunal with all the provisions of First Schedule of C. P. C. Therefore, only a chosen few orders have been mentioned in Rule 240 of the Rules. 2. Article 123 of Limitation Act does not apply to an application for setting aside an award given ex parte under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to an application for setting aside an ex parte award. This may appear to us an astonishing conclusion, but for the fact, the legislature or the Rule Making Authority under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has omitted to provide for any limitation for filing an application for setting aside an ex parte award. 3. Assuming that Article 123 of the Limitation Act applies, then the applicant is entitled to exclude the time requisite in obtaining the copy of the award. This is also clear from the definition of application in the Limitation Act. Section 12 (4) of Limitation Act cannot be confined to application for setting aside an award under the Arbitration Act at one for the reason the word 'award' has not been defined under the Limitation Act. There is no contrary indication in the context to hold that Section 12 (4) is confined to a particular kind of award. 4. The applicant has shown sufficient cause under Section 5 of Limitation Act and the trial Court should have condoned the delay, for the reason, he was advised to obtain certified copies of the awards in question and his counsel thought this time for obtaining certified copy is to be excluded.
Issues: 1. Whether revision is maintainable? 2. Whether Article 123 of Limitation Act applies to an application for setting aside an award given ex parte under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988? 3. Whether the applicant is entitled to exclude the time requisite in obtaining the copy of the award? 4. Whether the applicant has shown sufficient cause under Section 5 of Limitation Act?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Rule 240 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 expressly states that unless otherwise provided in the Act or in those Rules, no orders of the First Schedule of C. P. C. shall be applicable other than those mentioned in the list. The intention of the Rule Making Authority is explicit. It did not want to burden the procedure of Claims Tribunal with all the provisions of First Schedule of C. P. C. Therefore, only a chosen few orders have been mentioned in Rule 240 of the Rules. Once this aspect of the Rule 240 is borne in mind, it would be crystal clear that the Rule Making Authority omitted application of Order 43. Rule 1 of C. P. C. to the cases under Claims Tribunal. The omission deliberate or otherwise has to be respected. There is no other provision of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for short) or the Rules which makes Order 43 of C. P. applicable. 2. The Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to an application for setting aside an ex parte award. This may appear to us an astonishing conclusion, but for the fact, the legislature or the Rule Making Authority under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has omitted to provide for any limitation for filing an application for setting aside an ex parte award. 3. Section 12 (4) of Limitation Act cannot be confined to application for setting aside an award under the Arbitration Act at one for the reason the word 'award' has not been defined under the Limitation Act. There is no contrary indication in the context to hold that Section 12 (4) is confined to a particular kind of award. 4. The applicant has shown sufficient cause under Section 5 of Limitation Act and the trial Court should have condoned the delay, for the reason, he was advised to obtain certified copies of the awards in question and his counsel thought this time for obtaining certified copy is to be excluded.
Final Decision: The impugned orders, dated 22-9-1995, in Civil Revisions Nos. 1847/ 96, 1848/96 and 1849/96 are set aside. The revisions in each case succeed. They are, therefore, allowed with costs.
( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against the order dated 22-9-1995, passed by IIIrd Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Satna in M. J. C. No. 28/95. The disposal of this revision shall also govern the disposal of two connected revisions, Civil Revision Nos. l848/96 and 1849/ 96.
( 2 ) THE applicant filed three applications supported by affidavits of even number for setting aside three ex parte awards dated 4-7-1984, passed against him in favour of the non-applicants in Claims Tribunal Cases No. 126/89, 131/89 and 127/89 respectively. The case of the applicant was that none of the summons in above three cases was served upon him. Therefore, he was unaware about pendency of any claim against him. For this reason he remained absent and three ex parte awards, dated 4-7-1994, were passed against him in his utter ignorance. He received notices for appearance before the Tribunal in respect of the ex parte awards which were sought to be executed by the claimants on 8-2-1995. In this connection, he went to the court on the date fixed in the three notices on 8-3-1995 and upon inspection of record of cases, mentioned in the aforesaid notices, he came to know about the ex parte awards in each case. Thereafter, he applied for the certified copies of the three awards on 9- 3-1995 in each case. After obtaining the certified copies of the ex parte awards, he filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of C. P. C. for setting aside the ex parte awards on 17-4-1995. He stated in his applications under Order 9, Rule 13 of C. F. C. in each case that he knew about the passing of ex parte awards on 8-3-1995. Then he also explained in applications under Section 5 of Limitation Act supported by an affidavit in each case that if we exclude the time for obtaining the certified copies in each case, then his applications for setting aside the ex parte awards would be within 30 days from the date of the knowledge of these awards, i. e. 8-3-1995. In the alternative, it was pleaded that the time requisite for obtaining the certified copies in each case should be excluded and it be held that there was sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of Limitation Act for not filing the applications under Order 9, Rule 13, of C. P. C. within the period of limitation of 30 days. Apart from the question of limitation, the applicant took a plea on merits in each case that it was upon inspection of the record that he came to know that some Advocate appeared on his behalf and subsequently he did not appear before the Claims Tribunal in each case. That is why three ex parte awards were passed against him in each case. The applicant denied that he was served with the summons of the Claim Cases. He further denied that he had engaged any Advocate on his behalf in the three claim cases. He, therefore, prayed for setting aside ex parte awards in each case.
( 3 ) THE non-applicants denied the entire claim of the applicant on merits as well as contested his claim on the ground that all the three application for setting aside the three awards are barred by time.
( 4 ) THE Claims Tribunal without recording an evidence or making enquiry in each case as to whether the summons was served upon the applicant assumed that the applicant was served and represented. It also held that the three applications were barred by time. Accordingly, it dismissed the three applications for setting aside the three ex parte awards.
( 5 ) THE applicant has approached this Court under Section 115 of C. P. C. assailing the findings of the Claims Tribunal, Satna as unauthorised and unwarranted under the provisions of Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. read with Rule 240 of Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 (henceforth 'the Rules' ).
( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the non-applicant No. 1, Shri R. P. Agrawal has, however, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of those revisions. According to the learned counsel for the non-applicant No. 1, the applicant should have filed appeals
The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. M/s. Madanlal Dan and Sons Bareilly
Gitabai v. General Manager, M.P. Roadways
National Insurance Co.Limited v. Lachhi Bai
REFERRED TO : Collector, Customs v. Best and Co.
Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. M/s. Best and Co.
Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar (a Firm)
Oriental Insurance Co.Limited v. Chintaman
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.