The inquiry under the M.P. Public Trusts Act does not require mandatory issue framing, as it is not a civil trial, and the court's discretion in this regard is upheld.

ORDER :

1. The present petition has been filed challenging the order dated 22.7.2022 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Principal District Judge, Tikamgarh in MJC No. 23/2021, which are the proceedings in terms of section 26 of the M.P. Public Trusts Act 1951 (for short, Act 1951). By the said order, the said Court has rejected the application filed by the present petitioners under Order 14 Rule 1, 3 read-with section 151 CPC. The request of the petitioner to frame issues in terms of Order 14 rule 1 to 5 CPC and then to proceed further, has been turned down by the said Court.

2. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a frivolous complaint was filed by the present respondents No. 3 and 4 in the matter of improper management of the Trust known as Shri 1008 Digambar Jain Atishay Kshetra Papora Public Trust, Tikamgarh. The complaint was made to the respondent No. 2 who forwarded the same to the respondent No. 1-Registrar Public Trusts. It is further stated that the respondent No. 1 caused an improper enquiry into the matter and forwarded the matter to the District Judge as per Section 26 of the Act of 1951 to issue appropriate directions. The petitioners moved an application before the District Court to frame issues in the matter and then to proceed further. However, by the order annexure P-1, the District Court has refused to frame issues, on the reasoning that issues are not required to be framed, and the matter will be decided after framing points of determining while passing final orders in the matter.

The parties have restricted their arguments only to the aspect whether issues are required to be framed by the Court while taking up and deciding the proceedings under section 26 of the Act of 1951.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that as per section 28 of the Act of 1951, even the Registrar is having power to take evidence. It is thus, contended, that without framing issues, taking of evidence shall not be practicable.

4. A further argument is raised that as per section 30, provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings under the Act before the Court. Thus, the same procedure as followed in trial of a civil suit has to be followed.

5. It is also argued that as per section 27 (3) of the Act, the order passed by the Court shall be deemed to be decree of the said Court and it shall be appealable only to the High Court. Further, regular suit is barred as per Section 27 (4), for the matters that can be agitated under section 26. Thus, it is contended, summary procedure cannot be followed and the same procedure as trial of civil suit has to be followed.

6. By referring to the definition of “decree” in terms of section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is argued that the decree is expression of final adjudication, hence, by whatever name called, the order of the Court under Act of 1951 is a decree.

7. The learned counsel has relied on Para-41 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramrameshwari Devi Vs. Nirmala Devi & Ors. 2011 (8) SCC 249. The learned counsel also relied on Para-19 of the judgment in the case of Makhan Lal Bangal Vs. Manas Bhunia, 2001 (2) SCC 652, to contend that framing of issues is of paramount importance in the proceedings.

8. Per contra, it is argued by learned counsel for the respondents that the Court in terms of section 26 of the Act of 1951 is required to pass an order. As per Section 2 (14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, “order” is defined and the term “order” does not include “decree.” Thus, the order in proceedings under section 26 may be deemed to be decree of the Court, but it is not a “decree.”

9. It is also argued that the legislature has barred civil suit, only to provide speedy remedy in such matters of management of Public Trusts. If the regular trial procedure like trial of a civil suit is to be followed, there was no point in barring civil suit in the matter. The learned counsel for the respondent have relied on the judgment of the