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ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J.
Basheerunnisa Begum & Ors. —Petitioners
versus
Meer Fazeelath Hussaini & Ors. —Respondents
Civil Revision Petition No. 1758 of 2008
Decided on 23.1.2014

Counsels for the Parties:
For the Petitioners:V.L.N.G.K. Murthy for D.Arun Kumar Doddla, Advocates.
For the Respondent No.5:K.K.Waghray, Advocate.
For the Respondent No.6:N. Ashok Kumar, Advocate.
For the Respondent Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7 & 8: None.

IMPORTANT POINT
It is not necessary that there should be formal petition to excuse delay.

Headnote:(A) Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order 23 Rule 3 read with Section 151—WIthdrawal of suit—When suit is withdrawn by Counsel for plaintiff ostensibly on instructions of a party or on a representation by Counsel for plaintiff that matter was settled out of Court, but it is proved to satisfaction of Court that such instructions from party were non-existent or there was no such settlement out of court as represented by counsel and party was a victim of fraud played on him by counsel, Court can invoke its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC and can set aside order permitting withdrawal of suit. (Para 26)

       (B) Limitation Act, 1963—Section 5—Limitation—Condonation of delay—It is not necessary that there should be formal petition to excuse delay—It is always open to Court or Tribunal to condone delay if person concerned is able to convince that there are justifiable grounds for delay in presenting appeal or petition and that filing of formal petition for excusing delay is not sine qua non for exercise of that power—One has to only see whether reasons given by petitioners in affidavit filed along with IA are convincing and indicate sufficient cause for condonation of delay as per Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 or not. (Paras 28 and 29)

       (C) Limitation Act, 1963—Section 17—Limitation—Exemption—Section 17 of Limitation Act, 1963 specifically provides that where any person having a right to make an application has, by means of fraud, been kept from knowledge of such right on which it is founded, time limited for making such application against person guilty of fraud or accessory thereto shall be computed from time when fraud first became known to person injuriously affected thereby—Petitioners are entitled to calculate period of limitation from date of knowledge of fraud. (Para 47)

       Result: Civil Revision Petition allowed.

ORDER

M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J.— This Revision is filed under Section 115 CPC challenging the orderdt.24.10.2007 in I.A.No.1405 of 2000 in O.S.No.198 of 1986 of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at Hyderabad.

THE PLEADINGS IN THE SUIT OS NO. 198 OF 1986

2. The petitioners are plaintiffs in the above suit. The said suit was filed by the deceased 1st petitioner originally for partition and separate possession of 14/48th share out of an extent of Ac.300.24 gts. in Sy.No.1007 of Kukatpally village, Ranga Reddy Mandal, Andhra Pradesh. The lst petitioner engaged Sri S.M.P. Mathur and S. Bhooma Goud, Advocates on her behalf. In this suit there were originally 8 defendants. Subsequently, defendant Nos.2 and 3 (who are the daughters of the 1st petitioner) were transposed as plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 vide order dt.20.8.1987 in I.A.No.422 of 1986. They are petitioners 2 and 3 herein.

3. The plaint schedule property belonged to late Nawab Rais Jung Bahadur. The 1st petitioner claimed to be the widow of one of his sons by name Mir Mujtaba Hussain, who died in 1972 and contended that on the death of late Nawab Rais Jung Bahadur, the petitioners are entitled to the share of Mir Mujtaba Hussain. Written statement was filed by defendant Nos. l to 4 (i.e., the original defendants 1,45 and 6) opposing the suit claim contending that 1st petitioner’s husband had already sold portion of land to various persons prior to his death in 1960, that the parties had already divided the property and so there cannot be any fresh partition.

4. Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 had given a Power of Attorney to Mir Kazim Hussaini, s/o. late Rais Jung as both of them were not available in India.

THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUIT

5. The 1st petitioner was examined as PWI on Commission on 4.9.1991 and again on 1.12.1991. The Advocate-Commissioner appointed by the trial Court in I.A.No.610 of 1991 to take evidence of 1st petitioner (PW1) filed his report along with a memo on 27.1.1992.

6. The 1st petitioner became sick and was advised to take rest and her daughters i.e. petitioner Nos.2 and 3 advised her to come to U.S.A., where they are residing, for rest and medical attention. So, the 1st petitioner left India on 7.4.1992 informing her counsel Sri S. Bhooma Goud and giving address etc. where she could be contacted, if necessary.

7. On 29.4.1992, the suit came to be dismissed by the trial Court with the following order:

JUDGMENT

“Counsel for plaintiff endorsed as suit is compromised out of court hence to dismiss the suit. Hence the suit dismissed without costs.”

The pleadings in IA No. 1828of 1998 (IA No. 1405 of 2000)

8. I.A. No. 1828 of 1998 was filed under Section 151 CPC by the petitioners before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District through their GP.A. Syed Ali Mohammed to set aside the above order dt.29.04.1992 in O.S.No.198 of 1986. This application was transferred to the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar and renumbered as I.A.No.1405 of 2000.

9. In this application, the petitioners contended that 1st petitioner had executed a GP.A. in favour of one Syed Ali Mohammed on 29.7.1997; that petitioner Nos.2 and 3 were also residing in U.S.A. and had also given a GP.A. to the said person; that all the petitioners were being represented in the suit by Sri S. Bhooma Goud, Advocate; that petitioner Nos.2 and 3 were residents of U.S.A. and the 1st petitioner also left India for U.S.A. on 7.4.1992 as mentioned above instructing the said counsel to contest the suit and giving her contact details with him; that the said counsel never informed the petitioners about endorsing that the suit was compromised out of Court and to dismiss the suit; that 1st petitioner never gave instructions to get the suit dismissed as compromised out of Court; and in fact there was no such compromise at all at any point of time between the parties. The petitioners contended that the 1st petitioner came to India in the last week of June, 1994 a




















































































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