HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Suresh Kumar Kait and N. Balayogi, JJ.
Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan
Waleshan Bahadur —Appellant
versus
Princess Manolya Jah and Anr. —Respondents
F.C.A. Nos.99of 2006 and 131 of 2006
Decided on 27.2.2018
Result: Appeals dismissed with costs.
N. Balayogi, J.—Inasmuch as both these appeals arise out of one and the same judgment and decree, and parties being same, they are heard together and being disposed of by this common judgment:
F.C.A.No.99 of 2006:
2. The appellant/defendant being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 23.06.2006 passed in O.S.No.52 of 1996 by the learned Judge, Family Court, City Civil Courts, at Hyderabad preferred this appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 on the grounds that:
(a) the judgment and decree of the Family Court is contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case; that the Family Court erred in partly decreeing the suit O.S.No.52 of 1996 based on Exs.A.5 to A.8 without considering the objections of the appellant with regard to the admissibility and enforceability of the documents as required under Section 49 of the Registration Act and that Exs.A.7 and A.8 are required to be stamped in accordance with the relevant entries in Schedule 1-A of the Indian Stamp Act and compulsorily registerable under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act.
(b) The Family Court erred in altering the issue as to whether the Agreements dated 9.7.1992 (Ex.A.7) and 18.11.1994 (Ex.A.8) are true, valid and binding on the defendant from the issue originally framed as to Whether the said agreements are valid in law and are enforceable ?. The Family Court erred in holding that the said documents were admissible in evidence under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 without recognizing that Section 14 of the Family Courts Act,1984 only permitted a departure from the ordinary rules of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and not from the mandatory and peremptory provisions respectively of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the Indian Registration Act, 1908.
(c) It is contended that Exs.A.5 and A.6 constitute security bonds if not promissory notes and a charge was created in Ex.A.6 over immovable property over the value of Rs.100/- and hence they are improperly stamped and are inadmissible in evidence.
(d) The Family Court erred in considering the appellants objection that Exs.A.7 and A.8 are not based upon any consideration and are void, being contrary to Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act. Ex.A.7 contemplates gifts for future which are void under Islamic/Mohammedian law and are unenforceable and are required to be registerable under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act.
(e) It is further contended that Exs.A.7 and A.8 were never meant to be acted upon. Ex.A.7 dated 9.7.1992 was during the subsistence of marriage and Ex.A.8 dated 18.11.1994 was before the divorce became final. Therefore it was only a form of security agreed to by the appellant and was not meant to be acted upon. Further Exs.A.7 and 8 are contingent in nature and have become unenforceable in view of the settlement of jewellery and valuables made by the appellant in favour of the first defendant at the time of divorce.
(f) The Family Court completely ignored Ex.B.4 declaration under which the appellant categorically stated that Exs.A.7 and A.8 documents were never meant to be acted upon and were at any rate withdrawn and cancelled.
(g) The judgments cited by the appellant on inadmissibility of the documents constituting Exs.A.5 to A.8 were not considered by the Family Court.
(h) The recitals of the agreements do not entitle the respondents for any perpetual injunction on the suit schedule property and the agreements themselves do not confer any such right or authority on the respondents.
(i) The Family court committed grave error in recasting the issues and in not considering Issue No.6 of the original issues framed on 27.01.1998 and Issue No.1 of the additional issues framed on 19.08.2005.
(j) It is contended that the reliefs originally sought for by the respondents in reliefs (a) to (d) have not been properly valued and paid Court Fee. In respect of the additional relief claimed from reliefs (e) to (k), there is no valuat
Pulluru Vajramma (Smt.) vs. More Agaiah (AIR 1979 AP 2.(Para 23)
Revansiddappa vs. Mallikarjun ((2011) 11 SCC 1.(Para 39)
Phool Patti v. Ram Singh (2009) 13 SCC 22.(Para 40)
Bhoop Singh Case v. Ram Singh Major (1995) 5 SCC 709.(Para 40)
K.Raghunandan v. Ali Hussain Sabir (2008) 13 SCC 102.(Para 40)
Madhvi vs. Pushpendra (2014(1) M.P.L.J. 346.(Para 41)
Romila Jaidev vs. Jaidev Rajnikant (2000(3) Mh.L.J. 468.(Para 42)
Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre ((1986) 2 SCC 614.(Para 43)
Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala ((2009) 4 SCC 94: 2009 (2) Supreme 529.(Para 44)
Revana Siddappa and Another vs. Mallikarjun and Others {(2011)11 SCC 1.(Para 58)
Som Dev and Others vs. Rati Ram and Another {(2006) 10 SCC 788: 2006 (7) Supreme 202.(Para 59)
Golla Dharmanna vs. Sakari Poshetty @ Wadoor Poshetty {2013 (5) ALD 490.(Para 60)
Jupudi Kesava Rao vs. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao and Others {1971 (1) SCC 545.(Para 61)
Bolleddula Lakshmi Devi (Smt.) vs. Bolleddula Papanna and Ors. (2003 (3) ALT 513).(Para 81)
Jamunabai and Anr. Vs. Sharadabai and Ors. (1998 (4) ALT 676).(Para 81)
Rachakonda Ramakoteswara Rao and Ors. Vs. Manohar Fuel Centre and Anr. (2003(2) ALD 638.(Para 81)
M.L.A.Jabbar Sahib v. M.V.V.Sastri (1969 (1) SCC 573).(Para 81)
Mangan Lal Deoshi v. Mohammad Moinul Haque (AIR 1951 SC 11).(Para 81)
Som Dev v. Rati Ram ((2006) 10 SCC 788): 2006 (7) Supreme 202.(Para 81)
Indra Kumar Patodia v. Reliance Industries Ltd. ((2012) 13 SCC 1): 2012 (8) Supreme 205.(Para 81)
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