IMPORTANT POINT
Inherent Power – The Commissions have the inherent power to stay the operation of the impugned order, subject to the condition that the appeal is duly filed after depositing the statutory amount.

JUDGMENT

By Ext.P1 order, the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Kottayam (‘District Commission’, in short) had allowed the complaint filed by the 3rd respondent against the petitioner under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short, ‘Old Act’). Aggrieved by Ext.P1, the petitioner has filed an appeal before the Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Thiruvananthapuram (‘State Commission’, for brevity). The State Commission has admitted the appeal and issued notice to the 3rd respondent. As there is no provision in the Act to stay the operation and execution of the order, the petitioner is precluded from filing such an application. However, the 3rd respondent has filed an execution application before the District Commission to execute the Ext.P1 order. On receipt of the summons in the execution application, the petitioner appeared through counsel and sought time to file her objections. Yet, without affording the petitioner an opportunity to file an objection, the District Commission has issued Ext.P7 non-bailable warrant of arrest. Ext.P7 is ex -facie illegal and erroneous. Hence, the writ petition.

2. When the writ petition came up for consideration on 03.12.2024, this Court had called for a report from the District Commission to ascertain why Ext.P7 arrest warrant was issued despite the petitioner preferring an appeal before the State Commission.

3. Pursuant to the said order, the District Commission has submitted a report stating that the complaint was allowed by Ext.P1 order. Subsequently, the 3rd respondent filed E.A.No.51/2024, alleging that the petitioner has not complied with the order. Consequently, the District Commission issued a summons to the petitioner under Section 72 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (“New Act, for short). Although the petitioner appeared through Counsel, she did not state about the filing of the appeal and did not produce any order staying the operation of the Ext.P1 order. As the petitioner failed to comply with the directions in Ext.P1 order, the District Commission was constrained to issue Ext.P7 warrant of arrest. On 01.08.2024, the petitioner produced the interim order passed by this Court. The District Commission has transmitted the records in the complaint to the State Commission.

4. Heard; the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent.

5. The 3rd respondent had filed C.C.No.73/2018 before the District Commission on 21.04.2018 under Section 12 of the Old Act. By Ext.P1 order, the District Commission allowed the complaint on 25.1.2024, directing the petitioner to pay the 3rd respondent Rs.5,00,000/-. The New Act came into force on 09.08.2019. The petitioner has challenged Ext.P1 order by filing Ext.P2 appeal before the State Commission under Section 41 of the New Act. The petitioner has asserted in Ext.P2 memorandum of appeal that she has deposited Rs.25,000/- before the State Commission as per the mandate under the second proviso to Section 15 of the Old Act.

6. The petitioner contends that since there is no enabling provision, either under the Old Act or the New Act, to stay the operation and execution of the impugned order passed by the District Commission, the petitioner was precluded from filing a stay petition along with Ext.P2 appeal. The only requirement under the Old Act is to file an appeal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order and to deposit 50% of the ordered amount or Rs.25,000/-, whichever is less. The petitioner has complied with the twin conditions. Thus, the operation and execution of the impugned order stand statutorily stayed by operation of law. Hence, the District Commission should not have issued Ext.P7 warrant of arrest.

7. Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 reads thus:

“15. Appeal.—Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order, in suc