ORDER :

1. This is an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking the Court to condone the delay of ‘1100’ days in filing the petition to bring the Legal Representatives of the deceased-appellant on record.

2. Heard Smt. B. Darshini, learned counsel representing the petitioners as well as Ms. Ambatipudi Vaishnavi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

3. Making her submission, learned counsel for the petitioners states that the 1st petitioner is the wife and petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 are the married daughters of the deceased-appellant and as they were not aware of the pendency of the appeal, they could not move an application within time to come on record as legal representatives of the deceased-appellant and therefore, the delay occurred may be condoned. Learned counsel for the petitioners also states that indeed, there is no such delay and they have come on record within time.

4. Vehemently opposing the submission thus made, learned counsel for the respondents states that the appellant died on 07.07.2017 and the present application to condone the delay is moved on 24.11.2022 and therefore, there is about five years of delay in moving the application and thus, the delay is not ‘1100’ days as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the delay is more than 1800 days. Learned counsel also states that the petitioners nowhere mentioned the date on which they came to know about the pendency of the appeal and the application is not moved indicating cogent and convincing reasons. Learned counsel for the respondents also submits that the reason for such delay is not explained in the petition and therefore, the petition is not maintainable.

5. Making her submission that the delay should not be condoned casually, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court which is rendered in the case between Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 wherein dealing at length with regard to the approach of the Courts in condoning the delay and how the expression “Sufficient cause” should be looked into, the Court at Paras 21 & 22 of the order held as follows:

“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3 (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6 (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7 (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9 (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are rel