1. Removal from service for non-disclosure of criminal case involvement despite acquittal — Challenge to termination and appellate orders. (Para 2 , 3 )
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2026 Supreme(Raj) 607
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR
PRAVEER BHATNAGAR, J.
Surendra Singh S/o Harphool Singh – Appellant
Versus
The State of Rajasthan – Respondent
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21768 of 2013
Decided On : 26-02-2026
Important Points
Territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) requires a 'cause of action' to arise within the court's territory. Mere communication of a termination order to an employee's residence does not constitute a cause of action unless the service is an integral part of the underlying dispute.
Subject
Constitutional Law - Writ Jurisdiction
Act Referred
Headnote
(A) Constitution of India - Article 226(2) - Territorial jurisdiction - Cause of action - For a High Court to exercise jurisdiction, the cause of action, wholly or in part, must arise within its territorial limits - ‘Cause of action’ is a bundle of material facts that must be pleaded and proven to entitle the petitioner to relief (Paras 15, 20) - Mere communication of an order of termination at a residential address within a state does not necessarily confer jurisdiction if the service of such notice is not an integral part of the cause of action (Paras 16, 32).
(B) Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings - Situs of cause of action - In matters of termination, the cause of action generally arises where the disciplinary proceedings are initiated, conducted, and concluded, and where the order is passed - Residential address of an employee has no nexus with the disciplinary process and does not constitute an essential fact for adjudication (Paras 32, 33).
Facts of the case:
An employee was appointed to a central force and subsequently removed from service following a departmental enquiry. The enquiry, the initiation of charges, and the final order of removal, along with subsequent appellate and revisional orders, were all passed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The employee challenged these orders in the High Court of the state where he resides, contending that the communication of the impugned orders at his residential address within that state conferred territorial jurisdiction.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the disciplinary proceedings were neither initiated nor conducted within its territorial limits. The communication of the termination order merely provided knowledge of the decision; it did not form part of the bundle of material facts constituting the cause of action. The right to sue had crystallized when the employee was dismissed from service outside the state.
Issues: Whether the mere service or communication of a termination order to a petitioner within the territorial limits of a High Court is sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India.
Ratio Decidendi: Territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 is determined by the place where the cause of action arises. In disciplinary cases, this is where the action was taken. Mere receipt of an order does not create a cause of action in the place of receipt if the underlying dispute and the decision-making process occurred elsewhere.
Result: Writ petition dismissed in limine on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
(B) Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings - Situs of cause of action - In matters of termination, the cause of action generally arises where the disciplinary proceedings are initiated, conducted, and concluded, and where the order is passed - Residential address of an employee has no nexus with the disciplinary process and does not constitute an essential fact for adjudication (Paras 32, 33).
Facts of the case:
An employee was appointed to a central force and subsequently removed from service following a departmental enquiry. The enquiry, the initiation of charges, and the final order of removal, along with subsequent appellate and revisional orders, were all passed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The employee challenged these orders in the High Court of the state where he resides, contending that the communication of the impugned orders at his residential address within that state conferred territorial jurisdiction.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the disciplinary proceedings were neither initiated nor conducted within its territorial limits. The communication of the termination order merely provided knowledge of the decision; it did not form part of the bundle of material facts constituting the cause of action. The right to sue had crystallized when the employee was dismissed from service outside the state.
Issues: Whether the mere service or communication of a termination order to a petitioner within the territorial limits of a High Court is sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India.
Ratio Decidendi: Territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 is determined by the place where the cause of action arises. In disciplinary cases, this is where the action was taken. Mere receipt of an order does not create a cause of action in the place of receipt if the underlying dispute and the decision-making process occurred elsewhere.
Result: Writ petition dismissed in limine on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : M.S. Raghav
For the Respondents: Praveen Singh Rajawat, Munendra Singh Faujdar, Somitra Chaturvedi
For the Appellant : M.S. Raghav
For the Respondents: Praveen Singh Rajawat, Munendra Singh Faujdar, Somitra Chaturvedi
Table of Contents
2. Petitioner claims no deliberate concealment and communication of orders confers jurisdiction; respondents assert no cause of action within court limits. (Para 4 , 7 , 8 , 9 )
3. Territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) determined by cause of action arising, not mere communication or residence. Material facts must have nexus to dispute. (Para 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 32 )
4. Communication of termination order at employee's residence does not constitute part of cause of action for territorial jurisdiction; cause arises where disciplinary proceedings occur. (Para 32 , 33 , 34 )
5. Writ petition dismissed in limine for lack of territorial jurisdiction; liberty granted to approach appropriate forum. (Para 35 , 36 )
6. Does service or communication of a termination order at an employee's residence confer territorial jurisdiction on a High Court under Article 226(2)?
No, unless the communication is an integral part of the cause of action. Generally, cause of action arises where disciplinary proceedings are initiated, conducted, and concluded; mere knowledge or receipt of order is not sufficient. (Para 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 32 , 33 )
7. What determines the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226(2) in service matters?
It is determined by the place where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, based on the bundle of material facts having nexus with the dispute, not merely the location of parties or residence of the employee. (Para 15 , 20 , 32 )
8. Can judgments relying on communication of orders conferring jurisdiction be applied to all termination cases?
No, such decisions were rendered in peculiar factual circumstances, such as custody at the place or absence of prejudice, and do not establish a general rule; ordinary principles of cause of action apply. (Para 24 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 )
JUDGMENT :
PRAVEER BHATNAGAR, J.
1. The present writ petition has been preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking following reliefs:-
“(i) By an appropriate writ, order or direction the impugned termination order dated 21/2/09 and impugned order dated 10/8/09, 11/5/10 & 24/8/11, passed by the respondents be quashed and set aside, and further pleased to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner back on the post of constable (G.D) with all consequential benefits.
(ii) Any other appropriate order or direction which the Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also kindly be passed in favour of the humble petitioner in the interest of justice.
(iii) Cost of the writ petition may also kindly be awarded in favour of the petitioner.”
2. Briefly stated, the petitioner was selected and appointed to the post of Constable (GD) in the Central Reserve Police Force pursuant to a recruitment advertisement. During the course of his service, a show cause notice dated 13.08.2008 (Annexure-1) was issued against the petitioner alleging non-disclosure of involvement in a criminal case, against which the petitioner submitted his reply (Annexure-2).
3. Subsequently, a charge memorandum along with relevant documents was served by Respondent No.5 and a departmental enquiry was conducted under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955. Upon conclusion of the enquiry, the disciplinary authority passed an order dated 21.02.2009, removing the petitioner from the services (Annexure A-3).
Arguments advanced by learned counsel for the Petitioner-
4. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no deliberate concealment on part of the petitioner, as he was unaware of the alleged incident relating to the year 2001 and no criminal case was pending against him at the time of his appointment. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order of removal dated 21.02.2009, preferred an appeal before the Competent Authority contending that his defence and explanation had not been properly considered in the departmental enquiry and the said appeal came to be rejected vide order dated 10.08.2009.
5. The petitioner thereafter submitted a revision petition before the office of I.G. CRPF, inter alia, contending that mere involvement in a criminal case prior to joining service, particularly when the same ends in acquittal, could not justify termination. However, the said revision petition was rejected vide order dated 11.05.2010.
6. It is further averred that the adverse action culminating in the order of removal was founded upon alleged negligence on the part of the police authorities at Jhunjhunu, who forwarded two police verification reports along with reference to an FIR dated 18.07.2005, indicating that a criminal case was pending against the petitioner and FIR was registered under Sections 341 and 343 Indian Penal Code, 1860. However, as per subsequent communication issued by the concerned police authority vide letter dated 21.10.2008, it was clarified that the criminal case had already been adjudicated on 09.11.2001 and that the petitioner had been acquitted by the learned Trial Court. It is further pleaded that at the time of the alleged incident the petitioner was a juvenile and therefore, no criminal case was pending against him on the date of selection. It is contended that he had truthfully filled the relevant columns of the verification form and was not required to disclose any pending criminal case.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though the order of removal dated 21.02.2009 and the subsequent appellate, revisional and review orders were passed outside the territorial limits of this Court, the same were admittedly communicated to the petitioner at his residential address within the State of Rajasthan and, therefore, part of the cause of action has arisen within this jurisdiction. It is contended that under Article 226(2) of
